As delegates from each ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) head for the Wa capital of Panghsang aka Pangkham on the Sino-Burmese border, one question: whether the 1-3 May conference there will unanimously adopt the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) draft that their Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) had negotiated for 17 months.

According to sources, the NCCT’s government counterpart, Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) is satisfied and is ready to sign it. “We are only waiting for you,” said one of its members to an NCCT member in Rangoon on the last day of the negotiations.

Consequently, what Naypyitaw wants is not another series of rounds on the draft. “If there is anything to add or amend, it should be in the annexure (which already has 35 resolutions) but not the text,” a member of the UPWC’s technical team Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) told SHAN.

The only problem is one doesn’t know how much the contents of the annexure will be held valid by the government once the text is signed.

Already some groups are calling for an amendment to the draft text. Here are three of their point of concern:
Article 5 (c) ….    When the need arises either for the defense of the country or defense against external threats, both parties will jointly undertake military preparations as prescribed by bilateral coordination

“ ‘Defense of the country’ is a phrase which can be either expanded or shrunk as one may desire,” an EAO member with legal experience says. “If it’s defense against external threats, it is already understood all citizens, whether they be civilian, government or rebel, must do their duty. So I think this clause is absolutely unnecessary.”

The second           concerns Article 10 (a). That “relevant government agencies, ethnic armed organizations and local organizations will coordinate and undertake the administration of humanitarian assistance by NGOs and INGOs for internally displaced peoples (IDPS) and victims of conflict with the permission of the government

Several community based organizations have expressed their disappointment that government permission must be sought even for humanitarian assistance desperately needed.*

The third concerns the perceptible disagreement between Article 20 (b). and Article 21 (b).
Article 20 (b)       Drafting and adopting a framework for political dialogue by ethnic armed organizations and representatives of the government

Article 21 (b)       By working together with all relevant stakeholders, signatories to this agreement agree to develop and adopt the final version of the framework for political dialogue

Some political parties, understandably, ask, “Are we being left out? Or are we needed just to play second fiddle?” while the NCCT and the UPWC/MPC take pains to explain that they are not excluded. “We need more than explanations to convince us,” a prominent ethnic politician retorts. “Amend the articles.”

These are only noticeable examples. There are still others by which some EAOs have charged the NCCT: “You have been outsmarted,” “You were focusing more on the political considerations rather than the ground situation.”

Naturally, not all of the NCCT members are unable to maintain their cool under the all-round onslaught by their own people. “If you don’t like what I have done,” one NCCT member reportedly told his mother organization, “it’s easy. Replace me.”

If there is one thing that has been learned during the 17-month negotiations, it is that replacing these negotiators on both sides, who have learned by trial and mistakes, will not be easy. Because the replacements are bound to make the same mistakes and thereby unnecessarily prolong the process, and might even derail it.

Which does not necessarily mean the present negotiators are irreplaceable, because they are.

What needs to be done, if the peace process is to go on, is to train the replacements on both sides before they begin negotiations.

Because as all experts agree: The methods are not secret. If both sides are equally trained, it will be easier to negotiate with each other. And if they have been trained together, all the better.


*Article 25 (a) meanwhile says, “During the interim period of conducting and implementing peace negotiations, it is agreed to carry out the following programs and projects in consultation with each other in ceasefire areas: (5) The receiving of aid from donor communities both inside and outside the country for regional development and capacity-building projects”