Three crucial topics have been dominating Burma's political arena, since the National League for Democracy (NLD) won with a landslide in the nationwide elections. They are if the transition from quasi-civilian regime of Thein Sein to Aung San Suu Kyi led NLD government would be smooth or problematic; whether the wars in Kachin and Shan States could be resolved; and the interconnected nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) or peace process structure and procedure would be accepted by the incoming NLD regime, as formed and headed by the Thein Sein regime.

First, let us ponder on the development of transitional aspect that have been worrying the NLD leadership and the people at large, who are still fearful that the 1990 post-election scenario could be replayed or repeated, when the then State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), military regime refused to hand over power to the landslide winning NLD.

Doubtful transition

U Ye Htut, spokesman of the President and the information minister, in answering the doubtfulness of handing power to Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party, stressed that President Thein Sein aimed to leave a good tradition for the country's young, budding democracy. He said that peaceful power transfer would be the “final victory” of the government.

He told The Irrawaddy: “What we are trying to do now is to establish a good democratic tradition. A government formed by the result of the election transferring power to another elected government peacefully has never occurred in our country's history, since independence in 1948. As a reform, final duty of our government, we are going to do this. And it will be our last victory.”

He showed his irritation for the doubtfulness from some quarters by saying: “I will tell you, (people) didn't believe in President Thein Sein's reform process of 2011, call for peace process and free and fair elections. But he has done it according to his promises. Transferring (of the power) will also be done.”

When the NLD's tsunami-like landslide win were made known, Aung San Suu Kyi requested for a meeting with the President, Commander-in-Chief and House Speaker, but so far she has only managed to meet the House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann on 19 November, where both agreed to work for a smooth transition.

Following the meeting,  a statement released said: “They will peacefully implement the desire of the people that emerged from the election on November 8, in order to ensure people’s joy and to improve the image of the country. They will continue to implement the hopes of the people in line with the principles of the Parliament: the people’s voice is Parliament’s voice and the people’s desire is Parliament’s desire. They vowed to work together with trust and respect for one another on matters of national reconciliation and unity for all ethnic groups. They agreed to discuss the means to organize parliaments in accordance with the law.”

Deputy Speaker of the Lower House Nanda Kyaw Swar, bill committee chairman T Khun Myat, minister of commerce Win Myint, Zaw Myint Maung from the Rule of Law and Stability Committee and Director General Kyaw Soe from the Union Parliament also attended.

Perhaps to alleviate international and as well, the people at home of their doubtfulness of his government transfer of power to the election winning NLD, President Thein Sein told the 27th Asean Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on  21 November that he would abide by the results of November 8 election and conduct the transition peacefully.

Ye Htut, spokesperson for the president, told the Daily Eleven: “The president again promised to follow the election result and to transfer power peacefully. Asean leaders talked extensively about the election. They praised and congratulated us. They acknowledged our development.”

War in Kachin and Shan States

The war in Kachin and Shan States, which have been going on and off, escalated after the elections.

On 6 November, two days before the election, the Burma Army (Tatmadaw) launched a major offensive against the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) which had signed bilateral ceasefire agreements with the government at both State and Union levels.  In spite of this, the Burma Army unleashed ground offensive operations backed by air raids, against the SSPP/SSA.

The Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) declared in its November 14 statement that Burma Army offensives escalated after the partial-ceasefire signing, dubbed as NCA with 8 ethnic armed  organizations (EAOs). Battles continue almost daily between the TNLA and Burmese Army troops in northern Shan State.

According to the TNLA News and Information Department, on November 21, at 0935 hours, a recent battle took place between troops of TNLA Battalion 717 and Tatmadaw Division 77, at a place between Tot-san and Nuaung-bin-hla villages in Kyaukme Township, Brigade 2 area, Ta’ang Region. There was no casualty on the TNLA side. Two were killed on the Myanmar Tatmadaw side. The head-on battle took place, because Myanmar Tatmadaw troops had been closely following and launching attacks in the place, where TNLA was active.

On another front, one of the heaviest battles since the renewed war of 2011 between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burmese Army took place in south-western Kachin State, just days after the widely hailed 2015 elections.

