Concerning the pending and failed peace process, a lot of people, including Burma watchers were expecting another spectacular performance from Aung San Suu Kyi. However, they were disappointed as it turned out to be an average show, not comparable in anyway to the two extra-ordinary political moves played out earlier by the National League for Democracy (NLD) regime, namely: the creation of a State Counsellor position Suu Kyi against the military (Tatmadaw) strong opposition and the mass release of the political prisoners, incarcerated by the former, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)-Military regime.

True to her conviction, Aung San Suu Kyi did tried to impress her audience by declaring that she is keen to start a nationwide political dialogue, dubbed the “21st Century Panglong” within one or two months, during a speech given in Naypyitaw, on 27 April, at the Union Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC-U) meeting that was supposed to be her first serious political appearance, after taking office as a State Counsellor.

While she admitted that it is a sort of information gathering, learning and orientation to be acquainted with the works done by the previous administration regarding their undertakings, she left no doubt that the course of peace process would be set by her, involving restructuring of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) and perhaps, even introducing the whole new game plan, although she hasn't spelled it out as yet.

For the moment, her intention was said to be convening the political dialogue, which she might and could term it as 21st Century Panglong, while at the same time, wooing the non-signatory Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).

Now let us look at the reactions of the ethnic leaders and the Tatmadaw on this latest Aung San Suu Kyi's initiative.

Responses of the ethnic leaders

Regarding Suu Kyi's initiative, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) Chairman Hkun Htun Oo, according to BBC, said that to achieve peace, constitutional amendment is essential, for the EAOs are also asking for it. As circumventing it is not possible, the present regime should discuss and secure promises from the military.

He stressed that doubts are growing between the military and EAOs and thus is impossible to amend constitution through the peace conference. And also since both camps are having their own policy and planning, only sitting down at the table on an equal basis would be able to resolve the problems.

He added further, “At the moment, Burma's political situation is not even clear who is leading (the country)”.

SNLD Secretary General Sai Nyunt Lwin, who was offered a minister post by NLD but declined due to his party decision, was also of the opinion that it would be more appropriate to start the Suu Kyi's initiated move only after the problematic of armed conflict is resolved.

He said: “I welcome (Suu Kyi's initiated) convention and also endorsed it. But desiring it to happen within one or two months and don't want to wait longer is just the opinion of the elder sister (Suu Kyi). In reality there could be a lot of problems. It is impossible to start an all-inclusive discussion within two months. A lot of talking is needed with the Tatmadaw. Raging battles are not the only concern of the Tatmadaw, (we) need to talk with the other side (EAOs) as well. (We) could start the negotiation only if both sides could stop fighting.”

Secretary General of United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) Khu Oo Reh also echoed the same when he said: “My view is that if we are going to hold such convention, we would need a common agreement. And to prepare details concerning political issues and discussion together, we need to first stop the ongoing war. (We) just can't lightly say that the ceasefire is already there. I think firstly it has to be firmly consolidated.”

UNFC Vice-Chairman Nai Han Tha's point of view was more or less along the same line and stressed that Panglong-like conference or convention would only be effective, if it is all-inclusive and nationwide ceasefire could be implemented. But in order to do it he said: “All EAOs need to participate and nationwide ceasefire has to be in place. Otherwise, it would be also good if the government could declare unilateral ceasefire and invite all (EAOs). For example, in 1963, the government just stopped fighting and invited all (anti-government combatants). The (present) regime could also do the same.”

The Tatmadaw

Generally, the military seems to be in tune with the policy of NLD, although armed confrontations are ongoing in Kachin, Shan and Ararkan States.

Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, vice-chairman of the Union-level JMC formed by eight armed ethnic groups who signed a so-called NCA and the military last October under the former military-backed government led by Thein Sein, said prior to the Aung San Suu Kyi's attendance of the meeting on 27 April: “The new government has said many times that it will work to prioritize national reconciliation and peace as its policy.”

“The groups that have signed the NCA should work [as examples] for achieving national reconciliation and peace,” Yar Pyae said. “We will work to stop fighting by connecting with each other, because we have networks.”

In an interview with BBC Burmese, Colonel Wunna Aung, secretary of the JMC-U described Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s perspective on the peace process as a continuation of the Tatmadaw’s goals.

