Linking Panglong Agreement review and the 5th anniversary re-eruption of Kachin conflict
As the Kachin Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and
over a hundred Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), local and international,
called for peace and an end to the military offensives in Shan and Kachin
States, on the 5th
anniversary of re-erupted armed conflict between the Kachin Independence
Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and Burma Army (a.k.a. Tatmadaw or the military),
the two Shan resistance armies - the
Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), Restoration Council of
Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) - joined by KIO/KIA, met in Chiang Mai
from 7 to 8 June to review, reflect and build awareness on the Panglong
Agreement that was signed in 1947, between the Federated Shan States, Kachin
and Chin Hills, together with the Ministerial Burma or Burma Proper.
These two seemingly unrelated issues are in fact
intertwined and even inseparable, which need to be resolved simultaneously, to
end the decades-old ethnic conflict that has plagued the country for so long.
Let us look at the linkage, which has been
deliberately neglected and manipulated by successive military-dominated
regimes, so that better understanding and pragmatic approach to resolve the
problem could emerge.
Breaching and rejection of Panglong Agreement
Initially, the Burma Army's breaching of Panglong
Agreement contract is the main source of ethnic conflict occurring in the
country today.
The 1947 Union of Burma Constitution although federal
in form is unitary in practice. And to right this wrong the non-Bamar ethnic
nationalities tabled an amendment proposal titled "Federal Amendment
Proposal" within the union parliament in 1962, which was rudely
interrupted by the General Ne Win's military coup on 2nd March the
same year, citing to rescue the union from disintegration. But this was the
only possible legal chance and approach to resolve the then simmering ethnic
conflict peacefully, which was threatening to blow out of proportion. For the
non-Bamar ethnic nationalities saw the imbalanced political system as being an
unjust usurpation of political power by the Bamar political class, effectively
taking the place of British colonial master, treating them as its colonial
possession.
To make the long story short, the Burmese military had
ruled the country through military dictatorship from 1962 until 2011, when a
quasi-civilian rule was established, under the military-drafted 2008
Constitution.
As all know, the Aung San Suu Kyi headed National
League for Democracy (NLD) came to power a few months ago, but despite a
landslide victory in November 2015 nationwide election, it still has to share
political power with the military. According to the constitution the military
is entitled to 25% of parliamentary seats without having to enter the
elections, in addition to the privilege to control the three most important
ministries of home, defence and border
affairs.
In short the breaching of Panglong Agreement, which is
in fact the denial of ethnic nationalities' rights of self-determination,
equality, democracy and human rights that were supposed to be anchored in a
genuine federalism, started in 1962 because of the military coup and is still
the case until today.
And as the consequence of this political rights denial
is the ongoing armed resistance movements from the part of the non-Bamar ethnic
nationalities, the Burma Army goes about with its self-appointed, protector
role of upholding the national unity, security and protecting the country's
sovereignty, unleashing militarization
and occupation of the ethnic homelands.
And as all could see, the result is the prolonged
civil war producing hundreds of thousands of IDP and refugee population within
the country and neighbouring countries, which in turn hindered the
democratization and development process, at the expense of all the people,
Bamar and non-Bamar included.
The cost of conflict
As to how this ongoing civil war has impacted upon the
country and people, the Myanmar Times of 26 March 2012 had made some
astonishing assessment.
Aung Tun, a researcher at Myanmar Egress, a
Yangon-based training centre and policy think-tank,
who penned the piece titled “The economic cost of
conflict”, asked 5 critical questions. First is the pure financial cost of
these civil wars. Second, who paid for it? Third, what if the regime had used
that money for the development of the region where the fighting has taken place
instead of the wars? Fourth, who benefited from the wars? And last and most
importantly, what should the regime do next?
In answering the first question, he said there is no
definite answer. But stressed: “Certainly, the cost to the government has been
massive; you only need to look at defence spending – K1.193 trillion in 2011-12
– to get some idea of the cost of perpetual conflict.”
To the second question it is easier to answer he said:
“(W)e all have to pay for it, and this is a major reason why we’re now all in a
large amount of debt. Recently, the finance minister announced in parliament
that we owe more than US$11 billion. No surprises there.”
To the third question, he said: “(It) is the really
tragic aspect of this, particularly in an age when it is quite difficult to get
money from donors. Everybody knows that we are the lowest recipient of aid per
capita among undeveloped countries. Yet, we have still spent our own money on
these conflicts. If we used this money on development projects instead, we
probably wouldn’t need to receive support from other countries today.”
To the fourth question: “(N)obody really benefited
from the wars. Many people, both military and civilian, have died, children
missed out on their education, refugees camps had to be set up along the border
areas, political stability has declined and development in other areas of the
country has been hindered. If we add in the additional costs of these ethnic
conflicts, the external debt figure doesn’t sound so large.”
To the fifth and most crucial question, he
recommended: “(P)erhaps the most difficult one. An excellent start would be to
avoid the wars that have dogged us for decades. Both politically and
economically, the country can’t bear any armed conflict at this crucial time.
Added to this gloomy prospect of continuously waging
war on ethnic nationalities are staggering statistic of IDP and refugee
population that any nation facing it would definitely be alarmed.
- Over 1 million people
in need of humanitarian assistance (Source: UN OCHA HRP 2016)
- Over 140,000
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 800,000 in a dire humanitarian
situation in Rakhine (Arakan) State due to a human rights crisis
- Over 96,000 IDPs in Kachin
and northern Shan States, approx. 50% of which are in camps located in
non-Government controlled areas.(Source: UNHCR, 2016)
- An estimated 3
million people from Myanmar/Burma live in Thailand as economic migrants,
while 110,000 are living in nine refugee camps along the border between
the two countries. {Source: Factsheet - European Commission's Humanitarian
Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO), February 2016}
The most important human causalities is hard to
compiled, as warring parties are not ready to publicize and thus remains a
misery. But let us just take a few stories from secondary sources to see how
high the human tolls could possibly be.
It is said that thousands from both sides, the
Tatmadaw and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), had lost their lives during
this decades-long armed ethnic conflict, with no decisive victory for either
side and a potential that could go on for a much longer time, if no political
solution is found and this senseless war is allowed to be continued.
On 8 July 2015, The Irrawaddy reported that it paid a
recent visit to the cemetery, in Lashio town of northern Shan State, which
hosts the graves of some 200 soldiers who died between February and April last
year, at the height of the conflict in the Kokang Special Region along the
border with China, which displaced tens of thousands of civilians.
Nang Wah Nu who also visited the cemetery alongside
the then parliamentary Speaker U Shwe Mann, told The Irrawaddy: “I heard that
the tombs were just for soldiers who died while coming from Kokang to get
treatment in Lashio. Some others died in the hospital. They could not pick up
those who were killed on the frontline.”
Nicholas Farrelly's hypothetical report in New Mandala
- 11 April 2012, titled “3,000 dead Burmese soldiers?” wrote: “Now there is a
report that according to KIA [Kachin Independence Army] sources the number of
government troops lost over the past 10 months [since 9 June 2011, when the
Kachin war recommenced] could be as high as 3,000”.
According to FindTheData website, 210,000 death toll
estimation was counted for 65 years period, from 1948 until 2013.
Thus, even without precise death toll count, one could
clearly see that the human cost of conflict is tremendously high.
Panglong awareness-building spearheaded by Kachin and
Shan armies
The meeting of two Shan armies and KIO/KIA to review
the Panglong Agreement and subsequent producing of the Panglong Handbook was an
ambitious undertaking to build awareness of the historical document, without
which there would not have been the Union of Burma/Myanmar.
The drafted Panglong Handbook contains the following
headings:
- Foreword
- How it came into
being
- The Panglong Spirit
- The Panglong Promises
- The Panglong
Agreement
- Statements by Aung
San, and others
- Afterword
The draft was provisionally approved, pending input
and endorsement by Chin National Front (CNF).
The next step was said to be to present it to the
planned Pre-21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC). The procedure
is not unusual historically speaking. On 6-7 February 1947, the Chin, Kachin
and Shan leaders met and reached agreement on what to present to Aung San, the
head of the Executive Council of Burma Government, who arrived at Panglong on
the next day.
General N’Banla, head of the KIO/KIA remarked the
following at the end of the meeting.
- This meeting held to
revisit Panglong has been really satisfactory
- There would never
have been a Union of Burma/Myanmar without Panglong
- The word Panglong
therefore carries a truly profound meaning
- Chin, Kachin and
Shan, being the original signatories of the Agreement, must take primary
responsibility
- Panglong has been the
central pillar to the Union. But successive governments have only chosen
to dishonour it. If you are looking for the perpetrators of the Three
Sacred Causes (Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of
National Solidarity and Perpetuation of National Sovereignty), there is no
need to look far. These people should be tried in court.
Different interpretation of Panglong
Bamar's Panglong Agreement interpretation is upholding
unitary political system with minimal devolution of power. Apart from this, the
military has been eagerly rewriting the essence of Panglong Agreement as if it
is a reunion of the Burmese empire between the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities
and lowland Burma. But the treaty from the ethnic nationalities' point of view
is to form a voluntary new political entity, that later became the Union of
Burma in 1948.
The ongoing armed conflict of the EAOs with the
successive Bamar military governments, including the present quasi-civilian NLD
regime, that continues to these days is only because of their breaching of
contractual obligations rooted in Panglong Agreement.
Besides the heightening of war going on in Shan and
Kachin States, due to the Burma Army military offensives, under the pretext of
protecting the interest of the people and protecting the national sovereignty,
the recent armed conflict outbreak in Arakan State is also the ramification of
such broken promises.
In other words, as the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities'
political grievances could not be addressed and corrected within a proper,
appropriate political channel, coupled with the coercive bullying to follow the
military-dominated government's prescription and political agendas, armed
resistance was the only way out left to
express their political conviction. To put it differently, armed struggle has been resorted to express or achieve
their political aspirations.
The way ahead
There is hardly any other way to resolve the conflict
but to honour the Panglong Agreement, Pledges and Spirit.
In practical terms, the military must first stop its
offensives through acceptance of the fact that its concept of sole sovereignty
ownership of the country, is in fact, a shared-sovereignty, according to the
Panglong Agreement, stemming from the co-independence achieved from the British
in 1948, together with the other ethnic nationalities.
And if this is conceptually cleared, withdrawing of
warring troops to a safe distance could be agreed upon, followed by earnest
political dialogue.
To conclude, the offensive war in Kachin, Shan and
Arakan States could easily be stopped, if the Panglong Agreement and Promises
are adhered to, while breaching and rejecting it with a twisted logic will
prolong the ethic conflict.
It is now up to the military, and as an extension the
NLD regime, either to stop the war and follow up with the national
reconciliation process or continue the denial of the ethnic nationalities'
equal status, rights of self-determination, human rights and democracy
enshrined in Panglong Agreement.
Whether the awareness-building of Panglong review
spearheaded by the Shan and Kachin resistance armies would be enough to educate
the right side of history to the Bamar political decision-makers and military
leaders or not is hard to speculate. Equally, the pleas and demand of the
Kachin and Shan people, including local and international CSOs, to stop the war
will be heard is also unpredictable. But one thing is sure, honouring the
Panglong Agreement and Promises will definitely pave way for a more peaceful
atmosphere, which eventually will usher the country into a more harmonious
co-habitation together, with possible long-lasting solution.
Tags: Opinion
