To Burma’s Big Power friends: We need your support not meddling



Burma has already been a Cold War battlefield between 1948-1989, which had cost the country tremendous loss in both properties and lives.


It took us two decades plus more to realize the folly in order to launch a peace process 4 years ago which, despite all the obstacles that we have erected by ourselves between us, is still ongoing.
At present, we might say that the process is undergoing a bumpy period even without interference from our “friends.” But when they are “advising” about what we should do and what we should not, things get more complicated as they were during the Cold War.
One friend plays a subtle game. He is a long time foe to the country’s rulers, who has since 2011 become a friend. As years go by, one can’t help but notice that he is becoming more than a friend to our rulers, while at the same time less of it to the non-Burman underdogs. He has been urging the armed resistance movements to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) whether or not it leaves out some of the movements. What he should have done instead is tell the government to make it inclusive.
In the meanwhile, there is the other friend who is not shy about telling us what he wants:
  • On 5 October 2011, there was a murder in cold blood of 13 sailors who were members of the friend’s family on the Mekong. Ambassadors of Burma, Laos and Thailand were then unceremoniously summoned and “asked” to speed up their probe into the killing. The friend’s spokesman himself conceded afterward that his minister “was not completely diplomatic.”
  • Less than two years later in February 2013, there was a meeting between representatives from the government and the armed resistance movements which was hosted by the friend. Everything went right until the draft agreement was read out. Then the friend demanded that some of the draft’s wordings and substance be changed because he didn’t like it, which both surprised and dismayed negotiators on both sides.
  • The latest, but probably not final, straw was when the friend started to insist, both directly and through intermediaries, that we see to it that the other friend is not meddling in our internal affairs.
What it amounts to is that our big friend is telling us only he, and not others, has the right and privilege to have a say in everything we do.
This is simply a demand that our country’s rulers and leaders of the armed resistance movements should not comply. Not because we like the other friend better. But because we want peace, not only among ourselves, but with all our neighbors, far and near.
Moreover complying to this friends’ demand is most likely not going to end the problem. Because more demands will follow until we are completely gobbled up by the friend.
What we all should do instead is that both friends allow us to sort out our differences by ourselves and then support us in whatever agreement we have reached. Burma, being a small country and jammed between big power friends is certainly not going to decide anything that is harmful to anyone of them. Because, no matter how strong and modern our Tatmadaw is, the country and its peoples can only live in peace only if they are friends to all their neighbors, both far and near.


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Why are some groups excluded from Burma’s “inclusive” nationwide ceasefire?



Fifteen ethnic armed groups are expected to be invited to sign Burma’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in the first week of October.


But the other five groups who comprise the membership of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), founded in 2013 to negotiate an end to longterm active conflict with government forces, will be left out of the ceasefire agreement.
Hesitation regarding the signing of the NCA largely stems from an ethnic demand that all ethnic armed forces be allowed to join the ceasefire for it to be truly “nationwide” and “inclusive,” as the agreement has been widely described.
However, the Burma government will only allow groups that have already signed bilateral ceasefires to sign the NCA.
The six organizations excluded from the signing are the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), Arakan National Congress (ANC), Wa National Organization (WNO).
The Burma Army alleges that the three excluded armed groups—the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the ethnic Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA)—are involved in continued clashes with government forces, making them ineligible for participation in the NCA.
If these groups were allowed to sign the accord, they would receive certain benefits reserved for other signatories, including the retaining of arms for self-defense, removal from the national list of unlawful organizations, joint implementation of a code of conduct, joint monitoring of the ceasefire to prevent recurrence of clashes and participation in political dialogue.
The other three groups have been excluded by the government under the pretense that they have no significant armed wings. This includes the Wa National Organisation (WNO), the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) and the Arakan National Council (ANC).
An August 2015 report from Euro-Burma Office (EBO) describes the government’s view of these groups as “not combatants.” It would allegedly remain possible for them to join a political dialogue at a later date. This is somewhat in contrast to a S.H.A.N. report earlier this month revealing government threats to exclude groups from political talks if they refuse to sign the NCA.
As for the other three excluded groups, the AA, MNDAA and TNLA, the EBO report explains government claims that these organizations were formed after the peace process began four years ago. The government view is that “including them will encourage a proliferation of more groups.”
EBO states that the activities of armed groups like the MNDAA “are seen [by the government] as a deliberate provocation to wreck the peace process.”
The Burma Army has stated publicly that they will not accept ceasefire talks with the groups allied with the MNDAA.
On August 5, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA) released a joint statement inviting the government to hold ceasefire talks. They received no response.
It is possible that the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) will be included as a signatory in early October, if it has finalized its own separate ceasefire agreement at the state and union levels.
On September 15, the Myanmar Times reported that the government would eventually allow for the participation of all armed groups, but that such inclusiveness would happen “step-by-step.”
The formalization of such steps for excluded groups is yet to be seen.

By SAI AW / Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.)


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The November elections: What the voters ought not to forget



Once upon a time, when this country was still ruled by elected officials and a coup det’at  was far from the people’s minds, the following story was told and listened (but not heeded):


Youth:   Grandpa, what’s more important between lu (person, what a person is ) and mu (principle)?
Grandpa:   That’s a good question, and I’m happy to answer it. But that horse-drawn carriage that has just passed in front of our house. What a horse! And what a carriage! Who do they belong to?
Youth:   Well, Grandpa. Who can they belong to except Mr X, our one and only millionaire in the village.
Grandpa:   You mean it’s Mr X himself who’s riding it?
Youth:   Oh, no. That’s his son, X Junior.
Grandpa:   And where is he going?
Youth:   To the toddy-palm field to get drunk with his friends, as usual.
Grandpa:   I think Mr X is also using the same carriage sometimes. If he is, where does he go to?
Youth:  To the monastery to listen to the sermons by the abbot or to attend meetings to discuss village affairs. But, Grandpa, why are you asking these questions?
Grandpa:   My dear grandson, I’m not trying to sidestep your questions. On the contrary, I’m just trying to make you understand the difference between lu (what a person is) and mu (principles, policies).
Principles and policies are like that horse and carriage. They may be both beautiful and sturdy. But whether they bring forth good results is up to the person or persons who implement (s) them. If you have a good and able person to implement them you don’t need to worry where these principles and policies will lead to. But, on the contrary, if you have a mischievous and incapable person to implement them, having beautiful-worded super principles and policies won’t get you anywhere.
It is the same with having a good and able person with bad policies.  No matter how good and able the person is, his policies won’t do the countless needy much good.
Youth:   So you mean both lu and mu are equally important, Grandpa?
Grandpa:  Yes, I reckon that’s what I mean.
Youth:  Thank  you, Grandpa.
We hope this time it’s heeded.


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The Peace Process: The Lady enters the fray



You don’t need to be a politician to know Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, under present circumstances, is not going to be our President for the next 5 years.
That wasn’t apparent in March, when the 7th meeting between the government’s Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) and the ethnic armed organizations’ Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) was held. The proposal to amend Article 59 (f) which bars anyone with children holding citizenship of a foreign country was yet to be resolved by the parliament which it did a few months later by rejecting the bill.
On the third day of the meeting, 19 March, Yup Zau Hkawng, the happy-go-lucky leader of the Kachin Peace-talks Creation Group (PCG) was asked on the sidelines, “Who are you going to support for President: U Thein Sein, U Shwe Mann, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, or Senior General Min Aung Hlaing?”
He was anything but hesitant about it. “We don’t know who’s going to be President, do we? “he asks rhetorically. “But I urge everyone to support any candidate that promises continuation of the peace process. Because without peace, this won’t be a country worth living.”
The incumbent who met the 9 top leaders of the EAOs on 9 September in Naypyitaw certainly echoed Yup’s words when he said, “We cannot move democratic transition without having peace.”
Now it looks like the President, who is also the leader of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), isn’t the only one who is working for peace.
Aung San Suu Kyi, his most formidable rival, after years and months of silence on the subject, is coming forth with her position on the peace process.
During her election campaign visit to Taunggyi last weekend, 5-6 September, she had toured two of its townships, where she promised to “prioritize the peace process and dialogue, and immediately work on it,” if her party wins, adding that she would stand by her promise to convene a Second Panglong conference. “We will never break our promise,” she said.
For the non-Burmans, especially the Shans, nothing else is sweeter in their ears than the word “Panglong”, and her resurrection of it is sure to win her votes, not a few if not overwhelming.
She did take her time and timing to say that in public.
In May, her party sent representatives to participate in the informal consultations on the draft Framework for Political Dialogue. Then last month, on 22 August, she received representatives from the Karen National Union (KNU), to discuss the ongoing peace talks.
According to sources close to the KNU, she had made 3 major statements, among others:
  • The NCA should be signed before the elections
  • The Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) should be agreed before the elections
  • The political dialogue (PD) should start after the elections
Taking for granted that the information is correct, it means she wants the first and second phases of the roadmap —NCA signing and FPD drafting —over and done with during the incumbent’s term while he has still a lot of pull with the military.
Which seems to make sense, because overcoming the first two phases might prove to be a bigger challenge to her than the third phase — political dialogue — that may take a while— 5-10 years according to the Senior General — to finish, whether or not she’s the government.
As for the ethnic parties, most if not all, no doubt are for the peace process and Panglong.
All in all, it thus appears whoever is going to win, the peace process is going to win. If so, it is now up to the people to decide which parties — USDP, NLD or the ethnic parties—will not only be working for peace, but also able to pull them through the long hard road to peace in our land.


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The peace process: Say ‘No’ to closed minds



One of the Shans’ most well known politician-writer was Tun Myint Taunggyi aka Tun Myint Lay.
He, in 1957, wrote on the Shan State’s right of secession as bestowed by the 1947 constitution.
There may be those who wish to remain in the Union.
At the same time, there may also be those in wish to secede in order set up their own nations.
Among the pro-Unionists, there may be found two categories:
  1. Those who wish to remain because of self-interest, and
  2. Those who sincerely believe that it is in the interests o the people of their states to remain in the Union.
Similarly, corresponding categories in the opposite camp may be found:
  1. Those who wish to secede due to lack or loss of private interests in the Union, and
  2. Those who sincerely believe that only through secession, will progress and prosperity be worked out for the Shan people.
Accordingly, one cannot at a glance denounce everyone who supports unionism of being opportunists, office seekers, and lacking patriotism. Similarly, one can also not accuse everyone who upholds secession of being traitors and imperialists’ fifth columnists. Instead, each side should be open-minded, respect the right of freedom of thought and expression of other people, give the other side the benefit of the doubt and examine their arguments carefully. People in general must be encouraged to freely and broadly discuss the issue. The decision of the majority must be taken as final.
To me the rise of the secession issue is a most valuable eye-opener for the Shan people. It will also serve as a criterion for Shan democracy. (‘To part or to stay’, 4 April 1957)
Today we are also facing the same kind of situation albeit in a new twist: To sign or not to sign (the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, more commonly known as NCA).
Those who want to sign are being accused as traitors and opportunists lining their pockets with millions of dollars from a certain foreign-supported NGO.
Say no to closed minds
On the other hand, those who are reluctant to sign are being charged as pitheads and puppets of a certain superpower nation.
As could be expected, these often repeated but unverified allegations, in time, became gospels for many. As Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda chief, used to say: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”
Were they true, they would only be for a handful of people on each side. The majority are just who, in accordance with their experience and information available, have decided to stand on the side that they believe is “for the people.”
At this critical hour, slinging stones and mud from afar at each other through mainstream and social media is certainly not going to help. It is high time both sides invite each other, sit at the same table, to sort out the pros and cons of each side’s position. Then we may be able to come to a decision that is indeed beneficial to the people.


