UNFC'S FUTURE: Waning political clout or revamping the organization's image?
Concerned Burma watchers and
people involved in the country's peace process eyes are trained on the United
Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) two-phase meeting, one explicitly for the
UNFC members and the other, that was programmed to host other Ethnic Armed
Organizations (EAOs) that are operating within the country, ethnic political
parties and civil society groups.
It is not that the UNFC is seen as
a crucial prime mover that it used to be, but whether it would be able to
survive the wave of resignation that has inevitably weaken its bargaining
stance as an umbrella ethnic group. And besides, of course, on how the
organization would fair politically in the aftermath of its remoulding and
reshuffling the setup.
Background
This formidable ethnic umbrella
organization was officially formed from the 12
remnants EAOs of the Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union (CEFU) on
16 February 2011, in Chiang Mai, Thailand,
which is also its first conference. They included: Kachin Independent
Organization/Kachin Independent Army (KIO/KIA), Karenni National Progressive
Party (KNPP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State Progress Party/Shan State
Army (SSPP/SSA), Arakan National Council/Arakan Army (ANC/AA), Lahu Democratic
Union (LDU), Wa National Organisation (WNO), Palaung State Liberation
Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), Chin National Front (CNF), Karen National Union (KNU),
and Pa-O National Organization (PNO).
The organization's objectives were
and still are to build a genuine ethnic unity, lasting peace in the
country, establishment of a genuine multi-party system, and to build a peaceful
federal union that all could live together.
However, in 2014, the KNU even before the signing of Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA) in October 2015, suspended itself from the UNFC, due to the
disagreement over the management of the organization and rivalry on leadership
position with the KIO. A year later, in October 2015, two other members - PNLO
and the CNF - were suspended from the council after signing the government’s
NCA, which other members had rejected because it was argued not to be
all-inclusive of all the armed groups. The MNDAA and the TNLA resignations from
the bloc followed in 2016, as the UNFC wasn't able to give a helping hand in
their resistance of the government's forces military onslaught. The KIO and the
WNO followed suit with the resignation in 2017; the former out of necessity to
join the EAOs for its survival in the face of the Burma Army or Tatmadaw's heavy offensives and the latter to join the
United Wa State Army (UWSA).
Presently, the
UNFC's member counts have dwindled from original 12 to only 5 members, which includes ANC, KNPP, LDU, NMSP
and SSPP.
UNFC 2nd
Conference
The second UNFC
conference kicked off during the last two weeks of June. According to the
UNFC's eight-point statement of June 29, the first part of the conference held
from June 20 to 26 was attended by 62 participants, which covered the second
term period of August 2014 to June 2017. During the gathering, the reading out
of various foreign, domestic reports, analysing and endorsing them; election of
new leadership; resignation of some members and as well, acceptance of new
membership issues were discussed and decided.
While the
acceptance of the new membership would be decided in the course of time by the
UNFC appointed committee for this sole purpose, the resignation of the members
were duly approved, without problem. Of all the resigned EAOs, KIO's case was
highly emotional, as it was the bulwark for the UNFC, in terms of military
might and as well, a generous financial backers of the council.
General N'Ban La
explained by saying: “Also due to regional situation, the government-Tatmadaw's
pressure under selective administrative condition, we, the northern groups,
were pushed to become united. That is why we have to resign from the UNFC.”
Accordingly, the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Chin National Front (CNF), Kachin
National Organization (KNO), Kuki National Organization (KNO), and Zomi
Revolutionary Organization (ZRO) have asked to join the UNFC's ranks.
The election of
UNFC for the third term was undertaken, where 24 council members were elected,
which includes 9 central committee members. The council line-up includes: Nai
Han Thar from the NMSP, who was elected as the chairman of the council, Dr.
Khin Maung from the ANC as vice-chairman, Khu Oo Reh from the KNPP as general
secretary, Hsur Onn from the SSPP as joint-general secretary-1 and Solomon from
the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) as joint-general secretary-2.
The second part of the conference
took place from June 27 to 29, which included friendly EAOs, political parties
and civilian-based organizations or civil societies, observers, including
technical consultative teams of one hundred and three altogether.
The second part gathering
undertook to analyse and discuss issues that were taken into account at Mai Ja
Yang, ethnic leadership conference in July 2016. They were Panglong principle
guidelines or Panglong Manual; basic federal principles; position on defence
and security; Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD); National-level Political
Dialogue (NPD) – actually it should be termed sub-national-level (remark by
this writer); and the outcomes of Union Peace Conference - 21st
Century Panglong (UPC–21CP). However, it is not clear whether common agreement
were reached among the attendees.
Most of the statement dwell on the
shortcomings of the UPC–21CP, on which different levels of implementation were
not appropriately followed and in some cases even breached the NCA's FPD
guidelines.