A statement was released on 22 November by the SSPP/SSA regarding its delegation's departure for Yangon to hold talks with the military and the regime.

Earlier, Sai Naw Leik central executive committee member of the SSPP met U Khin Maung Soe of the Union Peacemaking Work Committee and agreed to meet again on 23 November to negotiate about the more durable truce.

While armed clashes are going on and off between the Burma Army and KIA, TNLA, a proposed  truce was not achieved, even though the SSPP/SSA has appealed that refraining from the act of hostilities should be reached, while its five man delegation was on its way to thrash out a ceasefire, according to one of the SSPP/SSA front line commander.

The recent SHAN report of 23 November wrote that while the SSPP/SSA delegation was negotiating with the regime's UPWC in Yangon, fierce battles were fought in Mong Hsu Township and has been ongoing at this writing.

On 23 November, 08:00 hours, SSPP/SSA camp near Wan Lwe, Mong Ark villages, Mong Hsu Township, Loilem District was attacked, besides shelling it with artillery from Burma Army bases of Pang Wo, Loi Yu, Kui Mawk Khao from four sides, according to a front line commander.

“According to U Khin Maung Soe's invitation, (SSPP/SSA) is negotiating to restart peace process. (We) heard that it started at 08:00 hours, have a short break and continues again. But (the fighting) at this side has not stopped and still shooting. (We) don't know from which units, but they all arrived together. From what we know, they are from Military Operation Command (MOC) 2 and 17, supposedly under the Eastern Command. (They are) attacking fiercely. No air-plane has been sighted,” said Captain Sai Mong.

While talks on ending hostility are conducted, the war rages on, adding more problems to the already deteriorating situation as the government has reportedly demanded the withdrawal of SSPP/SSA forces from the route connecting Mong Hsu with the garrison town of Mong Nawng.

Ethnic endorsement of the NLD 

The incoming NLD regime has been endorsed by the ethnic political parties, EAOs and ethnic population for all were convinced that Aung San Suu Kyi, the party leader could fulfil their desire of peaceful co-habitation, with rights of self-determination, equality and democracy.

The three armed alliance of Myanmar National Democratic Army (MNDAA) known also as Kokang, TNLA and Arakan Army (AA) released a statement saying that it is solidly behind the NLD.

Likewise, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an eleven ethnic armed groups alliance, stated that it is ready to work with the incoming NLD regime. In the same vein, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the strongest of all the ethnic armies numbering some well-armed 20,000 troops,  also expressed the same sentiment.

United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), a twelve ethnic political parties alliance that had worked closely with the NLD for decades, would also meet with the NLD soon, which would touch on and cooperate on how to end the internal armed conflict and formation of a genuine federal union among others.

On 24 November, U Nyan Win, the NLD spokesman confirmed to the media that the meeting would take place soon, although no fix date has been mentioned.

NCA deliberation

The NCA structure has Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) at its top. The two committees that were formed are the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) – the word ceasefire is not initialled – and Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC).

JIMC is formed with 8 members each from EAOs and government side, while JMC is formed with 10 each from both quarters, with another 6 from civil society organizations (CSO) are earmarked to be included later.

The UPDJC has 16 members each from the EAOs, the government and the political parties, making it a total of 48 members in all.

The JMC is concerned with monitoring ceasefire issues, while UPDJC is to draw up framework for political dialogue (FPD) and responsible to begin the actual political dialogue (PD).

Apart from the seemingly problematic governmental transitional problem, the harbinger of NCA structure and formation of various committees could also become a cause of political tension, between the USPD-Military clique and the to be formed NLD government that has quite a different outlook, on how to go about with the whole peace process.

All-inclusiveness is the key and the Thein Sein regime has just signed partial-ceasefire agreement and refusing certain groups like MNDAA, TNLA and AA to be part of the peace process.

Other than that, even the formation of JIMC and JMC would become problematic, as they are   manned only with 8 and 10 representatives from 8 EAOs, together with equal number of representative from the government side,  when actually there are 21 EAOs operating within the whole country, which have not yet signed the NCA with the government.

