CRUCIAL POINTS TO PONDER: How would the 21st Century Panglong pan out?
In this
respect, the BBC's report of May 21, titled “What one should know regarding
Panglong convention”, has captured almost all the important headings, in this
writer's opinion.
It touches
upon the topics of: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) or Pangkham (peace
initiative); 5 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that were rumored to sign (the
NCA); agreement in principle [of the United Nationalities federal Council
(UNFC) 9-point NCA amendment proposal]; Pangkham alliance; and formation of
north and south (military) blocs among the EAOs.
The following
is an observation based on the topics, which hopefully would shed some critical
light to the prevailing political landscape.
Firstly, there
is now a new game plan initiated by the Pangkham alliance group involving 7
EAOs that rejects the government's NCA-based game plan. Thus, the government's
only game in town for some five years is now being contested by the Pangkham
alliance new approach.
The
Pangkham-led 7 EAOs military-political alliance includes the United Wa State
Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA), United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), Kachin
Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang
National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), Myanmar National Truth and Justice
Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), Peace and
Solidarity Committee/National Democratic Alliance Army (PSC/NDAA) and Shan
State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).
Pangkham
insisted that the NCA-based peace process is not working, as it is unable to
stop the war in Kachin and Shan States in the first place, besides being a
process aimed at replacing the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which the alliance
considers to be their historical-political legacy vested with rights of
self-determination, equality and democracy and also the sole legal bond, to
form a new political entity called the Union of Burma, between the ethnic
nationalities and the Bamar state prior to the independence from the British in
1948.
Other than
that it also accused the NCA-based process to be like the 1993 Nyaung Hnapin
national convention, which was dominated by the Military or Tatmadaw and
stage-managed to formulate and promulgate its self-drawn, 2008 constitution
that didn't cater in anyway to the ethnic nationalities' political aspirations.
Thus, the
Pangkham alliance consideration is to end the war in the north of the country
first, followed by political negotiation and eventual political settlement.
Secondly, the
5 EAOs – New Mon State Party (NMSP), Karenni National Progress Party (KNPP), Wa
National Organization (WNO), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) and Arakan National
Council (ANC) - that were rumored would sign the NCA and reportedly being
constantly wooed by the government doesn't seem to be making headway, as almost
all of them insisted upon the government's accommodation of the UNFC's 9-point
proposal to amend the NCA, and only after which it would sign the NCA as
preferred by the government. But the problem has been the inability of the
government to say black or white on the proposal. Leaving it pending for
further discussion in the future, and only came up with the in-between solution
for UNFC members to sign the Deeds of Commitment (DoC) that they would
definitely ink the NCA at a later date, which in turn would qualify them for
participation in the UPC-21CP.
Thus, it is
highly unlikely that the UNFC would take part in the conference, as most have
said that they would attend the conference as a group with full conference
participant rights and not merely as observers.
Thirdly, the
so-called government's agreement in principle of the UNFC's 9-point proposal to
alter the NCA isn't leading to any concrete agreement, as it is not committing
to it in any concrete term and just prefers to let the UNFC sign the DoC by all
means, pending further discussion of the UNFC's proposal.
While some of
the UNFC members might be willing to see this agreement in principle in a
positive light, General Gun Maw of the KIO said that the government, in fact,
just only agreed to the point number 8, which said: “Developmental projects to
be tackled according to Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
in cooperation with the public and the EAOs” and nothing more.
The crucial
nationwide ceasefire announcement of the Tatmadaw and agreement of the
tripartite negotiation composition of the proposal were not agreed upon, he
stressed.
Fourthly, the
Pangkham alliance that is made up of 7 EAOs. But the SSPP and KIO are also
members of the UNFC and while the latter has tendered the resignation from the
UNFC, the former said that it is still with it. Thus, the position of the SSPP
is not at all clear at the moment.
Finally, there
seems to be a formation of a north and south military blocs among the EAOs,
with Pangkham alliance depicted as northern bloc engaging militarily with the
government's troops, although for the moment the UWSA and NDAA are still not
taking part actively yet in the conflict, the situation could easily change if
the military conflict would become widespread. The northern bloc is the most
heavily armed and make up of more than three-fourths of the whole EAOs'
fighting force, estimated to field some 64,000 troopers, according to the “Deciphering
Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2016” report publication of Burma
News International, January 2017.
The combined
21 EAOs troops, when added together is 81,700.
The Pangkham
alliance members UWSA has some 30,000; the KIA 12,000; SSPP 8000; TNLA 6000;
NDAA 3000; MNDAA 2000; and AA 3000; totaling 64,000 or 78% of the whole EAOs'
fighting force.
The southern
bloc is made up of mainly the Karen National Union (KNU) that has 5000 troops,
while some small EAOs barely field a few hundreds.
Outlook
Given such
political development, with the participation of the Pangkham alliance highly
unlikely as the latest invitation list excluded the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, which
are members of the alliance. Reportedly, the government has only invited 9 out
of the 13 EAOs that have still not signed the NCA.
The other
excluded only EAO is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang
(NSCN-K).
So this would
mean the 78% of the EAOs troopers would be outside the fold of peace process,
indicating that in addition to just being a partial ceasefire gathering in Nay
Pyi Taw on May 24, achievable peace is still a far away illusion, much less the
national reconciliation which is supposed to be the aim of the UPC-21CP.
Topping this
disappointment is the heightened Tatmadaw's offensives in northern Shan State,
while the peace conference preparation is in high gear.
One could only
feel sorry for the lack of positive initiative from the government's part
saying that the invitation to the UPC-21CP is the responsibility of the Union
Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), which is made up of a tripartite group
of government (including parliament and military); 8 EAOs; and political
parties with 16 members each, according to Zaw Htay, the director general of
the State Counselor's Office.
He stressed to
the RFA in a recent interview of May 18, that “the government is responsible
only for the invitation of some 900 representatives and guests to the opening
ceremony and closing dinner and the invitation to attend the UPC-21CP is solely
the duty of the UPDJC, where the State Counselor is also the Chairperson.”
But questions
come to mind, why would the 8 EAOs and political parties would like to exclude
the said three EAOs from participating in the conference? The answer naturally
would come up as either the 8 EAOs and political parties are compromised or
forced to follow the Tatmadaw's line of thinking, which all know that it
harbors animosity to the three excluded group from the outset and has been
against it participation regardless of the tireless Chinese mediation and
insistence of the Pangkham alliance that it would only negotiate as a group,
according its repeated statements.
In short, the
recent prevailing inconclusive political development doesn't really look
promising for the UPC-21CP convention, especially to the disappointment of
those longing to see the achievement of peace and reconciliation in our
country.
Tags: Opinion