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Success of peace negotiations doesn’t rest on who’s right and who’s wrong



Dale Carnegie whose book How to win friends and influence people became a high school text* after Burma’s Independence, had admonished:
When dealing with people, remember that you are not dealing with creatures of logic, but creatures of emotion.
He learned that valuable lesson one night in London, after he unsuccessfully tried to correct a person who cited a quotation from Hamlet and mentioned it was from the Bible. However, the man stuck to his guns and absolutely refused to be corrected.

Carnegie’s friend who was sitting at the same table and was considered an expert on Shakespeare, when asked for his opinion, kicked him under the table and gave his verdict: Carnegie was wrong.
On their way back, his friend told him he was right after all. But he added, “Why prove to a man he is wrong? Is that going to make him like you? Why not let him save his face? Why argue with him? Always avoid the acute angle.”
Carnegie’s counsel: You can’t win an argument. You can’t, because if you lose it, you lose it; and if you win it, you lose it.
He then related about a truck salesman who was continually scrapping with the very people he was trying to do business with. To his credit, he often emerged the winner of his arguments. But there was another result: He wasn’t able to sell any of his trucks to the prospective customers.
So what does that teaches our leaders on both sides who will be meeting tomorrow? It is simple, according to Carnegie: The only way to get the best of an argument is to avoid it.
I remembered it when I was recently told by a friend (I disremember whose side he is on) about a negotiator:
“He is so clever that after he has made his statements, the other side feels trapped on every side. And as you know, sometimes a cornered animal may submit. But more likely it may try to attack you. So the best way to approach the other side is not to lecture the other side, but to call upon the other side’s high self esteem and disarm him.”
Of course, Carnegie has something to say about it: Appeal to the nobler motives.
The reader may also agree that the following quotations from the same book are applicable for our leaders:
  • Begin in a friendly way.
  • Get the other person saying, “yes, yes,” immediately (Start with something that each and both can agree to, he explained, because human beings’ psychological patterns are such, when one says “No”, the entire organism—glandular, nervous, muscular—gathers itself together into a condition of rejection. On the other hand, when one says “Yes”, it will pull itself together into a condition of acceptance.)
  • Never say, “You’re wrong.”
He quoted Lincoln who quoted the age-old maxim that “a drop of honey catches more flies than a gallon of gall.”
There is nothing more to say. Because saying more would amount to lecturing. This editorial is only meant to be a reminder for all of us, not a lecture.
The rest, especially peace which has proven so elusive to the people of Burma, is up to our leaders, each one and all.
May there be peace.

*The text book was translated by the late Premier U Nu.


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What comes after NCA is signed



Most readers may already be familiar with the seven step political roadmap as outlined in the 20 page draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which is expected to be signed early in September, granted everything goes according to the latest revised plan:

  1. Signing of NCA
  2. Drafting and reaching agreement on the framework for political dialogue (FPD)
  3. Launching of political dialogue (PD)
  4. Holding of Union Peace Convention
  5. Signing of Union Accord
  6. Ratification by the Union Assembly
  7. Implementation of the Union Accord
Accordingly, the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) top leaders are scheduled to meet the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw on 25 August in Naypyitaw for a make-or-break rendezvous. By that day, at least two burning questions will already have been answered:
  • How many EAOs are going to sign the NCA
  • The date for the signing ceremony
Many outsiders, and even some insiders, may think the next step is of course the drafting and agreement on the FPD, for which a series of informal consultations has already been held since May.
What will really happen however is the following:
  • Within 24 hours, military forces on both sides will be informed of the signing of the NCA, and an order for cessation of hostilities issued
  • Within 5 days, the NCA will be explained to the military forces on both sides in detail, especially Chapter 3: Ceasefire related matters and Chapter 4: Maintaining and strengthening ceasefire agreements
  • Within 2 weeks the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) will be held between the two sides to form the Union level Joint Ceasefire Committee (JMC) and Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)
  • The JMC will then work out a draft military code of conduct (COC) and a draft Terms of Reference (TOR) for the JICM to deliberate and approve within 30 days (after the NCA signing)
  • As for the UPDJC, its first and foremost job is to draft the FPD and submit it to the JICM for approval within 60 days (after the NCA signing)
  • This will be followed by the launching of the PD within 90 days (after the NCA signing) by the UPDJC
Indeed, once the NCA is signed, there will be no holidays for whoever is involved until the end of the year and whatever is happening (for example, elections) in the rest of the country.


But since we can eat the apple only one bite at a time, the first thing is to see what the EAOs are going to decide during the next three days, 21-23 August, prior to their meeting with the President and the Commander-in-Chief. The undying hope is that it has good news for the people, many of whom think they have already waited long enough.


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Questions for peacemakers



Thanks to you on both sides of the fence, the final Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft is now agreed by all on 7 August. The only question remains is whether there’ll be a signing of it.
newspictures_2013_feb_tiger-as-editor
The Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) plan is as follows, according to insider sources:
  • Each EAO will hold meetings to consider the question
  • They will then hold another summit to jointly reconsider it
  • The top leaders of what are known collectively as the Big Five (Kachin Independence Organization, Karen National Union , Karenni National Progressive Party, New Mon State Party and Shan State Progress Party) are expected to meet the President and the Commander-in-Chief afterward
What will happen after the Big Seven meeting is of course still open to further questions— and arguments.
Some of which are:
Government
·       Signing before the end of August (C-in-C will be traveling abroad, Election campaigns begin in September)
·       Signing before elections
·       Three of the EAOs, (Arakan National Council, Wa National Organization, Lahu Democratic Union) haven’t exchanged fire with the Burma Army. No fire, so no ceasefire necessary
·       As for the other 3 (Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Ta-ang National Liberation Army): AA is part of KIO, MNDAA guilty of “violation of sovereignty”, and TNLA needs to sign bilateral ceasefire first
EAOs 
·       We need time to hold a summit; it is not easy to organize one
·       Signing during the current government’s tenure.
·       They are our people
·       If the 3 are left behind the NCA will be meaningless. Government needs to show more magnanimity
Then there are questions and arguments from the government’s side too.
EAOs
·       President Thein Sein doesn’t deserve credit for the peace process
·       We don’t trust C-in-C Min Aung Hlaing
·       (Wa, Mong La) we don’t need to sign the NCA. We will only join the peace process after the NCA is signed.
·       We want to hold another summit before sending the Big Five to Naypyitaw
·       The Big Five want to meet the President and C-in-C
Government
Who else is?
Who then do you trust?
·       If you don’t, others will also use it as an excuse to skip the NCA
·       Since each EAO will have already met and decided whether to sign or not by that time, is another summit necessary?
·       Is there going to be the signing of NCA afterward?
Of course, there are more questions. But these should be enough for the present.


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The Peace Process: Making the best of both worlds



Once upon a time, three thirsty friends are traveling through a waterless jungle. Then one day they come upon a small pool which has a dead animal in it.

tiger-as-editor
Friend # 1: I’d rather die than drink it. Let’s dig a well instead.
Friend # 2: Why don’t we try to purify the water in the pool as best we can and drink it?
Friend # 3: If we follow # 1, we’ll have clean and cool water. But it will take too long and we won’t have the strength to dig it ad wait until it’s clear and cool.

On the other hand, if we do as # 2 says, then we’ll have water soon enough to quench our thirst, but it won’t be enough to go on. So why don’t we put to use your ideas together? We’ll purify the water in the pool first. Then we’ll have the strength to dig a well and have enough supply of water for the rest of our journey.

It is a good parable that I had listened to when I was a kid. It teaches us that every drastic choice we make has its black and white. While one gives us as short term relief, the other is for a long term settlement. However, what is obvious is that the first choice is meaningless without the second, and the second could not be accomplished without the first.

We seem to be facing the same situation in the ongoing peace process, part of which can be compared to the pool in the parable. And like the pool in the story, it has a dead carcass of an animal in it, in the form of conditions.

And we are being given two choices:
  • To accept the situation as it is and make the best of it like Friend # 2, or
  • To force the situation to our liking like Friend # 1
But like Friend # 3 suggests, neither option cannot go without the other, because, like it or not, they do complement each other, both short term and long term. Certainly there’s no sin in combining them. Indeed, it will be for the good of all and sundry (as the late Chao Tzang Yawnghwe liked to put it: Common Aim, Diverse Actions)

Which does not mean that the troubles will be over. Just like the three friends in the story: Although they have water, they face other hazards, like wild animals, savages and harsh weather. Similarly, we may gain a lot from the present draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) if only we are proactive:
  • The guarantee that we will not be forced to disarm
  • The guarantee that we will not be forced to disarm
  • The guarantee that we will be able to negotiate with the government collectively
  • The guarantee that we will jointly manage the peace process with the government and the political parties
  • The guarantee that we will be able to discuss interim measures while the dialogue is taking place
  • The guarantee that we will be able to jointly monitor the ceasefire and prevent a return to conflict through a jointly adopted Code of Conduct
  • The guarantee that the outcome will be a federal democracy (in what form or structure and how the power will be shared is of course up to how much we can negotiate)
That doesn’t mean the rest of the process is a walk in the park. It is likely to be even harder and more dangerous than what we are facing now.

According to Sun Zi (BC 551-469), who wrote The Art of War (Sun Zi Bin Fa), momentum and timing are everything in any kind of struggle:

When the speed of rushing water reaches the point where it can move boulders, this is the force of momentum.

When the speed of a hawk is such that it can strike and kill, this is timing.

Momentum and timing lost will not be easy to bring back. Isn’t it the right momentum and time now?


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The peace process: The singer not the song may be the problem



So many have read the (2-9 June) Law Khee Lar resolutions. And some of them have even listened to arguments from both sides. One thing positive that came out is that there is as yet no one saying its 15 point proposal for the amendment of the NCA draft is unacceptable.

