UNHCR'S REFUGEE REPATRIATION: A timely undertaking or just a trail and error pilot project?
The 25 October refugee
repatriation, involving some seventy refugees,
who left Thailand’s Tham Hin and Nu Po camps to return home voluntarily to
Yangon (Rangoon), Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) region, Kayin (Karen), Bago, Mon and
Rakhine (Arakan) states, is supposed to be a pilot project for further follow
up of wider undertakings to resolve the refugee problems that have plagued the country for decades.
While
some lessons from such a project could definitely be drawn, it is not clear if
such similar undertakings would follow suit anytime soon for some 103,000
refugees spread over nine camps along the Thai-Burma border for more than two
decades, given the still unclear to negative feedback regarding the returnees
in terms of the recent resettlement experience and more importantly, the
failure to instill the peaceful atmosphere on the ground, in most ethnic states
and the country over.
Although
this United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) first voluntary
repatriation of Burma's refugees from Thailand is definitely aimed as a pilot
project and partly, the eagerness of the stakeholders concerned to pull it
through for whatever reason they might have in store, even under unfavorable
condition, an UNHCR official was careful in his statement not to sound overly
optimistic, regarding the issue.
“This
particular movement is a milestone but it won’t be the start of a large
exodus,” Iain Hall, UNHCR’s senior field coordinator, told Reuters.
Rumors have surfaced that
the Thai government plans to close down the camps but Hall dismissed this
claim.
“We’re not promoting return and we’ve made that clear with both
governments,” said Hall. “We don’t yet believe it is the time to return but of
course these people have the right to return if they want to.”
Feedback and situation on the ground
Of the nine refugee camps
along the Thai-Burma border that house around 103,000 refugees and internally
displaced persons, more than 80,000 are ethnic Karen, with a mixture of Mon,
Tavoyan or Dawei, Karenni and Shan, from eastern Burma who fled violence and
persecution while the country was under military rule.
While most of the
refugees will be resettled in various towns within Karen State, according to
the state’s Chief Minister Nang Khin Htwe Myint, some would also go to Mon
State, Arakan State, Tenasserim and Rangoon Regions.
Feedback on how the returnees are fairing after their return is still
scant at this writing, but some resettlement problems regarding resettlement in
ethnic states are just beginning to surface, including also the housing
difficulties of the Rangoon returnees.
According to local media, seventeen refugees who returned recently to Burma from
Thailand are stuck in a state-run shelter in Rangoon because the government has
so far failed to arrange housing for them.
Reportedly, government officials have encouraged the four families to
buy low-cost housing in Hlaing Tharyar Township, but so far they have refused.
Daw Khin San Yi, 59, a former political prisoner and refugee who
returned from Nu Po camp in Tak province, told The Myanmar Times: “We lived with difficulties in Thailand. We are not
rich people and we have no money to pay for low-cost housing. I don’t
understand why the government arranged that.”
She added that she and
her husband returned from the Nu Po refugee camp, where they were sheltered
since 2010, as they heard that the National League for Democracy-led government
would fully support their repatriation.
“We chose to return to
Myanmar but I think we made a mistake. I thought the government had already
arranged our accommodation,” she said.
Again, although not
directly concerned with the recent repatriation, the Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) in Tanintharyi Region told a press conference in Rangoon
according to the Myanmar Times quite recently, that they thought their problems
were finally over when the ceasefire between the military and ethnic armed
groups was finally signed in October last year, allowing them to return to
their ancestral homesteads.
But they discovered that
their problems were just beginning, when four villagers from Kyayzuetaw
village, Yephyu township, have been slapped with lawsuits by Shwe Padonmar
Production Enterprise, and two villagers from Band Mae village, Myeik district,
are being sued by the Asia World company amid accusations that some villagers destroyed palm oil trees.
The villagers, who
left in the 1990s, due to the fighting between the KNU and the military,
returned twenty years later, as the regional minister for Karen affairs has
told them to do so, only to find out that certain companies were granted
permission by the government to set up palm oil plantation projects in their
villages, according to Naw Pe Tha Law of the Tanintharyi Friends civil society
group.
