WAR OF ESCALATION IN KACHIN STATE: Why are the guns not silent?
Actually, the Union Peace Conference (UPC) or 21st Century
Panglong Conference (21CPC) is supposed to bring all warring parties into an
atmosphere of peaceful negotiation that would lead to reconciliation and end
the some seven decades old ethnic conflict. But just the opposite is happening
in the aftermath of the conference, as the Tatmadaw – also known as Burma Army
or the military - offensives against the Kachin Independence Organization/Army
(KIO/KIA) dominated the news, prompting many to wonder why the guns could not
be silenced, which is the most important crucial stabilizing factor in
trust-building that could lead to a wider peaceful negotiations and eventually,
the political settlement.
The on and off military engagement between the KIA and the Tatmadaw
has become a routine ever since the seventeen years of ceasefire broke down in
2011. But the escalation of the armed conflicts that have intensified right
after the 21CPC and while its initiator, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi was
away on a visit to the United Kingdom and the United States, has quite a
different impact and meaning, which needs to be pondered.
According to RFA and The Irrawaddy report, the Tatmadaw conducted air
strikes on 23 September in Kachin State’s Waingmaw Township, continuing a
week-long offensive against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).
Offensives against the KIA’s Brigade 5 have been ongoing since earlier
this week, while military manoeuvrers have increased against other KIA
brigades—2, 3 and 4—in Kachin and northern Shan states for months, according to
KIA spokesman Lt-Col Naw Bu.
Naw Bu said “two helicopter gunships shot at the Lai Hpau Bum [or Lai
Hpau post] for about 30 minutes, starting at 2 pm.” on Friday.
He said that since 20 September, Burma Army troops used 120 mm and 105
mm artillery to attack Lai Hpau and nearby outpost Nhkaram, which are about
three kilometres away from the Myitkyina-Bhamo highway.
The KIA troops are a security unit, used to defend the KIA
headquarters in Laiza, which is about 30-40 kilometres from the current area of
engagement.
Naw Bu said that the offensives could be an effort to “put pressure on
the KIA” to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), in order to
“implement the Burma Army’s plan to bring the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) of non-state armed groups,” which was raised by military
representatives during the UPC.
The Kachin News Group (KNG) reported that the Lai Hpau and Nhkaram
outposts were repeatedly attacked since the month of August. But during last
week the offensive intensified, with the Burma army using some 300 to 500
troopers, firing artillery, to overrun the KIA camps. The KNG Burmese section
of 22 September said that the Burma Army casualty figure to be 70 killed in
action and 40 wounded, while the KIA suffered one death. However, the said
figures were not confirmed by either side of the warring parties.
Meanwhile, KNG on 19 September reported that some 300 Burma Army
soldiers slipped into China, reportedly wearing civilian clothes which a border
observer on military affairs suspected
would be used to attacked the Laiza headquarters. Reportedly in the
past, when the Burma Army attacked and seized the KIO’s former headquarters at
Nahpaw-Pajau Bum in 1987, its troops had attacked the KIA positions from across
the border in China, according to KIA officials.
In addition, The Myanmar Times reported recently that military
involving infantry troops, armoured vehicle squads, air force personnel and an
anti-terrorism unit all participated in the combined military exercise which
involved several fighter jets. The final day of the exercise included
mobilising a 155-millimetre howitzer and 122-millimetre rocket missiles.
The Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing was there on September 24
following a drill that exercised both land and air fleets. The Tatmadaw chief
said the two-day exercise – and the expenditure of much time, money and
manpower to conduct it – was necessary to build the capacity of soldiers
shouldering the duty of national defence.
Although Min Aung Hlaing said that that the Burma army is doing this
exercise as a conventional war game to build the capacity for conventional war
purpose, in the light of the heightened military offensives on the KIA, some
suspected that it could also be the preparation of a wider war.
Some few days ago there were also reports that the humanitarian aid
destined for the internally displaced persons (IDP) along the Burma-China
border were blocked by the military, saying that it might be for the KIA.
Given such circumstances and in order to make sense, as to why the
military is so determined to be on war path,
it is necessary to look at the military's mindset, particularly its
world outlook and political conviction.
Military mindset
One thing is quite certain, for good or bad, the military knows that
continued military dictatorship or something similar to that mode of governance
system is not the way to go. But one should not be misled that the military has
overnight become a saint or an enlightened democrat. It wants changes, but on
its own terms and the main concern is that economically the country cannot be
left behind, especially in comparison to its neighbouring countries that are well
ahead of Burma. Besides, it is also interested to reduce the dependence on
China, which during its years of isolation has been the only supporter of the
then military regime.
