Mong Ton Dam issue fast becoming a Shan's “Alamo”?
“Drowning a Thousand Island” documentary film produced by Action
for Shan State Rivers launched on 21 September in Rangoon, Taunggyi, Kengtung
and Chaing Mai portrays the forced exodus tragedy of the Kun Hing area, while
revealing the unique natural beauty of the “Thousand Island” area
along the Pang River tributary of the Salween, which is presently being
threatened by plans to build the massive Mong Ton Dam in southern Shan State.
Breathtaking drone
footage provides bird’s eye panoramas of hitherto unseen waterfalls, rapids and
ancient temples nestled among the countless islands in the Pang river, out of
bounds for decades due to the ongoing ethnic armed conflict, to astonished
viewers.
The 1996 to 1998 forced
relocation of twelve townships in central Shan State included Kun Hing, Nam
Zarng, Lai Kha, Ke See, Murng Kerng, Murng Nai, Lang Kher, Murmg Su, Murng Pan,
Murng Paeng, Loi Lem and Ho Pong.
Although this particular
central Shan State township scenic and tragic narrative centers around Kun
Hing, the actual affected areas included adjacent twelve townships involving
some 300,000 people.
In order to understand
the bitterness of the Shan people and as to why this issue of Mong Ton Dam is
fast becoming the Shan people's “Alamo”
or last crucial political bastion, one would need to look at another two
written documentation reports; namely, “Dispossessed” and “License
to Rape”. The former published by Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF)
and the latter a joint publication by SHRF and Shan Women Action Network
(SWAN), in 1998 and 2002 respectively.
But first let us look at the proposed Mong Ton Dam project, which is gearing to start if the government could have its way.
But first let us look at the proposed Mong Ton Dam project, which is gearing to start if the government could have its way.
Salween Project and Mong Ton Dam
The blueprints for a
hydro-power project on the Salween include a series of dams in Shan State: the
7,100 megawatt Mong Ton Dam; the 1,400 MW Kunlong Dam; the 1,200 MW Nawng Pha
Dam; and the 200 MW Mantone Dam. The project would also include plans for a
4,000 MW Ywathit Dam in Karenni State, and the 1,360 MW Hat Gyi Dam in Karen
State. Investors in the projects include the China Three Gorges Corporation, a
Chinese state-owned firm which operates the world’s largest dam on the Yangtze River.
The other foreign firms involved in the Salween project are: Sinohydro; China
Southern Grid; and a subsidiary of the state-run Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand.
According to Salween Watch Coalition's report of March
2016, the “Current Status of Dam Projects on the Salween River,” Mong Ton Dam
Project (Tasang Dam/Mai Tong Dam) is
located about 40 kilometers from Ban Arunothai, Chiang Dao District, Chiang
Mai, Thailand. Originally, the dam was to be located at Tasang, but as the
former project developers was unable to construct the dam in this location, a
new project was proposed.
The dam site for the ‘Mai
Tong Dam’, as it is known in Burmese, is 10 kilometers along the river from the
initial location, closer to Mong Ton Township. The Australian company, Snowy
Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) has been commissioned to carry out an
Environmental Impact Assessment in Shan State. However the legitimacy and
quality of the report has been questioned by a number of civil society organizations
in Shan State.
The study team has met
with opposition from local villagers in many areas. The study is also far from
complete, as part of the study area along the Salween River is under the
control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and they have refused to give
permission to the study team to enter the area.
A major concern is the
size of the project: The dam site and reservoir will stretch 870 kilometers
along the Salween and Pang Rivers, its main tributary in central Shan State.
Local people in the area were forcibly relocated by Burmese government troops
in the 90’s, and at least 300,000 people were displaced during this time.
The projected reservoir
size is said to be 640 sq kilometers.
The
Protest
Following the 12 August
announcement of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government that the
hydro power projects on the Salween River will be continued as the country is
in need of energy, the 26 Shan Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) sent an open
letter on 17 August, demanding to stop the project.
The Committee for Shan
State Unity (CSSU) followed suit, on 29 August, issuing a statement, demanding
that the project be shelved.
The eight point protest
and rejection statement of CSSU mainly underlined the fact that energy won from
the hydro-power dams of 15,000 megawatts would be just for export; the NLD
government has committed itself to dam the Salween river; the China part of
Salween (called Nu river) was suspended due to the fear of earth quake, but
pushed for the building of it on Burma, Shan State, side being unreasonable;
Burma is a natural disaster prone region, including earth quake, partly due to
the exploitation of the natural resources; no transparency according to the
international standard in conducting the feasibility studies; pushing big dam
projects before constitutional amendments addressing the power and resources
sharing could be worked out; and urged the government to review the project
which threatened people’s lives, property and
homes, and also destroy the ecological system.
The
final eight paragraph explicitly warned: “Large dam projects threaten
people’s lives, property and homes, and also destroy the ecological system.
Just as the government has decided to review and suspend the Myitsone dam, we
strongly urge the government to review the dam projects on the Salween river.
If the Salween dams go ahead against the wishes of local ethnic communities, we
will join with all the ethnic people, civil society groups and environmental
groups in opposing the dams.”
The CSSU is comprised of
Shan political parties and armed groups, including the Shan Nationalities
League for Democracy (SNLD), the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP),
the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State
(RCSS).
Speaking at the Foreign
Correspondents Club of Thailand (FCCT) in the Thai capital recently, Sai Khur
Hseng of the Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization and spokesperson for the
joint-statement, said that the new Burmese government has tried to implement
the hydro-power projects without caring about the suffering of ordinary people.
“While all eyes were on
the Irrawaddy- Myitsone dam, Burma has quietly sold off the Salween to China,”
said Sai Khur Hseng. “We fear there has been a trade-off.”
Regarding the Mong Ton
Dam, Sai Leik, SNLD's spokesperson and joint-secretary, said that the proposed
hydro-power plant is only seen as an export commodity and not in anyway aimed
at regional development. As such, the party rejected the dam-building and as
well, the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and Social Impact Assessments
(SIAs) outcomes, which were in-comprehensive with no transparency.
He elaborated: “When we
are still unable to promulgate a constitution that exactly defines the
economical distribution, sharing of natural resources and taxation,
implementing this kind of project could lead to repetition of more conflict”.
“This would slow down the
State Counselor's peace process. If this project would be pushed through by all
means using political pressure, (the government) would have to meet the
disapproval and ire of the people. The implementation party would become
historical villain and the party that allows it an accomplice,” stressed Sai
Leik.
His chairman, Hkun Htun
Oo added: “Dam-building on Salween needs to be approved by the concerned
state's people. But if it is done without their consent, national
reconciliation would have to wait more longer.”
He also made it plain
that failure to stop the project would have a tremendous effect on the well-being
of the peace process.
Dispossessed
The relocation of central
Shan State by the then military regime was to deny support base for the Shan
United Revolutionary Army (SURA), which later changed its name into RCSS that
had regrouped to continue the resistance after the surrender of Khun Sa's Mong
Tai Army (MTA) in 1996.
In process, the Shan
population in central Shan State were forcefully relocated near to big towns,
where the military could control them for its own security reason and aimed at
crushing the Shan resistance.
Shan Human Rights
Foundation (SHRF) reported that since 1996, some 300,000 people of over 1,400
villages throughout 7,000 square miles were ordered to move at gunpoint into
strategic relocation sites. But reportedly, the 80 percent majority opted to
flee to Thailand, while some 20 percent gave in to be relocated and a small
amount chose to hide in the jungles.
In 1997, in addition to expanding the area of forced
relocation, the regime's troops also began systematically killing villagers
caught outside the relocation sites in a program to deter others from going
back to their original villages. Villagers have also been massacred in large
groups. This has included those who were given official permission to return to
their villages.
On March 30, 1997, Burma Army troops raped and shot
dead a girl of 12 while she was taking hay to cattle in a field near her old
village of Ho Pung, Lai Kha township. When her relatives requested permission
to bury the body, the Burma Army troops said: "She must be kept like this
as an example for you people of Shan State to see, if you bury her you must die
with her." (SHRF June 1997 monthly
report)
On July 11, 1997, Burma Army troops laid out the
beheaded bodies of 26 villagers beside the main Keng Lom-Kun Hing road in an
apparent warning to other villagers straying from the relocation sites. On July
12, a further 12 headless corpses of villagers were placed by the Keng Lom-Keng
Tawng road in Kun Hing township.
Throughout 1997, Burma Army troops killed villagers
who were simply foraging for food near the relocation sites. Examples include a
woman blown up by a grenade when collecting bamboo shoots in a field (May 30,
1997, Kun Hing); 3 men shot dead when fishing in a stream (March 30, 1997, Nam
Zarng); and 6 men shot dead when collecting wild honey in the forest (June 6,
1997, Nam Zarng).
Villagers have also been massacred in large groups.
This has included those who were given official permission to return to their
villages.
For example, on June 16, 1997, two groups of villagers
who had been relocated to the town of Kun Hing were given permission to return
to their old villages to collect rice. They left in two convoys of ox-carts.
Both groups were stopped on the way by Burma Army troops; one near Sai Khao,
one near
Tard Pa Ho waterfall. In one group, 29 of the
villagers were massacred, in the other 27. One of the survivors, a woman with a
small child, who was spared, related the horror of the massacre:
"We were made to stay in a house. . They (the
Burma Army troops) came to the door and called out the people one by one. They
called away 16 people first, 12 men and 4 women. Then they came and called
another group of 10. . . Then to the west I heard bursts of machine gunfire.
They were killing the 16 people. Then after just a bit I heard gunfire nearby.
. . In the group of 10 my husband died. In the group of 16 my younger sister
and her husband died... I was sure I would be killed too.. I was shaking, shaking! I was sitting and
shaking all the time. My blood was hot all over my body. I could not think
properly. I would have run away but they were standing there guarding me... I
think I would be dead if I hadn't had my son with me. One of the women who was
killed had left her baby at home. She squeezed out milk from her breast to show
she had a baby, but the SLORC commander said that her baby must have died (and
killed her anyway)." (KHRG interview with villager from Keng Kham, August
30, 1997)
The extrajudicial killings also include people who
were killed while inside relocation sites. For example, on February 21, 1997,
at about 9.00 pm, 2 Shan families, including three young children, were blown
up while sheltering in a ditch near their homes by SLORC troops at Kho Lam
relocation site in Nam Zarng township. The troops had fired shells into the
site in retaliation for a Shan Army raid in the area.
During this two to three years period of relocation,
SHRF documented a total conservative estimate of of 664 killed, of which 319
deaths were from Kun Hing, suffering the most out of the nine townships that
had faced extra-judicial killings.
License to Rape
The executive summary of
the “License to Rape” details 173 incidents of rape and other
forms of sexual violence, involving 625 girls and women, committed by Burmese
army troops in Shan State, mostly between 1996 and 2001.
The report reveals that
the Burmese military regime is allowing its troops systematically and on a
widespread scale to commit rape with impunity in order to terrorize and
subjugate the ethnic peoples of Shan State. The report illustrates there is a
strong case that war crimes and crimes against humanity, in the form of sexual
violence, have occurred and continue to occur in Shan State.
The report gives clear
evidence that rape is officially condoned as a 'weapon of war' against the
civilian populations in Shan State. There appears to be a concerted strategy by
the Burmese army troops to rape Shan women as part of their anti-insurgency
activities. The incidents detailed were committed by soldiers from 52 different
battalions. 83% of the rapes were committed by officers, usually in front of
their own troops. The rapes involved extreme brutality and often torture such
as beating, mutilation and suffocation. 25% of the rapes resulted in death, in
some incidences with bodies being deliberately displayed to local communities.
61% were gang-rapes; women were raped within military bases, and in some cases
women were detained and raped repeatedly for periods of up to 4 months. Out of
the total 173 documented incidents, in only one case was a perpetrator punished
by his commanding officer. More commonly, the complainants were fined,
detained, tortured or even killed by the military.
The majority of rape
incidents were committed in the areas of Central Shan State where over 300,000
villagers have been forcibly relocated from their homes since 1996. Many rapes
took place when girls or women were caught, usually searching for food, outside
the relocation sites. Rapes also occurred when women were being forced to
porter or do other unpaid work for the military, and when stopped at military
checkpoints.
Perspective
Having linked the three
documentation reports, it could now be concluded that the bone of contention is
that while the NLD regime is bent on implementing the Salween dam project
solely aimed at exporting the energy won from it, the Shan are determined to
resist it, as they consider that they are being unfairly exploited, first by
clearing their inhabited areas in the name of anti-insurgency campaign - with
the pretext of protecting sovereignty and upholding national unity - and
currently, denying their rights of decision-making and administering their own
natural resources.
For the directive of
hasty implementation decision made by the government while the peace process,
to work out power and resources sharing through constitutional rewriting or
amendments is still underway, it is in no way an appropriate undertaking just
to export the Shan people's owned resources, won from the devastation of the
environment.
Furthermore, the argument is that if the Chinese are not ready to build dams on their side of Nu river, which is the upper part of Salween river, due to the fear of earth quake, the question to be asked here is, why could it be reasonable that the dams be built in Shan State should be allowed, that is also prone to the earth quake, as evident by what have happened just a few years back, in eastern Shan State.
To sum up the situation,
this dam issue is fast becoming a Shan's “Alamo”, with patience running thin on
both sides of the conflict spectrum, as could be seen by the fervent protests
of CSSU, the Shan CSOs and the affected public. The Shan sees that this area of
central Shan State, which is again about to be devastated for the second time in
two decades, considers this to be their “last
political bastion and as well, the Shan people's national value” that
have to be protected by all means. The adversaries should also take heed that
this protest might not be limited to just mass protests or civil disobedience,
given that the CSSU has two major Shan armies as its members, one non-signatory
(SSPP) and the other signatory (RCSS) of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(NCA) on 15 October 2015.
Meanwhile, on 1 October,
RCSS and Burma Army were engaged in heavy armed clashes in southern Shan State
as the latter raided the former's position, said to be a drug rehabilitation
center. It was said to be the third major armed engagement within a year,
according to the RCSS sources. At this writing the armed clashes are said to be
still in progress.
The non-signatory SSPP
and Burma Army has been on war-footing having an on and off armed engagement,
even during the peace negotiation phases all throughout these years.
Another similar
dissatisfaction over Salween dam project is also brewing in Karen State, as the
Burma Army in collaboration with the Karen Border Guard Force were accused –
under the pretext of going after the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)
splinter group - of trying to encroach into the Karen National Union (KNU)
controlled territory of Hat Gyi, where a dam is scheduled to be built.
The KNU commanders were
said to be against the project and have made it clear that any territorial
violation would be met with decisive military retaliation.
Given such a backdrop,
the choice that the powers that be could make is to either repeat and
heightened the anti-insurgency campaign by going for an all-out war on the
Shan, or suspend the project until an all agreeable constitution that oversees
the power and resources sharing that all could live with is worked out. It is
entirely up to the regime either to torpedo the nascent peace process or save
it, to give peace a chance.
Tags: Opinion