Karen Refugee Committee
(KRC)
Regarding the recent
refugee repatriation undertaking, this writer has inquired a prominent Karen
National Union (KNU) functionary, David Tharckabaw on his take, in which he
replied: “The KNU's stated policy has been the return of the refugees should be
done only after there are stable peace and democracy in the country. This pilot
project is done by some of our own officials and foreign NGO persons who would
gain benefit from the refugee return.”
According to him the KRC's
ten point refugee repatriation statement issued is also still the KNU policy
today.
The Karen News of 26 March
2013 posted the KRC’s ten key point
statement that had to be met in order for a repatriation process to be put in
place that did not undermine the lives of refugees.
KRC's ten key points are:
1.
Nationwide
ceasefire should be observed;
2.
There
should be sustainable peace and political conflicts should be settled;
3.
Provision
of universal human rights must be respected;
4.
Relocated
areas should be freed from land mines and security should be given a priority;
5.
The
relocated areas should be suitable for one to support their livelihood;
favorable land should be provided adequately for one's family;
6.
Health
certificates, education certificates received should be recognized by the
government;
7.
We
will not tolerate force repatriation; it should be one’s own decision or
voluntary return;
8.
Adequate
preparation should be given to return;
9.
Right
should be given to the Committee concerned regarding repatriation and allow
them to inspect location and collect necessary information;
10.
The repatriation can only take place when the concerned organizations,
KRC, INGOs, NGOs, UNHCR, and CBOs (Civilian-Based Organizations) agree that
there is a genuine peace in Burma.
UNHCR strategic roadmap
In the same vein, the UNHCR's “Strategic Roadmap for Voluntary
Repatriation” also outlined the similar conditions for the possible return of
the refugees on a large scale.
Accordingly, promotion of
voluntary repatriation will be initiated by UNHCR only when conditions of
legal, material and physical safety throughout South-East Burma are conducive
to return for the vast majority of refugees.
In particular, it is envisaged that the following
benchmarks should be met:
·
A Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement or other durable ceasefire agreements are in place;
·
UNHCR has unhindered
access to most of the return areas and is able to conduct protection
monitoring, including through confidential interviews with returnees and
receiving communities;
·
An effective framework
for mine action at the regional or national level is in place; in particular, a
system throughout the South-East for demarcation of return routes and
locations, and mine risk education (MRE);
·
Plans for free and fair
elections remain on track, or more likely the vote has been completed, with a
political transition underway (This benchmark penned in 2015 before the
election was partly fulfilled, with NLD being able to form the government in
March 2016, although the military's formidable clutch on political power
remains in tact, made necessary by the 2008 military-drafted constitution);
·
A
tripartite agreement for return is in place
which clearly re-establishes national protection for returnees.
Accordingly, UNHCR employs the following
definitions in relation to its repatriation categories.
·
Spontaneous
returns, which are already taking place, are
organized by the refugees themselves, without UNHCR’s direct knowledge or
support before or during the movement.
·
Facilitated
returns actively involve UNHCR both through
the provision of information prior to departure, possible assistance to Persons
with Specific Needs (PSNs) during the voluntary return movement, and assistance
upon return, with such engagement contingent upon an assessment of the
conditions in a specific location.
·
Promoted returns involve
extensive UNHCR support, including support for transportation and the
entitlement to a package of reintegration assistance, once the conditions are
appropriate for the promotion of return throughout South-East Myanmar. (Source:
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Strategic Roadmap for Voluntary
Repatriation”, Refugees from Myanmar in Thailand 2015-2017, Update - March
2015)
Core problems and perspective
Aside from the negative feedback of the
recent, facilitated, repatriation pilot project, lack of real ceasefire on the
ground and problems stemming from unjustified land confiscation and
distribution would be the two toughest challenges that the government has to
overcome.
The KRC and as well as
the UNHCR have outlined these common issues which are essential to the
successful repatriation of the refugees.
The nine refugee camps in
Thailand are mostly inhabited by the Karen, with a mixture of Karenni, Mon,
Tavoyan and Shan, among others. And the military situation in the mentioned,
affected states could be termed as a mixture of tranquil and conflict zones.