Properly speaking, it should be called a 12 point proposal, as 2 of them are:

  • “(We agree to establish a democratic and Federal Union) in accordance with the outcomes of the political dialogues”
  • “To submit (The Union Peace Accord) to the Union legislature for ratification”
which would not be amended. And the third was that the said NCA draft has been approved with proposed amendments by the conference.

The conference also debated at length whether or not to change “in accordance with the Panglong spirit” to the more unambiguous “in accordance with the Panglong Agreement” as suggested by the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) but the final resolution that was passed was to keep it as it is in the draft text.

The conference likewise had no problem with the government’s sacred Three Causes: Non- disintegration of the Union, Non- disintegration of National Solidarity, and Perpetuation of National Sovereignty.

The rest are more about the wordings rather than principles except for two:
  • “To coordinate and undertake administration of humanitarian assistance by NGOs and INGOs for IDPs and conflict victims with the permission of the Union government” that “with the permission of Union government” should be dropped
  • “Matters relating to management of land and natural resources” should be added to the work programs which are to be carried out in consultation with each other during the interim period
It would therefore not have taken more than one meeting to straighten out the draft, granted both sides are willing and eager to achieve peace, and no hidden agenda is involved.

The problem however is that if both sides agree to meet there will be new and untried negotiators on each side, who tend to be stronger on “debate” than in “sales”. Which may not bode well for reaching a swift agreement.

Making it worse is the fact that there are, according to a prominent politician, those who are for “throwing away the one bird in hand for the two up in the trees” on the one side and those that want to leave everything to “the two birds up in the trees” on the other.
All these remind one of an old movie where the dying desperado tells the priest who has been trying to convert him his last words: “It is the singer, not the song.” The meaning was clear: To most people, the message is less important than the messenger.


The only hope for peace therefore is that the negotiators on both sides are not “most people” and they will try their best to cooperate with each other to work out the best solution for the country and its 50 million inhabitants, before time runs out, as it always does.


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Chinese representative at Law Khee Lar and Mao



Sun Guoxiang, the Chinese envoy who turned up at the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO) Summit at the Karen stronghold of Law Khee Lar on 2 June, deserves interest to both China and Burma hands on at least 2 counts.

The first is the familiar face of Mr Wang Yingfan, who had been present in most of the negotiations between the EAOs and the government, was conspicuously missing. The question that naturally arose was that: Has he been replaced?

Myanmar Times, 3 June issue, described him as “China’s Asian affairs expert”. But Netease International News reported that there is as yet “no reference to the latest publicly reported Sun Guoxiang’s office,” since he had departed in December from New York where he had been serving as Consul General for 3 years.

Born in Shanghai in 1953, he reportedly entered the foreign ministry’s Asian Affairs Department since 1979, and has long term work in South and Southeast Asia. He also served as ambassador to Sri Lanka, Maldives, Turkey, Vietnam, and other countries. He is married and have a son.
Mr.Sun Guoxiang, Law Khee lar, 2 June 2015
Mr.Sun Guoxiang, Law Khee lar, 2 June 2015
Another point of interest is what he said about the armed groups, that they should move from the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by taking further steps, according to Myanmar Times. “There is a Chinese saying: Grasp opportunity when it appears, because it will not appear again,” he was quoted as saying.

Which echoed the poem the late Mao Zedong wrote in 1963, and was quoted by President Nixon when he made his historic visit to Beijing in 1972:

So many deeds cry out to be done
And always urgently
The world rolls on
Time presses
Ten thousand years are too long
Seize the day, seize the hour!

“This is the hour, this is the day for our two peoples,” he said as he toasted his host.
SHAN’s question therefore to our leaders at Law Khee Lar on this day, paraphrasing both Chairman Mao and President Nixon, is:

Is this the day,
Is this the hour yet?


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Naypyitaw vs UWSA: Same ploy, same pattern



So now, according to the Global New Light of Myanmar article, Outcome of Pang Seng conference and the true identity of UWSA, 18 May 2015, leaders of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), whom the government, either past or present, had known as “friends” and “national race leaders,” are all of a sudden becoming “drug kingpins”.
The article has leveled 5 charges against them:

  • Involvement in drugs
  • Ignoring government “information” not to invite groups fighting against the Tatmadaw (Burmese military) i.e. Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
  • On “the path towards secession from the Union”
  • Administrative positions being taken over by ethnic Chinese and official language being Chinese
  • Running weapons manufacturing factories
  • Challenging and “total defiance of” the central government
The charges are highly reminiscent of successive Burmese government’s policy toward other ethnic armed groups in Shan State:
  • Khun Sa (1934-2007), when he was fighting against other groups fighting against the government, was given a free hand in drug production and trade. But when he started calling for Shan independence, he became a druglord
  • It was the same with Peng Jiasheng, leader of the MNDAA. He was “a good guy” and “leader of the Kokang national race” until he refused to transform his army into a government-controlled Border Guard Force (BGF). Then he became a drug producer and illegal weapons manufacturer
The government (or the Tatmadaw’s) recipe for peace, as it appears, is nothing but to toe its line if one wants to have peace. The trouble starts when one starts to ask questions.
It seems the world, not only Burma, is in conflict because every peacemaker believes the only way to have peace is by listening to him/her and nobody else as a political cartoon has suggested. Because in reality, even a family cannot be at peace if the husband only does what the wife wants or vice versa.
All Burmese who goes to school are taught kings should treat their people as “bosom children” (yin-we-tha). But we seem to have left this teaching at school and never practice it in our everyday life. Instead our “kings”, past and present, appear to be treating their people as “enemies”.

Conclusion: Yes, we all have to change our mindsets, but it must start from the top, not bottom.


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The Peace Process: What’s next?



As delegates from each ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) head for the Wa capital of Panghsang aka Pangkham on the Sino-Burmese border, one question: whether the 1-3 May conference there will unanimously adopt the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft that their Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) had negotiated for 17 months.
tiger-as-editor
According to sources, the NCCT’s government counterpart, Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) is satisfied and is ready to sign it. “We are only waiting for you,” said one of its members to an NCCT member in Rangoon on the last day of the negotiations.

Consequently, what Naypyitaw wants is not another series of rounds on the draft. “If there is anything to add or amend, it should be in the annexure (which already has 35 resolutions) but not the text,” a member of the UPWC’s technical team Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) told SHAN.

The only problem is one doesn’t know how much the contents of the annexure will be held valid by the government once the text is signed.

Already some groups are calling for an amendment to the draft text. Here are three of their point of concern:
Article 5 (c) ….    When the need arises either for the defense of the country or defense against external threats, both parties will jointly undertake military preparations as prescribed by bilateral coordination

“ ‘Defense of the country’ is a phrase which can be either expanded or shrunk as one may desire,” an EAO member with legal experience says. “If it’s defense against external threats, it is already understood all citizens, whether they be civilian, government or rebel, must do their duty. So I think this clause is absolutely unnecessary.”

The second           concerns Article 10 (a). That “relevant government agencies, ethnic armed organizations and local organizations will coordinate and undertake the administration of humanitarian assistance by NGOs and INGOs for internally displaced peoples (IDPS) and victims of conflict with the permission of the government

Several community based organizations have expressed their disappointment that government permission must be sought even for humanitarian assistance desperately needed.*

The third concerns the perceptible disagreement between Article 20 (b). and Article 21 (b).
Article 20 (b)       Drafting and adopting a framework for political dialogue by ethnic armed organizations and representatives of the government

Article 21 (b)       By working together with all relevant stakeholders, signatories to this agreement agree to develop and adopt the final version of the framework for political dialogue

Some political parties, understandably, ask, “Are we being left out? Or are we needed just to play second fiddle?” while the NCCT and the UPWC/MPC take pains to explain that they are not excluded. “We need more than explanations to convince us,” a prominent ethnic politician retorts. “Amend the articles.”

These are only noticeable examples. There are still others by which some EAOs have charged the NCCT: “You have been outsmarted,” “You were focusing more on the political considerations rather than the ground situation.”

Naturally, not all of the NCCT members are unable to maintain their cool under the all-round onslaught by their own people. “If you don’t like what I have done,” one NCCT member reportedly told his mother organization, “it’s easy. Replace me.”

If there is one thing that has been learned during the 17-month negotiations, it is that replacing these negotiators on both sides, who have learned by trial and mistakes, will not be easy. Because the replacements are bound to make the same mistakes and thereby unnecessarily prolong the process, and might even derail it.

Which does not necessarily mean the present negotiators are irreplaceable, because they are.

What needs to be done, if the peace process is to go on, is to train the replacements on both sides before they begin negotiations.

Because as all experts agree: The methods are not secret. If both sides are equally trained, it will be easier to negotiate with each other. And if they have been trained together, all the better.


*Article 25 (a) meanwhile says, “During the interim period of conducting and implementing peace negotiations, it is agreed to carry out the following programs and projects in consultation with each other in ceasefire areas: (5) The receiving of aid from donor communities both inside and outside the country for regional development and capacity-building projects”


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Behind the Wa hosted ethnic conference



The first question asked by several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) when the invitation to a peace conference in Panghsang (officially Pang Kham) on 6 April reached them was, as to be expected: “Why only 12 (EAOs)? Why not all?”

Naypyitaw’s reaction was also understandable. It had reportedly protested against the inclusion of three EAOs currently engaged in heavy fighting with the Burma Army: AA, MNDAA and PSLF/TNLA. (see attachment)

The Wa spokesman U Aung Myint aka Li Zhulie no doubt did his best to answer these questions. It wasn’t his fault that his answers failed to convince anyone.

The inevitable new question thus comes up.

What’s behind the Wa-Kachin-Mongla organizers’ decision to host such a conference? Or rather who? And more inevitably, was it China?

There are several indicators, according to observers:
  • China, in 1994, had pressured the KIO to conclude a ceasefire with the then military government of Burma. Now, it no longer does.

  • The same goes for the MNDAA, better known as Kokang Army, led by Peng Jiasheng that the Burma Army has yet to defeat after more than 2 months of fighting.

  • The Chinese special envoy Wang Yingfan, during the 8 day marathon Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) negotiations, had tirelessly tried to lobby the government’s negotiators to put the Kokang issue on the agenda, only to be rejected by them.

The result was that although several nations had welcomed the successful completion of the NCA draft, China was not among them.

  • The UWSA is also oddly acting out of style. In the past, it had always done its best to avoid confrontations with the government. Even when there were credible reports of clashes between the two sides, it had always disclaimed them. But now it doesn’t seem to care about Naypyitaw’s outcry against the inclusion of the AA, MNDAA and TNLA in the conference.

