Col Sao Swy Mangrai, Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), was asked during a meeting, “How’s the ceasefire going?” In response, he stretched out his arms like he was holding a gun and said, “Like this. Cease! (releases the trigger and lowers the gun) Fire! (raises the gun and squeezes the trigger). Cease! Fire! Cease! Fire!”

He repeated his demonstration until his audience got the message and laughed.

But, lamentably, it wasn’t – and isn’t – a laughing matter.

Since it had signed both “state level” and “union level” ceasefire agreements with Naypyitaw on 28 January 2012, the SSPP/SSA had already been engaged in more than 150 clashes with the Burma Army, that had launched at least 6 major operations against it, after it refused to move out from its long-established strongholds along the west bank of the Salween:

·       June 2012                              Loi phapheung

Mong Awd Tract

Monghsu township

·       July 2012                                7^th mile camp

Mong-Kao tract

Tangyan township

·       February 2013                    Loilarn

Mong-Long tract

Tangyan township

·       March 2013                          Kawnghsai-Hwe Pu

Loizay tract

Tangyan township

·       June 2014                              Loi Hseng

Namtawng tract

Monghsu township

·       June-October 2014          Ta Pha Hsawng

Wan Warp tract

Kehsi township

Most recently on 9 October, flushed with victory over the removal of the SSA from Ta Pha Hsawng 6 days earlier, the Burma Army, through its Shan State minister Col Aung Thu, “notified” it to withdraw its troops from Nam Hsi Zeng-Loilarn, near the Salween crossing of Ta Man Hsom.

(Note On the opposite bank in the east is Pangyang, the gateway to the United Wa State Army’s headquarters in Panghsang aka Pang-Kham). 

There is no question what will happen if the SSA refuses to budge, ceasefire or no ceasefire, agreement or no agreement.

According to the 5-point ceasefire agreement signed in Taunggyi, “It is agreed that SSPP/SSA units, headquartered in Wanhai (Kehsi township), will be deployed pro tempore at present positions.”

The Burma Army appears to be long past caring about the text of the agreement, insisting that SSPP/SSA units are not allowed to move outside Wanhai. That doing so violates the agreement, thereby permitting the Burma Army to do whatever it wants with it.

Incidentally, the same position has been taken with regards to the SSPP’s cousin in the south, Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA). While the text of the 16 January 2012 agreement says: Homong  and Monghta (on the Thai-Burma border) are designated as towns for RCSS/SSA headquarters, the Burma Army’s interpretation is that RCSS/SSA units are not allowed to move outside Homong-Monghta areas. As a result, more than 100 clashes have taken place between the two sides, which included one major operation.

Clearly, the Burma Army’s present target is the SSPP/SSA. But the RCSS/SSA knows well who’s next on the Burma Army’s hit list.

Which doesn’t augers well for the ongoing peace process.

It is therefore high time President Thein Sein reins in the Army before the peace process he initiated on 17 August 2011 is being derailed by it.