The statement paragraph four
pointed out that the NCA implementation highest body, the Joint Implementation
Committee Meeting (JICM) and the two directly under it, the Union Peace
Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) and Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee-Union
(JMC-U), the former responsible for UPC-21CP and the latter for monitoring
nationwide ceasefire arrangement, were all very weak at every stage in
implementing the NCA and not doing their duties as prescribed.
JICM is made up of two groups with
8 members each. One is the government, parliament and military combined and the
other the signatory EAOs.
The JMC-U is made up of three
groups. The two groups with 10 members each are the government, parliament and
military combined and the other, the signatory EAOs. In addition, 3 civilian
representatives each chosen by the military and the signatory EAOs, making 6
altogether also are included.
The UPDJC is made up of three
groups, each with 16 members. The three groups are the government, parliament
and military combined, the signatory EAOs, and political parties. It is the highest
organ in directing the country’s political dialogue, including the convening of
UPC-21CP.
The UNFC statement paragraph five
stated the government's inability to conduct sub-national-level political
dialogues; not given enough time to hold sectoral - political, security,
economy, land and natural resources, and social issues – discussions; unclear
job description of the UPDJC; inadequate arrangement in holding the UPC–21CP;
the outcome of conference results (Pyidaungsu or Union Accord) didn't cover the
opinion of all the conference participants; no equality in all levels of
groups' discussions; and unable to conclude the FPD.
The paragraph six said that the
KNU and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), both the NCA signatories,
criticism on the last UPC–21CP as being on the same wave length with the second
part UNFC conference participants' opinion.
Its closing two paragraphs
recommendations said that in order to overcome the said weak points and achieve
long-lasting and genuine peace with the termination of conflicts, negotiation
is the only way out; and that all-inclusiveness participation of all groups;
re-examining and amending of the FPD; to first attain acceptable condition that
all could agree with before signing the Union Accord have to be carried out.
It also vowed to strive for
democracy, national (ethnic) equality, and rights of self-determination in
order to build the federal union and peaceful atmosphere together with the
EAOs, ethnic political parties and civil societies.
Apart from UNFC, United
Nationalities Alliance (UNA), Nationalities Brotherhood Federation (NBF), Women
League of Burma (WLB) and Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-Signed EAOs (NCA-S
EAOs) were present at the UNFC held conference.
Perspective
The question of whether the UNFC
would disintegrate and fade away like its predecessor organizations the
National Democratic Front (NDF) and Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) or
continue to survive now seems to be answered, if its latest statement is to be
taken as an indication or clue.
It might have endured the great
loss of having to let go its giant bulwark member, the KIO that has led to the weakening of its
military capabilities and of course, financial prowess also. But in terms of
political outreach and ethnic solidarity, it has really put on some plus
points, as ethnic political umbrella groups like UNA and NBF were active
participants, together with ethnic civil society organizations, including even
like the CNF and ABSDF which are NCA signatory EAOs.
Thus, it could be said that the
feeble UNFC is now able to revamp its image and position to be a political
platform for most ethnic nationality groups striving for equality and rights of
self-determination.
Again, the signatory 8 EAOs, the
UNFC, and the 7 EAOs Pangkham alliance or Federal Political Negotiation
Consultative Committee (FPNCC) now seem to see themselves not as separate
groups with different interest, but struggling for the same political aim or
aspirations. And as such, they now see each other not as enemies but organizations
united in their political will, aspirations and conviction, a proposition stand
point made by the departing, UNFC former chairman General N'Ban La.
From the government point of view
it could well be that it is angling to cash in some benefit in the form of
wooing some UNFC members into its fold by forcing them sign the NCA, as it
calculated the weakened UNFC would easily give in to the pressure or out of
worries that they could be left hanging without solid political base. This
assessment have shown to be premature as the government hasn't win over any new
group signing the NCA, since the NLD came to power more than a year ago.
For the short term, the
government's sincerity would be tested when the UNFC and government meet during
this month, where negotiation on UNFC's nine-point amendment proposal of the
NCA would take place. If the government sticks to its short term gains, the
give-and-take accommodation would be hard to come by and the stalemate with the
UNFC would continue.
While it is understandable that
now the government would need more to talk to the Panghsang alliance given that
it possesses eighty percent of the whole ethnic fighting force, including the
pressure to iron out the differences by China to both parties, treating the
UNFC as a low-hanging fruit that could be picked anytime it wanted would be a
disaster, as it would be a litmus test for the government's sincerity and
political willingness to really go for equitable political power-sharing,
embedded in a genuine federal union system of governance.
But for the longer term, the
success or failure of the peace talks would depend on whether the UNFC's
recommendations that echoed all the EAOs, political parties and civil society
organizations are heeded. And for the immediate jump-start of peace negotiation
that hasn't moved an inch forward for sometimes would depend on whether the
government is ready to accommodate the Panghsang alliance desire of meeting all
its members as a group and not separately as has been demanded, as the first step.
The ball is now actually in the
government-Tatmadaw's court, so to speak.
Tags: Opinion