  • Those that have been invited are all based along the Chinese and Thai borders. On the other hand, those on the Indian side, except for the AA that is headquartered on the Chinese border with the KIO, are invited. Notably the Chin National Front (CNF) of Chin State that shares the border with India’s Mizoram is unabashedly left out.

Clearly, Beijing’s aim is not against the EAOs signing the NCA. But it appears to be against Naypyitaw leaving out any groups, especially those that are based along the Sino- Burmese border.

It is also obviously concerned that if the conflict is allowed to go on, international intervention may be coming, the last thing it wants.

The best solution that will benefit all those concerned therefore appears to be the inclusion of all EAOs, as suggested not only by China but by all the EAOs.

Finally, whatever the conclusions are here, the upcoming Panghsang conference, 1-3 May, will be worth keeping an eye on.
Ethnic Conference UWSA


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War and peace process can’t go together



On 19 April, government owned media reported that a total of 126 soldiers were killed and 359 more injured during the fight in Kokang. The Kokang rebels who go by the name of Myanmar National Democracy Army (MNDAA) meanwhile says government casualties are some 1,800 while the MNDAA has suffered some 70. Understandably, the actual figures could be in the in-between.

Meanwhile the number of civilians that have fled the killing zone on the Sino-Burmese border is somewhere between 50,000-90,000.

The number however is less important. The point is more about the citizens of Burma who are giving up their lives to satisfy the whims of their leaders. On the contrary, if the war were fought only between the said leaders themselves in a duel without involving their soldiers and people, it would be more preferable.

The message here is especially for the government and its armed forces. Because all the trouble in the country today could have been avoided if they were more open to reason.

And also because it was the President himself who told his Kachin visitors on 16 March, according to U Hla Maung Shwe, Myanmar Peace Center’s special advisor: Anyone killed on the battlefield—whoever they are—is a loss to the country. These words should apply to those killed and wounded in the Kokang battlefield too.

Sun Zi (BC 551-467), the universally respected author of the Art of War, has counseled:
A government should not mobilize an army out of anger
Military leaders should not provoke war out of wrath
Act when it is beneficial, desist if it is not
Anger can revert to joy
Wrath can revert to delight
But a country destroyed cannot be restored to existence
And the dead cannot be restored to life
Therefore an enlightened government is careful about this
A good military leadership is alert to this
This is the way to secure a nation and keep the armed forces whole
(The Art of War, Chapter 12)

Master Sun’s master Lao Zi is even more explicit:
Weapons are instruments of fear
They are not a wise man’s tools
He uses them only when he has no choice
Peace and quiet are dear to his heart
And victory no cause for rejoicing
When many people are being killed
They should be mourned in heartfelt sorrow
That is why a victory must be observed like a funeral.
(Dao De Jing, Chapter 31)

A good soldier is not violent
A good fighter is not angry
A good winner is not vengeful
(Chapter 68)
What is more, how can a peace process that excludes some of the active armed movements inspire confidence even from those who have signed ceasefire agreements? They are certain to count themselves as the next possible targets of the government and its armed forces and focus more on preparations for war than for peace.

At stake is the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which was successfully drafted on 31 March. At stake is the peace that the country has been deprived of for so long.

It is therefore hoped both the President and Commander-in-Chief will conduct a critical review of the peace process and the war in Kokang—together, not seprately—and decide on an enlightened course of action that will benefit both themselves and the country.


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The journey for peace takes first step



Dr Hannes Siebert who has been involved in several peace process around the globe including Burma/Myanmar told listeners at the Chiangmai University last year that what was taking place at that time, that is, the negotiations between the government-established Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)' Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team(NCCT) could be compared to a long honeymoon. That the real work would come after it.

He was right. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft was 'successfully' finalized on 31 March after 17 months of negotiations. But it still awaits official endorsement both by the government and each of the EAOs. The latter is also planning to hold a Summit among themselves to make the final decision before inking it.

Moreover, the signing ceremony, to be witnessed by the UN,ASEAN, China and other foreign powers doesn't necessarily mean there will be instant peace in the country although the signing will be taking a major step forward in that direction.

According to the finalized draft, a 7step roadmap to peace has been agreed:
1. Signing of the NCA
2. Negotiations and agreement on the Framework for Political Dialogue within 60 days after the NCA signing (Negotiations on Code of Conduct and Joint Monitoring Mechanism to be completed within 30 days)
3. Launching of the Political Dialogue within 90 days after the NCA signing
4. Convening of Union Peace Conference
5. Signing of Union Peace Accord (UPA)
6. Submission to the Union Assembly for approval
7. Implementation of the UPA

Clearly both sides have their work cut out for them, especially due to the pressing time factor. The elections are going to be held in November. Two months before it would be prioritized on the poll campaigns by the contesting parties. There are only 5 months, counting April to complete the first three steps if the process is to be assured of continuation after the elections and a new Union Assembly and new government are installed, according to one informed observer:

April- May  Signing of NCA
June- July  Agreement secured  on the Framework
August        Launching of the political dialogue which will include setting up of work committees for each dialogue topics to be discussed after March 2016

" Could they be accomplished before September 2015? is a big question," said the observer. "If not, there is understandable concern that all that has been done the past 4 years might be wasted."

One sticky problem is the government might not agree to the EAOs' demand that groups that remain unrecognized by the government be permitted to sign the NCA thus preventing them becoming spoilers. They are Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA),Arakan Army(AA),Arakan National Council(ANC), Lahu Democratic Union(LDU) and Wa National Organization(WNO), among others.

Some of the clauses might also be demanded by other stakeholders for amendment, such as 20b. that government and EAO representatives will draft and conclude agreement on the Framework for Political Dialogue.

Meanwhile the NCA is not without positive features. "There are at least 3 guarantees : Federalism, Exemption from Unlawful Associations Act, and Political Dialogue," said U Aung Min, the government's principal negotiator. "What more do we need at this stage?"

Maybe he's right. Maybe he's not. What about the NCA? Will it be observed by both parties?
What will happen if one side fails to abide by it?



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New history text: How to keep hate speeches on the wane



Yesterday, SHAN was inundated with comments full of wrath and hate for its reports on the abuses-as-usual activities of the Burma Army troops in the wartorn areas of Kokang. Inadvertently, SHAN seems to have become a Chinese lover.

(Cartoon credit: quebecme.me/ZGtjZGL)


But the reports are true. Not only that but they are also useful for Burmese leaders who want this country to be united. Remember what the late Aung San had said: “If we can’t make them (non-Burmans) want to stay with us, it must be because no shoddier people ever existed.”

It was clear right from Day One that these peoples whose lands were both geographically and politically separate from Burma had misgivings about joining hands with it. Were it not for for their trust in Aung San and his promise they could either stay or leave after ten years, they wouldn’t have agreed to.

One well known Shan saying about Burmans is synonymous with an old American saying: A good Injun is a dead Injun. But there are kinder but less well known sayings about Burmans: There are no worse people than the Burmans. On the other hand, there are no better people than them.

For more than 60 years, the non-Burmans have waited for a good Burman to take the stage. In 2011 when President Thein Sein made his call for peace talks it seemed their prayers were at last answered.

However, what seems to have happened is the country has become two worlds: one urban and civilized while the other is rural and savage.

Non-Burman leaders accordingly are given special treatment and care in the urban world while their people continue to suffer in the countryside under the Burma Army troops.


(Cartoon credit: quebecme.me/ZGtjZGL)

Like the cartoon here, everyone appears to want change except to change themselves.

It is therefore high time we considered this. A new type of citizens, as the eminent Thai academic Dr Chaivat Satha-Anand recommends, is what this country needs to have. It can be acquired only if we have a new type of education: one that does not glorify war mongering rulers like Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya — as well as the Shans’ Hso Khan Fa (1211-1264) for that matter — but benign rulers like Kyansittha, Aung San and others.

But if we keep on extolling people like Alaungpaya, who had put to death more than 3,000 Mon monks, we should not be surprised if we are going to face another wave of anti-Chinese riots like in 1967, when 50 were killed according to official count, including 1 embassy official when the Chinese mission in Rangoon was ravaged by an angry mob.

To make it short, we need a new kind of history that teaches our children — as well as their parents — how people have lived together in peace under great rulers like Asoka and a new kind of mindset that generates good feelings and thoughts for one’s fellowmen.

After all, in less than a year, we are going to have the Asean Community, a larger one than Burma. All the more necessity for this new kind of history texts.

When dealing with people,
Remember that you are not dealing with creatures of logic,
But creatures of emotion (including yourself)

Dale Carnegie

*Words in parenthesis added by author


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President sending wrong signal



President Thein Sein, accompanied by Commander in Chief Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, visited troops wounded during clashes with the Kokang ‘renegades’ on Monday, 16 February 2015.

During the visit he was reported by Myanmar News Agency (MNA) as saying that the troops “are protecting sovereignty and ensuring territorial integrity.” He also “vowed not to lose an inch of Myanmar’s territory owned the successive generations.”

His statements, if they really were his statements, beg several disturbing questions:

• Was he insinuating that China was behind the fight that began on 9 February?

• Was he thinking of Kokang, the majority of its population speaking Chinese, just like Kiev leaders are thinking of eastern Ukraine, with the majority population speaking Russian?

• Was he signaling that he would need outside assistance to recover every “inch of Myanmar’s territory owned by the successive generations”?

• Or was it also an implicit message to all border-based armed movements that are “threatening” its territorial integrity that the military’s enraged response in the Kokang case also applies to them? That they could expect nothing less than what the Kokang resistance movement and the population are getting for offending his sacred institution — the Tatmadaw (military)?

SHAN may be wrong to feel that way about the President who has since 2011 been tirelessly pursuing peace, which, as all may agree, is harder than fighting a war.

But the difference between making peace and making a war is profound:

• When you try to make peace, you yourself may suffer (due to attacks by well meaning people, as Robert Kaplan says about Lord Castlereagh, who often confuse eloquence with substance, as well as the efficiency by which they pursue the country’s national interest) but the people do not

• But when you make war, you may not suffer as you are physically away from the battlefield, but the people there do

The message, if the report from MNA is true, may prove unfortunate despite substantial success made on the Union Day with the signing of the Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation, if something is not done immediately.

That something may involve the following measures:

• Immediate call for ceasefire talks with Peng Jiasheng, leader of the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)

• Clarification of the President’s 16 February statements that they were not directly or indirectly pointing fingers at anyone including the armed movements that have for so long fought without external assistance (The only armed groups that have received foreign assistance, as we all know, have been the Tatmadaw and the Communist Party of Burma)

• To earnestly and vigorously re-start the long awaited Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) negotiations

Who knows but the Kokang incident might become a blessing in disguise as well as a shot in the arm for the peace process.



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