For example in Karen State the conflict between the DKBA splinter group, which calls itself the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, and the Karen Border Guard Force (KBGF), that is under the wing of Burma Army with Burmese military officials involved, have pushed some four to five thousands of IDPs and refugees fleeing to inland sanctuaries like Myaing Gyi Ngu and to the Thai side of the border some two months ago.
Reportedly, as recently
as of 20 October, there has been a clash
between the DKBA splinter group and a joint force of Burma Army and KBFG.
“During the attack, four
of our soldiers died,” Maj Saw San Aung, a leader of the DKBA splinter group
told The Irrawaddy on 20 October. “The fighting lasted over 30 minutes and we
heard that one civilian was injured.”
The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) are non-signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and thus are militarily prone to attacks if the Burma Army chooses to do so.
Even the NCA signatory's
Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) drugs rehabilitation center and its
other various military camps were attacked last month by Burma Army with the
pretext of RCSS recruiting new troops.
The Union-level Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC-U) is said to be investigating the fighting that has now already died down, even though it could restart any time depending on the mood of the Burma Army.
The KNU, the signatory of the NCA has no military engagement with the Burma Army starting 2011, except for some small accidental clashes. But the clashes between the DKBA splinter group and KBGF, sometimes in collaboration with the Burma Army, have irked the KNU, as the Karen BGF intruded into its areas of control and even asked permission for its troops to be stationed permanently, which were refused.
Other than that the KNU
congress that is about to be held, even though rumors about postponement for
one year, due to the wish of Chairman Mutu Say Poe, is said to be in
discussion.
Many knowledgeable Karen watchers have not ruled out that Mutu's faction could be voted out, due what many believe to be his appeasement posture vis a vis the Burma Army, and a hardliner faction headed by Naw Zipporah Sein, Vice- President of KNU, could replace him.
Many knowledgeable Karen watchers have not ruled out that Mutu's faction could be voted out, due what many believe to be his appeasement posture vis a vis the Burma Army, and a hardliner faction headed by Naw Zipporah Sein, Vice- President of KNU, could replace him.
According to insider Karen sources, there has been unclear speculation regarding the last KNU congress election, which has ushered Mutu in as a Chairman of the KNU.
Reportedly, when the former Vice-President David Tharkabaw was not reelected, a proposal to recount the votes was made, but unable to carry out as the voting ballots were already burned. The controversial surrounding the election results were never able to be cleared, which might have resulted in little or no backing from Karen diaspora, political parties and Civil Society Organizations for Mutu headed KNU leadership.
If this happens, the KNU
might rejoin the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and the whole
military equation could change. This could either be unleashing another
heightened military offensive by the Burma Army or coming to the negotiation
table with renewed enthusiastic positive attitude, as it might seem fighting a
long drawn out war would only lead to the continued destruction of the country
without end and the denial of development and reconciliation, which the country
could ill afford.
Apart from that, within
the context of the whole country, the armed conflict in the North and
Northern-eastern part involving the Kachin, Shan, Palaung and Kokang EAOs are
still ongoing, where some 100,000 IDPs and refugees are still unable to go
home.
To sum up, the war in
Karen State is not as wide spread for now, but could escalate depending on the
KNU power struggle and political development. The armed conflicts in Shan and
Kachin States are ongoing and could heightened anytime, if the military chooses
to do so.
Besides all these
debacles, another social side-effect might be brewing that could become a
headache and problematic issue in the future, as Time has pointed out in its
report on 27 October.
“Nearly
half the Burma refugees in Thailand are under the age of 18. It’s bad enough to
be forced to become a refugee; it’s almost as bad to be forced to return to a
homeland you’ve never known—a refugee in everything but name only,” the Time
report said.
Given such circumstances,
the possibility of of a mass refugee repatriation, or promoted returns involving extensive UNHCR support, for the South-eastern and as well, the North and
North-eastern part of the country, is dependent
on a comprehensive end to conflict, a normalization of state-society relations,
and the emergence of a legitimate and functioning state. And as such, the trial
and error refugee repatriation pilot project of the UNHCR won't lead us
anywhere to the durable solution, but only the holistic political settlement
approach that would enable to end this decades-old, simmering, refugee crisis,
linked to all the woes encompassing the country, would resolve the problems.
Tags: Opinion
