To Hopeland and Back: The 23rd trip
Day Five.
Wednesday, 9 November 2016
Sometimes,
it is as necessary to take risks to win peace, as it is in war to win
victories.
Drum Beat
(1954)
Today’s the Pyidaungsu Institute for Peace and
Dialogue (PI) meeting which I have the honor to host. That’s why I wasn’t able
to stay in Naypyitaw last evening, no matter how much I wanted to.
Here are some of the observations by the
participants on current situation:
·
Burma is jammed between US, China, India and Japan, depending on all of
them to survive. The dark horse is Russia that keeps a low profile in the
country but according to Geopolitics weekly, its biggest concern is its
“sprawling landmass and lack of defenses” that “compel it to reach beyond its
borders and build buffers against the West.”
·
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has visited all these big powers except Russia,
where the President went in May.
·
Noteworthy is the remark by the outgoing Japanese defense minister Gen
(not General, just his name) Nakatani before his June visit to Burma: that
three countries (Thailand, Myanmar and East Timor) are very important for
Japan’s security.
·
In October, the United States upgraded its relations with Burma by
removing several former junta leaders and “cronies” from its blacklist.
·
Inside the country, Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi announced on Burmese New Year’s Day peace and reconciliation were
her priorities. Accordingly, the Union Peace Conference #2 (re-labeled UPC 21st
Century Panglong #1) where 18 EAOs had attended was held, which announced that
the UPC#3 will be in February following (local based, ethnic based and topic
based) political dialogues. The 1975 state protection law has been revoked. So
has the notorious Section 5 J.
·
The “dark side of the moon” includes:
 |
Dr. Sai Oo
|
-
Still no report from Union Election Commission (UEC) of the 2015
general elections
-
The war has intensified and the Lady “seems to be at a loss” how to
handle the military on the one hand, and the peace process on the other
And here are some of PI’s
key plans:
· The PIY (PI Yangon) will
become main office headed by Dr Sai Oo. PICM (PI Chiangmai) will remain as PILO
(PI Liaison Office)
· More publications,
especially the “Bilateral Agreements” between Naypyitaw and the EAOs
· Continues working with key
stakeholders in the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC), Union Peace
Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) and the National level Political Dialogues
(ND)
· Recruitment of new
researchers
The journal however will be incomplete without
touching on the negotiations between Naypyitaw and the non-signatories. Here
are some of the observations:
·
The general impression is that the international community wants the
NCA signed, but has little understanding of the reasons behind the
non-signatories’ refusal to sign
·
The government is also suspicious that the 9 point proposal presented
by the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) is just a delaying tactic,
because the proposal, while including other items, does not have anything to
say about “all inclusiveness,” which it has time and again stated publicly as
the key condition prior to its signing
·
On the non-signatories’ side, the government, or rather, the military’s
continued offensives remain a stumbling block
·
One thing seems to be clear: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, unlike U Thein Sein,
her predecessor, doesn’t have any legitimacy problem. She therefore has very
little incentive to compromise with anyone, except the military
For the military, it appears
to be gaining legitimacy, thanks to its decision to allow the Lady’s party to
assume office. The Arakan Army’s activities, for instance, had been dubbed by
it “as anti-democracy and a hostile act toward the state.” If it can say this
to AA, so it can to others too
A lawyer friend I meet later tells me this: I’ve
already advised the UNFC that it should sign, at least for two reasons:
·
One, if you keep on refusing to sign it, the world will think you’re
just being pig-headed, and if the Burma Army attacks, you have no one to blame
but yourself. On the other hand, if you have signed it and the Burma Army still
attacks you, the whole blame will be on it instead
 |
Marshal Ivan Konev (Photo: pinterest.com)
|
·
Two, by signing the NCA, you
will have the legal protection from it, as it has been ratified by the
Parliament. But if you don’t, there will be nothing to protect you, not even
the bilateral agreements you had signed, because the NCA only ‘recognizes,
reinforces and reaffirms’ these agreements only if you are an NCA signatory
Of course, there is a
question about the military launching attacks to pressure the EAOs either to
sign or, though surprising it may seem, not to sign.
Marshal Ivan Konev, the Russian general who made a name for himself
during World War Ⅱ, has a winning answer which I think is applicable
to both military or political situations:
Make up your mind what the
enemy expects you do, then do just the opposite
The evening is quietly spent
celebrating the victory of Donald Trump, as well as weeping for the defeat of
Hillary. I’m sure you know how we do it.
Tags: Opinion
