(8-11 January 2017)

This time even before the journal on the 24^th trip was properly finished, I was back in Burma/Myanmar again.

And since the strategic planning meeting, due 9 January, was postponed at the request of two signatory organizations, there was only a few other informal meetings left for me to attend.

As usual no individuals, organizations and places will be named so I don’t end up killing the goose that is laying a golden egg for all of us each day.

Day One. Sunday, 8 January 2017

A great country is like the lowland toward which all streams flow.

Hence, if a great country can lower itself before a small country, it will win over the small country;

And if a small country can lower itself before a great country, it will win over the big country.

The one wins by stooping; the other by remaining low.

Tao The Ching, Chapter 61,

John C.H.Wu translation

My arrival in Hopeland is followed by mutual updates of information with friends. As always, I have much to learn from them, most of whom are younger, energetic and eager for peace.

Here are some of the things I have learned and would like to share with all:

§  During the December visit to Panghsang (officially, Pang-Kham), the United Wa State Army (UWSA) reportedly for the first time spoke about signing the NCA. Their problem however was with the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) which, according to the Tatmadaw’s presentation at the (31 August-3 September 2015) 21^st Century Panglong, must come first. U Thein Zaw, the government’s chief representative, was able to relieve their worry by convincing them that although the DDR first is the Tatmadaw’s expressed wish, what is certain is that the EAOs would implement the DDR only at the 7^th and final phase of the NCA roadmap.

For those who are unfamiliar with the NCA, an official translation of the political roadmap in the NCA is reproduced here:

 The political roadmap

20. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar Government and the Ethnic Armed Organizations shall abide by the following political roadmap:

a)      Signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

b)      Drafting and adopting the “Framework for Political Dialogue” by representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations.

c)       Holding national political dialogue based on the adopted Framework for Political Dialogue, and negotiating security reintegration matters and undertaking other necessary tasks that both parties agree can be carried out in advance.

d)      Holding the Union Peace Conference.

e)      Signing the Pyidaungsu Accord.

f)       Submitting the Pyidaungsu Accord to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw for ratification.

g)      Implementing all provisions contained in the Pyidaungsu Accord, and carrying out security reintegration matters.

(According to the 36 resolutions attached to the NCA, “security reintegration matters” means SSR ‘security Sector Reform’ and DDR)

The Wa leadership then proposed a visit to Naypyitaw to present a 7 point proposition to the State Counselor and the Commander-in-Chief, if possible, before the Chinese New Year (28 January).

Note To this date, the visit is yet to take place.

§  Relationship between the SD and the CinC has yet to improve, despite a meeting in November. which produced a statement eulogizing the Tatmadawmen. “When the hero and the heroine are locking horns against each other,” says a friend, “anything can happen, like beating somebody up just to spite the spouse.” That, several express concern, may adversely affect the peace process.

§  One encouraging but unconfirmed report is that the CinC was not reacting negatively to the idea of constituent states having their own constitution, after the inter governmental workshop on federalism was held on 13-15 December.

“If he’s going to go along with another one: The Right of Self Determination, that is the right to exercise three political powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) in accordance with the agreed common principles for the Union constitution, the rest will be plain sailing,” comments an academic. “Because other principles are just Ta-Nwe-Ngin-Tazin-Pa (Pull one string of the creeper and the rest will come along).”

§  The problem is that none in the room is sure whether or not the Union Peace Conference (UPC) #3, aka 21^st Century Panglong (21CP) #2, is going to take place in February at all.

Apart for the “lover’s tiff” between the SC and the CinC, there is fighting up in the north, where China and Wa are suspected of involvement, and the UNFC saying if it is invited only as observers it won’t come. Economy is yet another “big,big headache,” calling for prompt action. “She needs some notable achievements,” says one. “Right now, there isn’t anything to show.”

§  Interestingly, there is difference of opinion as to how powerful the CinC is:  In 2011, when he was pulled up from the bottom of several other senior generals to become the Senior General by the outgoing Senior General Than Shwe, it was clear, he was entirely dependent on “the Old Man” to be able to command. But some think the situation has changed. “He has removed most of the officers senior to him throughout the past 4 years and replaced them with his own men,” says one. “Today, if U Than Shwe speaks 100 words to him, I’ll be surprised if he listens to more than 10 of them.”

Others however point out that incidents like the overthrow of U Shwe Mann, and later, U Thein Sein, as heads of the USDP, followed by the appointment of Gen Myint Swe as Vice President, wouldn’t have come about without personal intervention by the former strongman.

All in all, everything seems to be hanging in the balance, some are betting that there’ll be no UPC 21 next month.

One bright side is that the National level political dialogues (ND) is starting to take place, beginning with the PaOs and Karens. The Shans and others are due to follow soon. “We will know what our people want it said, whether or not there is a Panglong in February,” declares a Karen friend.