By: Sai Wansai
Wednesday, 12 September 2012

On 08 August, BBC, Burmese program, reported Deputy Defence Minister Colonel Aung Thaw accused Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) that peace could not be achieved, due to the insistence that political dialogue has to come first before ceasefire agreement could be reached.

In response to the accusation, KIA spokesman La Nan said that during more than ten years of ceasefire period, no political settlement could be worked out. Instead, the government started to launch offensive on the KIA last year and he pointed out the fact that ceasefire alone cannot lead to restoration of peace.

The BBC further reported that Colonel Aung Thaw maintained that the Burma Army followed the Presidential directive of 10 December 2011 to halt offensive on the KIA. But the KIA spokesman rejected it, by pointing out the ongoing numerous offensives and reinforcement of the Burma Army, continuing to these days.

Mr. La Nan insisted that the armed resistance within the non-Burman ethnic groups occurred, due to political grievances and violation of self-determination rights by successive military regimes; and it would be meaningless just to talk about ceasefire without touching the core issue of political settlement. He said “trust-building” is vital in solving the conflict. And that only gradual, step-by-step, building of trust, coupled with earnest political dialogue could lead to meaningful ceasefire. The KIA experience of 17 years ceasefire period – starting 1994 up to 2011 - with the successive military governments, including the recent military-back one, without having political dialogue has shown that ceasefire alone cannot produce the desired result of democracy, equality and universal human rights.

Meanwhile, on 08 August, Myanmar Ahlin, the mouthpiece of the regime, reported, President Thein Sein at the meeting with national races affairs ministers from regions and states in Naypyitaw said that if the regime could reach ceasefire agreement with the KIA, peace process could be taken as nearly successful. He went on to stress that various ethnic armed groups were different and that was why more time would be needed in negotiation; and that the concerned national and states ministers, together with the people should work together with his government to be more successful. He said that at the moment the peace process was still at national and state level and only after this could a union level discussion be held and decision made within the parliament.

Problematic ceasefire

But the irony is that the President’s optimistic view and the urging for cooperation from all sectors, in relation to the ongoing ethnic conflict, have been marred by the recent armed clashes and human casualties in Kachin and Shan States.

On 06 September, Kachin News Group (KNG) reported that officials with the KIA claimed as many as 140 soldiers from the Burmese military died on August 29 following a massive explosion at a mining compound that army forces were using as a temporary base in Kachin's state Hpakant (also spelled Hpakan, Phakant) jade mining district.

The massive explosion that ripped through the compound belonging to the Wai Aung Kaba Company near the Myauk Phyu jade mine reportedly caused what has been described as the single highest one day death toll for the government side during its 15-month Kachin offensive so far. According to KIA sources the lethal blast was triggered by an initial smaller explosion planted by members of the Kachin resistance. When the first blast went off it caused the large stockpile of explosives used for mining which were stored at the site to explode shortly afterward, causing what was described as a huge explosion.

On 08 September, KNG reported that a request made by representatives from Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) be allowed to collect the bodies left behind by a massive August 29 explosion at a mining compound in the jade rich Hpakant mining district in western Kachin State, has been rejected by the armed wing of the KIO.

Major N’hkum Doi La, commander of KIA Battalion 6 told the Kachin News Group last week that he had personally refused the NLD request because no one including KIA personnel are allowed to enter the site.

According to Major N’hkum Doi La the Red Cross, an officially neutral organization which is not affiliated with the government or other political groups will be allowed to visit the blast site to retrieve the dead, in keeping with longstanding rules of war which the KIO claims to follow.

On 04 September, Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) reported that more than 1,000 Palaung ethnic residents in northern Shan State have fled their homes as fighting between government forces and several ethnic armed groups continues to erupt in the region.

Lwe Poe Rein of the Ta’ang (Palaung) Students and Youth Association said fighting between the Burmese Army and armed groups, including the Kachin Independence Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Shan State Army-North, near Kutkhai, Mantong, Namhsan and Namtu townships has forced residents to abandon their homes.

On 07 and 09 September, Tai Freedom reported that armed clashes in central and eastern Shan State continued to take place, escalating the count of armed engagements with the Burma Army, which was said to be over 30 times in a row even after the ceasefire agreement has been signed in December last year.
Meanwhile, SHAN reported on 10 September, that the Shan State Army (SSA) South also reported clashes in Tong Lao, Mongkeung Township, Shan State South; and Mong Pu, Mongpiang Township, Shan State East on Friday, 7 September.

“We are also fighting alongside the SSA North (against the Burma Army offensive) in Shan State North,” the SSA South spokesman Major Lao Hseng confirmed.

Ethnic dissatisfaction

The non-Burman ethnic groups dissatisfaction about the ceasefire talks were documented by Alternative Asean Network on Burma in its August 2012 issue as below:-

Despite the succession of ceasefire agreements concluded under Thein Sein, in August representatives from various ethnic armed groups and political parties expressed serious reservations about the ongoing ceasefire process and questioned the sincerity of the regime’s peace overtures.

• 9 August: Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) Vice-President Abel Tweed said that “none of the conditions” agreed during negotiations with the regime had been met and that the Tatmadaw (a.k.a. Burma Army) continued to expand its presence in Karenni State.
• 12 August: Karen National Union (KNU) Chairman Tamla Baw said that the regime was pursuing negotiations with an emphasis on “business matters” rather than genuine political dialogue.
• 13 August: It was reported that New Mon State Party (NMSP) Secretary Hong Sar said that the regime lacked sincerity in ongoing negotiations and had failed to address political issues.
• 15 August: Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) leader Hkun Htun Oo said that peace talks should not merely focus on land or “business concessions” for ethnic groups but on resolving political issues such as a more decentralized form of governance.
• 17 August: It was reported that Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) spokesperson La Nan said that the regime was pursuing a “systematic strategy” of holding peace talks with ethnic armed groups while simultaneously waging military offensives.
• 17 August: It was reported that Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) leader Yawd Serk said that many of the terms of the agreements reached between the SSA-S and the regime had not been implemented and that although the regime had “declared peace,” the Tatmadaw – Burmese name for Burma Army - was pursuing “a different path.”

In August, the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) became the 13th ethnic armed group to sign a ceasefire agreement with the regime since President Thein Sein took office. On 25 August, PNLO officials and a regime delegation led by Rail Transportation Minister Aung Min signed an eight-point agreement in Taunggyi, Shan State. The PNLO also signed a five-point agreement with a state-level regime delegation led by Shan State Border Affairs Minister Col Aung Thu.

Human toll

As one could see, the human toll, both civilian and combatants caused by armed conflict between the Burma Army and the ethnic resistance forces are incredibly high, not to mention the economic difficulties faced by the population and constant human rights violations, due to the ongoing government offensives.

To sum up, although the Thein Sein government has concluded ceasefire agreements with 13 ethnic armed resistance movements, since it came into office in March 2011, it is still fighting against the Shan State Army (SSA) North and the Shan State Army (SSA) South both of which have signed the ceasefire agreements. Heavier fighting meanwhile is taking place against the KIA with which the present government’s predecessor had signed the peace agreement in 1994. The government’s 15 month offensive has already displaced nearly 100,000 people, according to KIA sources.

Conceptual differences of need satisfaction and values

While it is praiseworthy that ceasefire talks have been conducted by Thein Sein government, rather than just shooting at each other, the facts on the ground suggest that the President needs to do more than just being optimistic, delighting international opinion and enjoying good press reports. The actual situation and hard facts on the ground suggest that nation-wide peaceful atmosphere is still out of reach and deliverance of basic need satisfaction and values of non-Burman ethnic nationalities are still not in sight. Other than that, the success and failure of the reform process would heavily hinge on achievement of nation-wide, peaceful environment or not.

A question to ask here is: What exactly are the need satisfaction and values of non-Burman ethnic nationalities and those of the Burmese military and political class?

The answer for the non-Burman ethnic groups is simple. It is the rights of self-determination, democracy and equality, as has time and again being spelled out during the past decades by non-Burman ethnic political parties and resistance forces.

One would argue that the Thein Sein government is doing just that and should be patient. But the real problem lies in the fact that the approach or view of the Burman political class, including the present regime, to the need and value system largely contradict with those of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities.

The successive military regimes, including the Thein Sein government, have envisioned a nation-state dominated by the Burman and have never been ready to share political decision-making power with the non-Burman ethnic groups in a true sense. The 1974 BSPP and as well, the present 2008 Constitutions are designed as unitary system, which goes against the equitable power-sharing, decentralization, federal setup, as agreed upon in 1947 Panglong Agreement, which is the genesis of the new political entity formed in 1948 as the “Union of Burma”.

However, in 1961 federal reform movement, spearheaded and proposed by the Shan State Government and supported by all other non-Burman nationalities, is in effect the last legal effort and political solution, to ward off the growing ethnic conflicts between the Burman and non-Burman ethnic groups by introducing amendments to the 1947 Union Constitution which was federal only in form but unitary in practice.

In 1962, the unilateral action of the Burmese military regime in abolishing the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma, automatically frees the non-Burman ethnic peoples from all contractual obligations, both legal and constitutional, to that union.

In turn, the declaration of the suspension of the Constitution became a self denunciation that Burma had overnight become an aggressor-nation instead of partner. Thus, in a legal-constitutional sense, the Union of Burma ceased to exist.

But the successive Burmese military regimes, including the military-backed Thein Sein government, have been attempting to hold the defunct union together by sheer military force, whilst the real and only solution is political. One could clearly see, on why more than fifty percent of the Burma Army’s more than 500 or so battalions are deployed in Shan and Kachin States alone.

In retrospect, intentionally or unknowingly, the Burmese military oppression of the ethnic nationalities has taken the form of neo-colonialism, asserting itself to the role of colonial master in a crude form, much more worst than its British predecessor.

Thus, it is clear that the need and value system of the Burman military and political class is none other than the monopolization of political power and ethnocentrism, at the expense of non-Burman ethnic nationalities’ lost of rights to self-determination.

Why federalism?

The question arises on why the non-Burman ethnic groups should still like to rebuild the shattered union, under such horrible rights violations by the Burmese military. The short answer to it would be the prevailing regional and international mood and configuration, which are against the disintegration of an existing nation-state. In other words, establishment of a federal union goal is more likely or easier to achieve than outright total independence or secession. The cold fact is that the decision is not made out of sheer love or any other purpose, but only on a pragmatic ground and calculation to survive as non-state nations, not more and not less.

Also, all stakeholders should be reminded that the present day Burma or Myanmar is a relatively new political entity, made up of at least three countries, namely, Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma, Federated Shan States and Karenni.

The Shan and the Karenni joined Burma in their struggle for self-determination from the British and jointly attained independence on January 4, 1948.

And as an extension and interpretation of Panglong Agreement and spirit, all other ethnic groups like Chin, Kachin, Mon, Karen, Arakanese and other ethnic minorities are all stakeholders, even though they were not yet assigned to the administrative status of states on the eve of independence from the British, they have lived at their respective states from time immemorial.

Mindset change important

But how could an equitable and fair union be possible, when the regime is bent on upholding its ethnocentrism and political power monopoly?

The answer lies in the ability of the Burman military and political class to review their outdated racial supremacy, radical stance and reform their mindsets from within.

In practical terms, they would first have to do away with their colonial master mindset – unspoken but nevertheless practising it in a day-to-day politics - and refusal to treat all non-Burman ethnic groups as equal partners. Secondly, they should honour the Panglong Agreement – the only legal bond between the Burman and the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, signed in 1947 - and restoration of the rights to self-determination of all ethnic groups. And finally, they should accept the implementation of power-sharing and decentralization within the framework of a genuine federalism, compatible to the nature of a multi-ethnic state, as agreed upon prior to the formation of the Union of Burma in 1948.

Consequently, so long as the Thein Sein regime or Burman political class continues to hijack the ethnic rights of self-determination, in the name of unity and non-disintegration of the union; wedded to the notion of centralized, unitary system; domination or monopoly of political decision-making power; and treats the non-Burman ethnic nationalities as de facto colonial possessions; no amount of ceasefire agreements would be able to extinguish the flames of ethnic armed conflict and the resistance will continue unabated.

The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor