As SHAN report on National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) hits the headline, The Irrawaddy interview with John Sifton, who is the Asia Division Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), based in Washington DC, is also publicized, on the same date of 5th November.

The question posed by The Irrawaddy to John Siffon, if he could expand on what he said that President Thein Sein didn't hold all the power over reforms, but that the Burmese military did, he said:
“I worry that many outside actors have fundamentally misjudged the transition process. They believe that a quasi-democratic government has taken power from the vestiges of a military authoritarian government and are now navigating a reform process that will end with a democratic government with control over the military, and not the other way around.”

"That’s entirely inaccurate. The fact is, the Burmese military continues to retain overarching political control in this country, in terms of the Constitution, economic power, and their ability to repress most of the population through force, especially people living in ethnic areas. This will continue to be the case until the military is compelled, by one method or another, to relinquish its powers. Of course it isn’t easy for an autocratic junta to give away its powers, but that is why it is so important that they continue to feel outside pressure when the process stalls.”

In the SHAN report of points that need to be discussed, regarding NCA, part has confirmed the Burmese military position of clinging to absolute power monopoly, at least in four instances, supporting John Siffon's statement.
The first point writes:
•    The Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) says the present Tatmadaw (armed forces), being made up of multi-ethnic nationalities, is already a Union Armed Forces (or even a Federal Union Armed Forces though the military is against using the word “Federal”). Somehow this doesn’t sound right to the Nationwide Ceasefire Negotiation Team (NCCT).

This is clearly the denial that the present Tatmadaw or Burma Army is dominated by the ethnic Burman majority from top to the bottom of the military hierarchy. But everyone knows that it is the suppression tool used by the successive military governments to subdue non-Burman ethnics' self-determination movements and as well, to quell any democratic opposition all along. A few cannon fodders from the rank of non-Burman ethnic nationalities don't make it a federal army.

The second point writes:
•    Violations of NCA will be resolved peacefully by parties concerned instead of by Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC) as proposed by UPWC.

The third point writes:
•    The formation of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at different levels and Joint Union Peace Dialogue Committee (The UPWC only agrees to have a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee but still undecided about setting it up at different levels. It is also for the UPCC to oversee the whole peace process)
Both the second and third points tabled by the UPWC demands that the UPCC oversees the whole peace process is like telling your adversary to accept your verdict on a dispute, which you are personally involved. It is like saying, when gambling that “Head I win, tail you lose”. As SHAN rightly pointed out, the UPCC, to all intents and purposes, is another name for the National Defense and Security Council, the most powerful organ in the whole Union.

The fourth point writes:
•  That the NCA should be submitted to the Union Assembly instead of should be ratified by the Union Assembly (The MPC says “submitting the NCA” is a proper technical wording because the executive cannot give orders to the legislature. However since the government party has 53% of seats and the military 25% of seats in the Union Assembly, that should be no problem.)

The argument here is not whether the NCA could sail through with the help of USDP-Military dominated Union Assembly, but how the Union Assembly is seen by the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO). The EAO, including most ethnic political parties, see it as a military dominated Assembly and as such, is part and parcel of the ruling clique. Asking for the endorsement of the agreed NCA is only to buttress the accord made between the non-Burman ethnic nationalities and USDP-Military dominated government. In other words, the USDP-Military government suppose to be only acting on behalf of the Burman majority or for Burman State – which the Burmese military has divided into seven regions now - and not necessarily having the ruling mandate, which covers also the non-Burman ethnic nationalities and their territories.

And so, it seems, it is again difficult to imagine that the Burmese military will reform on its own free will to make way for meaningful, peaceful reconciliation and democratization, if this deeply rooted, pre-conceived, military mindset is not altered to accommodate the aspirations of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.

To sum up, the progress to sign NCA will solely depend on how much the USDP-Military regime could change its mindset of domination and manipulation in all negotiations to accepting the adversaries as equal negotiation partners for a fair deal.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor