RCSS-TNLA Conflict: Proxy or mini-Cold War in display?
As 4000 plus refugees count hits the headline due to the armed engagement between the Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta'ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), coupled with seven Shan villagers being killed, reportedly by the Palaung troops, the conflict dimension changed drastically and dramatically.
First, the parliament in Naypyitaw approved the motion to stop the inter-ethnic armed conflict, prompting the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) to take action, asking the RCSS to stand down, stop the offensive and issuing ultimatum to the TNLA that it would be clearing the areas of conflict. Since then the armed clashes was said to have died down, starting from 11 February. But the Tatmadaw, which was tasked to stop the clashes in the said areas delivered fire-fights in the vicinity of Kutkhai and Namhsan areas with the TNLA on 19 and 22 February respectively , according to the Palaung sources.
Again on 19 February, the US Embassy released a statement stating that it is worried of the human rights situation in northern Shan State and that the warring parties, RCSS and TNLA, including the Tatmadaw, to stop the armed engagement against each other. The statement writes:
“The U.S. Embassy is deeply concerned about ongoing clashes in Shan State involving the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), and the military. We are particularly concerned by alleged human rights violations targeting ethnic Shan and Palaung communities. Civilian protection as well as unhindered access for all humanitarian organizations to those affected by the fighting is a fundamental international principle. Offensive military actions undermine the trust necessary to build lasting peace. We urge all sides to exercise restraint and recommit to dialogue so that the peace process may remain on track, and those displaced are able to return to their homes and resume their lives.”
On 21 February, after the emergency United Nationalities Federal Council's (UNFC) four days meeting, a statement was made public. It confirmed the formation of Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) to lead the peace process with the government and strongly condemned the present government and the Tatmadaw for sowing racial hatred among ethnic nationalities.
The fourth and final paragraph of the statement stressed: “We see that the current government and Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) are using the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) as a military and political weapon. We strongly condemn the current government and Tatmadaw’s acts of causing racial hatred among the ethnic nationalities, with the military-political strategy of divide-and-conquer.”
In addition, the RCSS-TNLA conflict becomes more complicated and the UNFC secretary general Khu Oo Reh condemned the Tatmadaw for preparing to launch an offensive against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), according to the recent Mizzima report.
He elaborated: “We cannot see this happening as a simple conflict any more. It is becoming wider and between the Shan and Palaung population, racial (animosity) views are being aired and we are worried this will go on (to escalate).”
He further stressed: “In addition, for one or two days, the Tatmadaw is gearing to start the attack on Kokang (MNDAA) and has even already begun. We consider that (the Tatmadaw) is using the NCA to pressure us in a variety of ways, especially talking peace, while creating problems.”
Parallel to the happening, rumours were making the rounds that the RCSS boss Sao Yawd Serk have been meeting the US and Chinese diplomats, during the third week of February, in Bangkok either to brief them or making a deal, but unclear of what issues might have been in discussion.
Generally it would seem that this inter-ethnic conflict is only to do with competing for area of influence and control. But careful study shows there are a lot more involved in this trajectory.
Now let us delve into it a bit more and do some critical thinking. But first, we need to look at this particular contested area to make a picture, why this has propelled to such a derogatory situation.
Contested areas are where Chinese gas and oil pipelines run through
If one carefully looks at the map, the fighting between the two warring groups, RCSS and TNLA were happening mostly along the Chinese gas and oil pipelines, within northern Shan State.
The TNLA expansion form its original Namhsan, Mantong Townships of Palaung Self Administrative Zone included 8 Townships of Namkham, Namtu , Muse, Kutkhai, Lashio, Nawng Khio, Kyaukme and Man Piang, (Mabein) which are overwhelmingly populated by the Shan, who called themselves as Tai.
The Palaung Self-Administered Zone was created by the 2008 Constitution and is headquartered in the town of Namhsan.
The RCSS, which has its troops presence since 2005 in the mode of roving guerilla units began setting up base camps with increased deployment in contested areas, after the signing of NCA in October last year. However, it is not clear whether such deployment were with the approval of the Burma army or on its own decision. But nevertheless, the clashes between the RCSS and TNLA started, with the ambush of the latter in Namkham area, in November last year. The armed conflict has escalated ever since, sending thousands of refugees fleeing their homestead.
