SIXTH UNFC-GOVERNMENT MEETING: "Is the glass half empty or half full?"
Again, the official sixth meeting between the United Nationalities Federal
Council's (UNFC) Delegation for Political Dialogue (DPN) and the government's
Peace Commission (PC) held from August 10 to 11, wasn't able to produce an all
encompassing agreement for the former to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA). But accordingly four from the eight-point UNFC's proposal to
be added to the NCA were tentatively agreed with the rest four points to be
still discussed and agreed upon at the forthcoming seventh official meeting
that should take place in September.
Reportedly, the four agreed points were said to be from 1 to 4 and the points from 5 to 8 would be thrashed out in the upcoming September official seventh meeting after the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and government have consulted their respective leadership in details.
Although there has been a little confusion as to
whether the UNFC amendment proposal to the NCA is 8 or 9 points, the reality is
just 8, as the point number 9 merely said that “As soon as the above said
points are in agreement, the NCA would be signed.”
To refresh our memories let us again look at the
said 8-point UNFC amendment proposal. They are:
1. Bilateral
ceasefire agreement between the government-military and the UNFC;
2. To
build a federal union with result achieved from 21st Century
Panglong Conference (21CPC);
3. Agreement
of tripartite dialogue composition;
4. Drafting
and promulgation of constitutional law based on the outcome of 21CPC;
5. Advance
agreement on Military Codes of Conduct (CoC) and monitoring on Terms of
Reference (ToR);
6. Formation
of military Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) with representatives from
government, EAOs and international figures acceptable to both parties;
7. Formation
of a neutral, enforcement tribunal for NCA involving domestic and international
law experts and judges that are acceptable to both parties; and
8. Developmental
projects to be tackled according to Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), in cooperation with the public and the EAOs. (Source: UNFC
Documentation)
Naturally, hopes were high for the government and
as well the UNFC negotiators as half of the UNFC proposal could be agreed upon
and that the enthusiastic optimism, especially from the government's side, that
the other half would be easily overcome at the next meeting in September,
should be taken with a pinch of salt.
Khu Oo Reh, head of the DPN at the end of the
meeting said: “I could say that we are getting extremely near to participate
equally and seriously together in our works. As we are not in a position to
decide all things on our own, we would like to request the citizens to have
understanding on this.”
He probably meant to say that that the DPN has to
consult with its leadership and also, the cooperation of the Tatmadaw is needed
to implement the agreed points.
He went on to explain the nature of the peace
process has to go step-by-step and that they are hoping to achieve peace as
soon as possible through mutual cooperation by all stakeholders.
Earlier on the eve of the sixth official meeting,
Khu Oo Reh, regarding the UNFC's proposal that if some of the points are not in
agreement, it should be construed as there is no agreement, stressed: “We heard
what the media are reporting. Some said there are two, three or one point left
(to agree). No matter how points are left to be discussed, even if one is left
it is like all the eight points are not in agreement.”
It seems Khu Oo Reh has taken a leaf out of the
Geneva Accords of 24 November 2013 between Iran and 5+1 Powers regarding the
nuclear case of Iran, where the reference to the phrase “Nothing is agreed
until everything is agreed”, was made at the beginning and the end of the
document and since then becoming a standard usage in all earnest treaty
deliberations.
Tun Zaw, secretary of Arakan National Council
(ANC) and member of the UNFC's DPN also echoed the same sentiment regarding the
four points agreement of the UNFC's proposal, he said: “Only if all eight
points are thrashed out we could reach the stage of signing (the NCA) and still
need to try and labor more on it,” according to the interview by Mon News
Agency of August 12.
He also make a point that the Tatmadaw or the
Military has no interest, “political will” and advancing the closely connected
“trust-building” whatsoever. He further said that the National League for
Democracy (NLD) regime is enthusiastic and has full commitment for political
settlement but the Tatmadaw is still clinging to the old institutional
mechanism that it has represented for decades.
The government spokesperson Zaw Htay just merely
confirmed the meeting's progress saying: “Half of the points were generally
agreed upon as a result of the sixth round of talks. Discussion concerning the
other half must be presented to the leaders of both sides for a final
decision.”
Chair of the government’s National Reconciliation
and Peace Center Tin Myo Win said he, “hope[s] for a pathway through the peace
process to appear, by fulfilling the points of the discussions with UNFC as
much as we can after presenting to the government,” reported The Irrawaddy on
August 11.
“If we can pass this point, the peace process
will not stop or move backwards. It will keep going forward, toward peace,” he
added.
Outlook and Perspective
Regardless of the prevailing optimistic view that
the remaining four points of UNFC proposal could be thrashed out leading to the
signing of the NCA, lack of political will and trust-building from the part of
the Tatmadaw might hinder real progress on the ground, as Tun Zaw has correctly
pointed out.
With this in mind, let us look at the issues tied
to the UNFC's NCA amendment proposal of bilateral ceasefire; establishment of a
federal union; tripartite composition; constitutional amendment; international
involvement in JMC; formation of a neutral, mediation and enforcement tribunal
for dispute arising from NCA implementation; and resources management.
Bilateral ceasefire is, in fact, not just between
the Tatmadaw and the UNFC, as the former meant to say that ceasefire with only
the NCA signatory EAOs, while the latter understood it to be nationwide
declaration of ceasefire, implying that every corner of the country must be
covered by the ceasefire agreement.
Concerning the establishment of a federal union
with the result or outcomes from 21CPC, the Tatmadaw notion of federalism is
tied to its self-drawn 2008 constitution which is neither federal nor
democratic.
The tripartite composition participation mode at
all level of political negotiations, so far as the UNFC is concerned, would be:
government, Tatmadaw, parliament; EAOs; and political parties. The previous
participation in Union Peace Conference (UPC) – now renamed Union Peace Conference - 21st
Century Panglon (UPC-21CP) – were counted seven parties with 700 participants.
It is still not clear if the Tatmadaw and the government have agreed to the
UNFC's mode of composition.
Constitutional amendment, actually rewriting anew
by making use of the outcomes from 21CPC, would be accepted by the Tatmadaw is
unclear, as it always maintain that it would protect the military-drafted 2008
constitution, which is in no way a federalism, with all its might.
The CoC, ToR and troops relocation still could
not be completed and some already formed state-level JMC were unable to stop
the ceasefire breakdown happening very often between the NCA signatory
Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and the Tatmadaw.
International involvement in the JMC and NCA
mediation-enforcement roles have always been rejected by the Tatmadaw, arguing
that it is a problem between brethren
and outsiders should not be involved,
and is highly unlikely this proposal could sail through easily, even
though a clause in the NCA doesn't rule out such an arrangement.
Indeed, in the NCA a paragraph 12(c), signed
between the 8 EAOs and the government on 15 October 2015, said: “We shall jointly decide on the basis
of mutual agreement, the role of representatives from foreign governments and
international organizations that are involved in the ongoing peace process,
either as observers, advisors or to provide necessary technical assistance at
different levels of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee.”
As for the resources management, including
international humanitarian aids to be administered in cooperation between the
concerned EAOs of the area and the government, with the consent of the people
could be easily ironed out, if all the other proposal points could be worked
out.
To sum up, the above mentioned points have to be
adjusted and agreed upon if the UNFC is to sign the NCA and eventually
participate in the next upcoming 21CPC. It won't do just to repeatedly push for
the UNFC to sign the NCA without accommodating its proposal.
Thus, it would do all parties good if there could
be a compromise on the UNFC proposal in the upcoming seventh official meeting,
as this would demonstrate a desire to be equal and stimulate trust-building
that has been in deficit all along. This, in turn, could even encourage the
Panghsang alliance or Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee
(FPNCC) to rethink its policy of only to meet the government as a group and not
separately.
At the end of the day, it will all depend on if
the NLD and the Tatmadaw would be able to communicate on the same wavelength,
especially where all-inclusiveness, national reconciliation, achieving and
instilling peace for the benefit of the people and country are concerned.
Tags: Opinion