And what exactly is this military's “own terms”? To come short to the
point, it is none other than the vehicle of disciplined flourishing democracy,
which is anchored in the military-drawn, 2008 constitution, where its leading
role and veto power are ensured, to protect its own group's survival and
interest.
In clear text, “to keep the military apparatus as it is now”,
with ethnic Bamar domination and assimilation of the Ethnic Armed Organizations
(EAOs) into its Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme and “further continuation
of the 2008 constitution”, with some cosmetic amendments to show that
it has some features of federalism.
This means reforming just enough to uplift the country's economic,
with its hold on power intact, and not in anyway a genuine federalism that
cater to the real democratic principles. But the restless EAOs and the ethnic
nationalities are determined to achieve an equitable federal union and the
reformation of the military to be a genuine federal army, not Bamar dominated
army as it is now the case.
Three core reform problems
According to Ye Myo Hein, executive director of Tagaung Institute of
Political Studies (TIPS), the Burma Army has three core reformation problems,
which are indoctrination, institutional and political involvement, in his
interview with the Frontier Myanmar on 8 July 2016.
He said regarding the indoctrination problematic, the military is
convinced that they have to lead and guard the country.
Institutionally, he said: “They are not a professional military outfit
yet. They have a lot of things to do to become a professional military. The
codes of conduct are not strong enough and they have notorious human rights
abuses that they need to solve”.
The third problem is a political one, which he stressed: “They are
heavily involved in political affairs by having seats in parliament and the
cabinet. If we talk about a civilian-military issue, we also have to talk about
an ethnic-military issue. The military has problems with ethnic groups also”.
He summed up: “So there are three issues. The commander-in-chief has
said they will form a professional army. If they want to do that, then they
have to solve these three problems”.
Pushing through military's own agendas
During the recent 21CPC, the military when delivering its position
papers made it very clear that the military-drawn 2008 constitution would be
the basis on which amendments could be made to become more federal, as it
already has all the features to fulfil the task.
As it is, the military doesn't have to take orders from the government. Thus it usually conducts and executes its own policy, especially where the ethnic states and the EAOs are concerned, the way it sees fit.
The exclusion of 3 EAOs – Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
(MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) - from
attending the 21CPC and offensives decision-making in Shan and Kachin states
are examples, which showed even if the government wanted to have all
inclusiveness political participation and unilateral or bilateral ceasefire, it
was able to reject and torpedo them. And this is still ongoing in both of the
issues mentioned.
This means in the light of what is happening in Kachin state, one could only conclude that the military is pursuing its own agenda of annihilation or surrender of the EAOs rather than the desired give-and-take negotiation process. And the NLD government is absolutely powerless against the military manipulation in important matters.
For example, in the case of 3 EAOs the military demanded them to issue the statement of repentance for their armed struggle position. In other words, to confess their wrong doings for waging a resistance war. No one would believe such an undiplomatic ultimatum would be suggested by Suu Kyi, but Deputy Director General of the President’s Office Zaw Htay, who is a former military officer and also holds the same position during Thein Sein's tenure, confirmed that it was exactly the case.
In a BBC report at the end of August, Zaw Htay when asked whether if
this handling of the 3 EAOs is Suu Kyi’s desire, replied: “Under National
Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) there is Peace Commission (PC) and under
State Counsellor’s control, there is Preparatory Committee for 21CPC, which is
made up of the government, military and parliament.”
He pointed out: “When the Preparatory Committee tabled policy matters,
the State Counsellor has to make decision. Here the high ranking military
officers are also included, where their policies and the State Counsellors’
desired policies are adjusted. This policy decision what the State Counsellor
has agreed upon is also the opinion of the military and the parliament.”
And regarding this, Suu Kyi was unable to do anything but kept silent,
least she would be revealing her helplessness against military manipulation of
the situation.
Brewing Cold-War?
Bertil Lintner, Swedish journalist, author and
Burma expert, is of the opinion: “There is a new Cold War in Asia with an
increasingly assertive China on one side and a loose alliance of the US, India
and Japan on the other. In May this year, the US announced that it would lift
its arms embargo against Vietnam, hardly a democratic nation that respects
human rights, but a very useful ally against China,” according to a recent
interview, on 12 September, by The Irrawaddy.
The same report added: “In 2011, Burma began to drift
away from the close alliance it had had with China since crushing the 1988
pro-democracy uprising, [a move that] was welcomed by the US. In fact, Burma is
the only example of the US managing to expand its influence at the expense of
China’s”.
Although it is not clear to what extend the
President Obama's lifting of all the remaining sanctions, regarding the
military would be covered, the United States has already re-engaged military
cooperation with Burma since 2013, focusing on humanitarian issues, officer
professionalization and human rights, in an effort to encourage the Burma Army
to transform into a professional security force with civilian oversight.
In addition to the United States' military engagement, Japanese
defence minister Tomomi Inada and her Burma counterpart, Lieutenant General
Sein Win, agreed on 21 September to strengthen security co-operation between
their countries, a Japanese official told Kyodo news agency. It is said to
include increasing military capabilities, accepting students from Burma at the
National Defence Academy of Japan, among others.
Perspective
While it might be premature to assume that the Cold-War is indeed
taking shape in Asian region, with Burma perhaps playing a minor role, within
the whole conflict spectrum, the super power and the aspiring super power - China,
confrontation could also be real. But this would depend on how the
give-and-take factors between the contending parties would play out or develop.
For now, no one knows how the South China Sea debacle would be
resolved, with China claiming jurisdiction and the West, particularly the
United State opposing it. The joint-military exercises between the United
States, Japan and some Southeast Asian countries are examples of resistance
against Chinese dominance in the region.
The latent rivalry in Burma context between the West and China is also
there, even no one is portraying it earnestly for now that it could become a
spark for the mini-Cold-War, with some EAOs siding with China on one side and
some with the Western interest, including the Burma Army, on the other. A
similar pattern like the war in Vietnam, so to speak.
But the world's international configuration has drastically changed
over the years and such a scenario might be quite out of mode - although could still be
possible - given that the intertwined globalization market mechanism where
China's market potential for the West and vice versa could not be ignored.
Even then, despite denial, the United State's encirclement or
containment policy on China is there and the Chinese efforts to influence Burma
as a whole to come out as a winner is also not a secret.
But one thing is sure, China sees Burma as part of its dominated
sphere to profit economically, politically and would not tolerate the country
to be part of the United State's containment tools. And while the Chinese are
on charm offensives offering various goods and incentives doling out “carrots”,
the stick also exist in form of the EAOs, that it has its influence along the
China-Burma border.
How does this situation be interpreted from the realpolitik point of
view? one might like to ask. And the simple answer would be, if the National
League for Democracy (NLD) regime leans too much on the West, the stick could
be used. But if the regime is accommodative to its economic schemes and of
course, at least political neutrality would be maintained, if not
wholeheartedly to China's liking, it would help end the war of ethnic conflict
by pressuring its so-called proxies to play along, so that peace could be
restored. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and National Democratic Alliance Army
(NDAA) participation of the 21CPC, from 31 August to 3 September in Naypyitaw,
is the case in point.
Thus, a recent article in South China Morning Post which said that the
United State is no match for China in this ensuing game is quite correct. The
United State and West is far and China is just across the border and a big
regional power, which is aiming to become a super power anytime soon.
Therefore, the recent Burma Army's escalation of conflict in Kachin
and Shan States doesn't fit well into the holistic political consideration of
Suu Kyi and the NLD.
An ideal planned scenario would be the all-inclusiveness participation
of all EAOs, which China has dutifully
done to let its so-called proxies EAOs chip in, to be followed by nationwide
peace negotiations, national reconciliation and development.
But the military's thwarting of this noble scheme is questionable and
one couldn't help but think that it is deliberately keeping the war flames
burning to demonstrate its hard power and to pressure the NLD regime to accept
its line of thinking, which are non-inclusiveness participation of the EAOs and
its ultimate plan of DDR implementation. The heart of the problem is, that it
is not ready to become an equal partner negotiator, like the rest of the
stakeholders, but determined to positioned itself above all others and pushes
through its preconceived ideas through coercive hard power usage.
To sum up, the first priority of ending the war through negotiation is
being thwarted by the military, while no one is sure if this is due to its
commitment to hold on to power as a sole self-employed saviour of the nation or
determined to see through its military and Bamar ethnocentrism aspirations and
conviction. And in process, it is dictating its preconceived ideas to the NLD
through its hard power implementation to hang on to power that it is accustomed
to for more than fifty years, if not for anything else.
As for the NLD regime, it has to do a tight rope walking of
maintaining neutrality and maximize the country's interest so that it could
deliver the goods to the public. But first the guns have to be silenced and it
is not in the position to convince the military to stop the offensives, in
order to fulfil the necessary implementation of genuine nationwide ceasefire;
amendments of Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) and Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA); all-inclusive signing of the NCA; state and region-level
political dialogue; and holding the national-level political dialogue at the
21CPC, to determine the country's future.
In short, whether all the deliberations of peace process could be
smoothly conducted hinges on if the military would stop its senseless
offensives first and agree to either a unilateral or bilateral nationwide
ceasefire. Otherwise, it will be a vicious circle of waging war and talking
peace, benefiting no one in a real sense, not even the military.
Tags: Opinion
