The 8 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that were, together with the government, military and legislature, joint signatories of the historic (“hysteric”, according to some critics) Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 15 October 2015, met again for the second time since November to reassess the progress made and to reorganize, as well as plan, for the upcoming months.

What follows is a recapitulation of what took place at the 3-day summit, 24-26 March, at Khum Phuncome Hotel’s multi-purpose hall in Chiangmai.

Day One. Thursday, 24 March 2016

Nothing is final in history.

It always moves on.

Peace must be built again and again.

Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary General, Council of Europe

The meeting is attended by 79 EAO representatives, technical advisers and observers. Some of them are already well acquainted with most readers:

Gen Mutu Saypoe           President, Karen National Union (KNU)

Lt Gen Yawd Serk             President, Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS)

Hkun Myint Tun                                Chairman, PaO National Liberation Organization (PNLO)

Khaing Soe Naing Aung Vice Chairman, Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)

Pu Zing Cung                      Chairman, Chin National Front (CNF)

Yebaw Than Gay              Chairman, All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF)

Dr Naw Gabaw Htoo       Secretary General, Karen Peace Council (KPC)

Plus other not less known leaders, such as, Hkun Okker (PNLO), Saw Kwe Htoo Win (KNU) Saw Mra Raza Win (ALP), Dr Lian Hmung Sakhong (CNF) and Dr Suikhar (CNF).

The only signatory movement conspicuously missing is the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) that, after the death of Gen Lah Pwe last month, has yet to elect a new leadership.

Sao Yawd Serk presides over today’s session. Here are excerpts from his opening address.

There are five issues that need to be addressed: 

One, ethnic issue

There is division and fighting. There is no mutual trust. How we are going to rebuild it constitutes a formidable challenge.

Two, political issue

One party is trying to sell federalism. Is the other party going to buy it? How? On the other hand, one party is holding fast to the 2008 constitution. How is the other party going to drive a bargain with them?

Three, economic gap

There is a huge gap between the rich and the poor. How are we going to bridge it?

Fourth, the land issue

Land is being confiscated not only by the government but also by companies with huge capital. Many people have gone landless.

Fifth, continued rights abuses

Especially when there is fighting. Victimization of the people invariably follows a clash.

We need to discuss our plans well. It is only through good plans we will be able to avoid pitfalls and reach our destination safe and sound.

There are three items engaged by the summit today:

§  Reports by EAO Coordination Team (CT), EAO Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) and EAO Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)

§  Working with the new government

§  Engaging the non-signatory EAOs

Reports by EAO-CT, EAO-JMC and EAO-UPDJC (extracts from the reports and discussion)

17 October 2015

CT formed by one representative each from the signatory EAOs

8-10 November 2015

EAO Summit #1 held in Chiangmai

CT office

Set up at Diamond Condominium, Hlaing Township, Rangoon, supported by USAID

Issues discussed by participants include:

§  Continued rejection by JMC-U (Union level) against setting up of JMC-S (State level) in Arakan/Rakhine State

§  Issuing “command-like” demands instead of discussing issues by JMC-U which is chaired by a Tatmadaw general

§  Publicized accusations without verification, such as, alleging that the RCSS/SSA troops are expanding beyond their original operational areas

§  Troops from different regional commands saying the Code of Conduct (CoC) and the JMC-S Terms of Reference (ToR) don’t apply to them because they are not under the Central Eastern Command, whose commander, according to the ToR, represents the Burma Army in Shan State

§  Different interpretations of the bilateral agreements by the Burma Army and the EAOs

§  The Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM), composed of top representatives of the signatories, to be regularly held “to resolve” any issues faced during the implementation of the NCA, has long since December becomes a toothless tiger despite having problems that could not be resolved at JMC-U and UPDJC levels

The reports are adopted just before lunch time.

Working with the new government (Extracts)

§  When the signatory EAOs met the NLD in December, they (the NLD) reportedly spoke about setting up a Steering Committee. Does it mean it will be a new mechanism to replace JICM (which is but a meeting), or is it one to replace the Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC) formed by the outgoing President?

§  The NLD should put to good use of both existing mechanisms: What cannot be done by the parliament must be done by the Union Peace Conference (UPC) and vice versa.

§  There is concern that the newly created Ministry of Ethnic Affairs will turn out to be a wimp (“Whether a dish is delicious or not depends not only on the ingredients available, but also the cook,” one participant quips during the coffee break)

§  When it comes to democracy, we are not worried about the NLD. But when it comes to federalism, we don’t know what blueprint it has. But I remember The Lady had publicly supported the Maetharawhta Declaration (which called for a federal democracy) in 1997 (when “federalism” was still a taboo word)

§  Will it be easy to negotiate with the NLD government? During  the UPC in January, one NLD elder was out-and-out against the 8-state configuration (presented by the United Nationalities Alliance)

Despite concerns expressed above, the Summit, in the end, decides to give the benefit (a huge one at that) of the doubt to the NLD and work with it for common cause.

Engaging the non-signatory EAOs

As an old friend is waiting for me downstairs, I’m not able to follow all that is being discussed. But the following are in my notes:

§  There has been 3 informal meetings between signatories and non-signatories. On the whole, they have been fruitful. A 4^th one has been proposed.

§  The non-signatories also seem to be making preparations for the UPC#2 with is expected to be hosted by the new government sometime this year (According to one of the UPC#1 resolutions, the next UPC is due in May, but as the government still needs time to familiarize itself with its new job, it may be well after the honeymoon period, remarks one)

My friend, whom I have known since the early 80s, is a vocal critic of the NCA, particularly the signing of it just 3 weeks before the general elections, when everything appeared to be hanging in the balance.

“It didn’t make sense,” he says.

He had been to Panglong and visited the monument that marks the signing of the historic agreement between Burma and Chin-Kachin-Shan alliance in 1947. “The inscription there says ‘Reunification’ between the Mainland and the Hills Peoples,” he tells me, who has not been there since 1969.

This is one of the bones of contention between successive Burman-dominated governments and the non-Burmans. While the former maintains the coming together in 1947 was a ‘reunification’, the latter vehemently argues that it was a ‘unification’. That without Panglong there would never have been a Union of Burma/Myanmar.

Who’s right and who’s wrong? We are sure going to hear that in the forthcoming UPCs, or maybe even before them.

The day’s session is over by the time I bade farewell to my friend.

 By SAI KHUENSAI / Director of Pyidaungsu Institute and Founder of Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N)