Roughly there are five major interest groups having to do with the recent inter-ethnic conflict. They are RCSS, TNLA, Union Solidarity and Development Party-Military (USDP-Military), the United States, China and the UNFC.
Conflict of interest
The RCSS, which has its base in Loi Tai Leng, across the Thai border of Pang Mapha district, Mae Hong Son Province, has been active also in northern Shan State since 2005. There had been no clashes prior to the signing of NCA October last year, but the armed confrontation only started as of November, when the TNLA attacked its column that was coming back to its base in Namkham.
While the TNLA accused the RCSS for expansion of its operational areas with the help of the Burma army, the RCSS insisted that the areas have been its areas of operation since a decade. But the motive of RCSS for such moves could be more than just this given reason.
First, the TNLA has expanded its reach into mostly Shan or Tai inhabited areas and have been riding roughshod on the population from demanding recruitment for its army to taxation, to the dissatisfaction of the people in the area.
Second, the RCSS and even some of senior member of the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), known as the northern Shan State Army, and many lower ranking Shan soldiers detested the TNLA’s heavy handedness of the Shan population and have been itching to counter it. But since the SSPP is allied to the TNLA through the UNFC, the official policy line is to keep mum on TNLA mistreating the Shan population. It was said that many of the rank and file of the SSPP were quietly and gleefully approving the RCSS undertaking to “teach the TNLA a lesson,” for trying to insert its influence over the Shan population, needless to say of its riding roughshod on the people.
Thus, the actions of the RCSS could have been to protect the Shan villagers on one hand and also expanding its reach on the other, while other benefits deriving from it could also be the real motive behind such undertakings.
The TNLA, which was trained and supported by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and allied to MNDAA and Arakan Army (AA) have been openly siding and fighting along side its allies, has lately received material support from United Wa State Army (UWSA) and as well from China to protect its interest: the gas and oil pipelines, according to Shan sources.
If this is true, it explains the fact why the TNLA has strayed and branched out so widely beyond its traditional stomping ground, into 8 Townships of mostly Shan populated areas with force and vigour.
For the USDP-Military regime, the classic “divide and rule” could be the motive. Pitting RCSS against the hated TNLA, for its alliance with the MNDAA and unspoken collaboration with the UWSA, is an advantage and could even swoop down on both the warring parties, when both are tired and exhausted, according to a senior officer of the SSPP.
The Tatmadaw sees the MNDAA, UWSA and Mong La, also known as National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS), as China's proxies sitting along the Sino-Burma border.
Apart from that it is also in the interest of the USDP-Military clique to clear all armed factions from the vicinity, while all the while it could curry favour indirectly with the super power for standing up to China's proxy, in its mini-cold-war undertaking, within the mode of expansion containment of the regional power.
While the US comes out with a decent, balanced statement that all the warring groups, the RCSS, TNLA and Burma army should stop the war so that democratization could move ahead and human rights violations curtailed, its real motive could be more than this. Its containment of China policy, in the wake of assertive China's ownership claim of South-China Sea, could also play a role in determining the relationship and consideration. But of course only the policy makers in Washington could answer such a question.
As for China, its policy is to benefit from Burma as a whole and not just part of it, which means not only Wa, Kokang or Palaung regions or even the whole Shan and Kachin States are of importance.
It is interested to protect its already finished pipelines, the pending Myitsone dam project, the Letpadaung copper mine and so on, country wide. And thus, securing the pipelines is just a part of its project to satisfy its energy hunger, from a variety of economic investment and interest.
And as such, it is ready to cooperate with any entity to secure the pipelines and the TNLA might have come into question. But whether this has been a wise choice is completely another question.
It now seems, it is having a second thought for betting the wrong horse otherwise, it won't be opening up the venue to talk to the RCSS, even though this rumour could not be confirmed at the moment.
UNFC on its part is more interested to project its political aim of achieving ethnic rights, anchored in the rights of self-determination, equality and democracy within the mould of a genuine federalism. Thus, the RCSS-TNLA conflict is not desirable for fractured ethnic unity is the last thing it wants, because it would work against the alliance interest and the whole ethnic nationalities' aspirations as a whole. So it could be said that achieving understanding between two warring ethnic armies is its ultimate desire, at this juncture.
The UNFC has formed during the recent emergency meeting, a five-men team to particularly handle this RCSS-TNLA conflict.
59(f) Section and maintaining war-footing
On political transition facet, it is becoming clearer that the Aung San Suu Kyi's push to circumvent the 59(f) clause won't be an easy undertaking, even she has sought to buy time to work out a give-and-take accommodation with the military, so that she could take the top job of the country, the presidency.
Apart from the government's mouthpiece, Myawaddy newspaper commentary that the military-drafted constitution should not be altered for eternity, the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing's rejection posture, U Ye Htut, the information minister and witty orator, in an interview with Voice of America during an ASEAN gathering hosted by President Barack Obama in California, said: “If the two sons want their mother to become president, they and their wives can apply for Myanmar citizenship according to the 1982 Immigration Law. This is in fact their family matter.”
Reportedly, it was the first time that a senior government figure had expressly ruled out such a move.
59(f) bars any individual aiming for the top job of the country is ineligible, if his or her immediate family members hold foreign citizenship, including the spouses of the sons or daughters. Suu Kyi's two sons are British citizens.
59(f) is also one component that could be used to turn back the tide of National League for Democracy (NLD) political onslaught, as Tatmadaw considers it is being overwhelmed and might be on the verge of a domino-like scenario, hastening and escalating the military clique's downfall, if Aung San Suu Kyi is allowed to take the presidency.
To fight back on all front and to alleviate this angst the Tatmadaw is keen to create armed conflict or at least to be on war-footing, so that it is seen as an essential saviour of the country from disintegrating and further legitimize its claim to lead the country out of such debacle.
The cases in point here are the Tatmadaw offensive last year in central Shan State against the SSPP that produced thousands of refugees, apart from declaring no-vote areas to the disadvantage of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) for they were its political stronghold; and recent the RCSS-TNLA armed confrontation that has been designed to create an atmosphere of conflict and war-footing, which could be used as an excuse to declare either emergency decree for the particular area or even out right military rule, if and when the Tatmadaw chooses to do so.
Is there a way out?
The catchwords here are “containing racial conflict, peaceful political transition and building genuine federalism” and shouldn't be fuelling a proxy or mini-Cold War of any sort, as outside stakeholders, intentionally or unintentionally, might be suggesting or driving to do so.
The official will of the super power and regional power is known to be the reconciliation and harmony of the people leading to peacefulness and development of the country. If this is the case, the super power should refrain from looking at the Burma's ethnic conflict scenario through the usual containment of China prism and the neighbouring regional power not only just to exploit the country by all means, but also empower it by not taking undue advantage of the conflict parties for its own benefit. It is easily said than done, to put moral ethic ahead of the interest-driven tendency, in realpolitik. But for the sake of the suffering people of Burma, for once the international stakeholders should make altruism and moral principle a priority.
In the same vein, the self-appointed saviour of the nation, the Tatmadaw, should wake up to the reality that it has no right to dictate its “Discipline-Flourishing Democracy” or “Tatmadaw's way to democracy” and thrust down the throat of the people. To put it differently, it should not lay stones on the way to genuine federalism, by blocking Aung San Suu Kyi's path to presidency with 59(f) Section.
The military should not forget that the people has shown that they wanted her to lead and have given their overwhelming mandate of 80% vote in the nationwide election. It is a clear “no” to the continued military self-appointed leading role of the country and an unmistakable, affirmative “yes” to the Aung San Suu Kyi-led NLD. As such, it would do the Tatmadaw good to make it easier for the smooth transition and look at the big picture of reconciliation and development for the sake of people and the country.
Besides, nobody is buying the Tatmadaw's pretext that gradual reform allowed by it is the safe and only way to go about democratization and that it will be the guiding party to determine, whether the country is ripe for fully fledged democracy or not.
Wasn't it the military that had trampled upon the nascent democracy in 1962 and ruled the country through military dictatorship until 2010, when a quasi-civilian Thein Sein regime was installed? With such track record, the military is hardly an institution to oversee the democratic transition. It is better left to the will of the electorate.
Having said that, the super power and regional power should assist Burma to be on its feet again and the USDP-Military clique should give a helping hand to make the democratic transition smoother and faster, for the country and people that have suffered for too long deserves to live a decent life as citizens of the free world, under the democratically elected government.
Tags: Opinion