“What she said is in line with what we have been doing,” said the Colonel. “The most important thing is the ceasefire. Only after the ceasefire can we move on to political dialogue and the peace conference.”

According to an interview with an online media, Col Wunna Aung, who is also a spokesperson for the Tatmadaw, besides being a member of the JMC-U, recently said: “We will cooperate. We’ll form committees and continue engaging in the peace process. It is too early to say when [a second Panglong conference can be held]. We still can’t say, as we have not yet prepared. We are no longer fighting with the eight groups with which we have signed the ceasefire. As we are an organization dedicated to peace, we will give a hand to the peace process.”

Outlook and analysis

The military doesn't vary much with the ethnic leaders on the convening of peace conference, or according to Suu Kyi's wish of 21st Century Panglong Convention, that it needs to wait until real ceasefire on the ground could be established. But the major responsibility hinges upon the military, for so long as it is entertaining the idea of being the sole enforcer and protector of the national unity and sovereignty, going about with its military offensives within the ethnic homelands, in the name of establishing the “area of influence and peacefulness” policy, the war cannot be stopped, much less the durable ceasefire.

The case in point, why meaningful ceasefire could be hard to achieve might be the explanation made by the Pyidaungsu Institute's Director Khuensai Jaiyane, when he said: “The Burmese military seems to want to secure as much land as it can before political dialogue starts with the new government. These kind of acts affect trust.”

Generally speaking, the phobia that the EAOs would opt for secession from the union by the Tatmadaw and Bamar political class is an outdated perception, given the unfavourable contemporary regional and international configuration in facilitating such an ambition. And as such, they have all given up the aspiration of total independence and since years projected their aims to a practically achievable genuine federalism, within the mould of the present political entity.

Likewise, all the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities have embarked on a federalism solution, as a way out of the ongoing ethnic conflict and realization of their political aspirations.

However, the existing reality on the ground are ongoing wars in Shan, Kachin and Ararkan States, involving Kachin Independence Army, Shan State Progress Party,Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ararkan Army, while latent conflict prevails with all the non-signatory EAOs, including the United Wa State Army, which fields some 30,000 troops and is the strongest ethnic armed group.

Adding to these debacles are the Tatmadaw's positioning of a “state within a state” posture which tend to leave the government of the day powerless to deal with the peace initiative in an effective and appropriate manner, as the former Thein Sein regime had shown, during his five years tenure. The present NLD government, no doubt, also faces the same position.

The name of the game then is to ponder on a workable cooperation between the NLD regime and the Tatmadaw, so that real ceasefire on the ground could be implemented.

For now, the strained situation between the two adversaries are compounded by a number of disagreement, undertaken by the NLD, such as creation and appointment of Suu Kyi to a State Counsellor position and mass release of the former regime's political opposition prisoners. Recently, as if to stoke the military's burning anger, although symbolic and insignificant it might seem, the publicized administrative line-up in the presidential Facebook, which placed Suu Kyi second in line, after the President and pushed down the Commander-in-Chief one place down to the eighth place, is not so helpful or conducive for the cooperation to materialize.

Furthermore, Thura Shwe Mann, who recently called on his 11th in-take classmate of the DSA to join the Suu Kyi's regime in the democratization and development of the country is seen by the Tatmadaw as driving a wedge between the military establishment. More so, as Shwe Mann is a former USDP second boss and now head of the Commission for the Assessment of Legal Affairs and Special Issues, under the NLD regime.

Given such prevailing political atmosphere, Suu Kyi is faced with a dilemma of escalating the latent conflict to an open one and reversing the confrontation course to a manageable level that the military could accept without losing face, enabling the top brass to fade away in silence, coupled with a continuation of democratization process that would benefit the country and the people. Thus, handling this delicate political situation, or charting the troubled political waters, would largely depend on the ability, far-sightedness and tactfulness  of the NLD leadership and Suu Kyi.

In the same vein, the Tatmadaw leadership would need to accept and confront with the reality of the people's wish, personified by Suu Kyi and her NLD, and do away with its entrenched, privileged stature of a “state within a state” of more than 50 years.

If such a compromise could be worked out, unilateral ceasefire on the part of the NLD regime could be easily announced and implemented, followed by all-inclusive invitation of all ethnic armed combatants without preconditions, leading to an all-inclusive Panglong-like convention and eventually, a set of political settlement that all could identify and live with.