The UPDJC which sought to draw up a framework for political dialogue could also become a source of problem, as legitimately elected political parties should have a priority, rather than picking representatives, as it is now, from political parties that either have poor showing or not winning even a seat in the elections.

The formula used  to elect for the political parties are: NLD – 2, USDP -2, SNLD – 1, ANP- 1, UNA- 1, FDA-1, NBF-1 and  7 elected from other parties, according to the insider sources

True, the UPDJC is including 3 umbrella ethnic groups like UNA, Federal Democratic Alliance (FDA) and National brotherhood Federation (NBF) giving each a representative seat in the 16 members representation on behalf of some 80 registered political parties, which seems to look like quite an appropriate distribution.

But Dr Yan Myo Thein, a well known political commentator, in an article titled “Has peace process being monopolized?” published by 7 Days Daily, on 24 November writes: “It seems in order to give one representative each to FDA and NBF, UNA has been given a direct representation. In reality, allowing one direct representative each for the three ethnic alliance parties could be analysed as not appropriate. It could be termed as a political aggressiveness for involving the Federal Union Party, Chin Democracy League, Palon-Sawor Democrtaic Party, National democratic Front and Democracy and Peace Party, which have all decisively lost and having to bite (endure) the zero outcome.”

He further stressed that out of the 16 representatives in UPDJC, 8 is allotted to the election winning parties and the other 8 to those who have lost it. Thus, it is against the desire of the people for involving the non-elected parties in the UPDJC.

Meanwhile, on 23 November,  joint-secretary of SNLD Sai Leik who attended the NCA meeting said that two representatives, one each for UNA and SNLD have been selected to participate as political parties representatives in the UPDJC.

It was said that this is to facilitate better understanding between the incoming NLD regime and the military, like as it is now between the USDP and the military, according to Sai Leik.

“There is harmony between the present government and the Tatmadaw (military). Only if harmonious, hand-in-hand (atmosphere) could be continued with the Tatmadaw, can the reform issue be continued. The hope for peace be kept (alive). That is why, in order Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw could steadfastly join hand for peace process, and with the aim to work hand-in-hand with the ethnic nationalities, (we) have given the name list.”

The UNA representative selected is Angela Thaung and for the SNLD Sai Kyaw Nyunt is endorsed.

Sai Leik added that despite such deliberation, it would all depend on the incoming NLD government, whether the UPDJC work would be taken as it is or push for changes in personnel and as well the contents. However, the task of the UPDJC is to primarily draw up the FPD and see to that the PD actually started before the Thein Sein regime's legislature period ended in a few months.

U Win Htain of NLD confirmed the speculation on 24 November, during the selection of 16 representatives for the political parties meeting in Yangon, that it would be the Aung San Suu Kyi's peace process, which she would lead through political means, to establish a genuine federalism.

Summing up

To sum up, the angst of the people, the NLD, stakeholders and all those concerned with the well-being of Burma, regarding the transfer of political power from Thein Sein to incoming Aung San Suu Kyi's regime is well-founded, but it will definitely sail through, even if it would have to come across some nasty hurdles.

Points to ponder among them are complaints of irregularities to the Union Election Commission (UEC) during the election period; Aung San Suu Kyi's statement that she will rule as a figure above the president; irregular election campaign spending accusation of the NLD; and the reluctance of President Thein Sein and Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing to meet Aung San Suu Kyi, in a timely manner.

It might seem that the outgoing regime's functionaries are laying stones along the way, to frustrate the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, but in the end this will all be cleared up for Thein Sein reportedly  is committed to pull through his reform process to the end, as repeatedly promised. He recently iterated this in Kuala Lumpur during the ASEAN meeting and also told President Obama that he would hand overpower in due course. On top of it, he also told Obama that he would meet Aung San Suu Kyi.

Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hliang in his recent interview with the Washington Post said the meeting could take place in December, after the UEC finishes its job. The NLD only needs to be a bit more patient.

The war in Shan and Kachin States are being viewed as a desperate attempt by the ethnic nationalities and democratic political parties that the military is paving way for emergency rule, so as to create a two-tier society: a relatively free community with democratic rights in Burmese heartland and a military occupied and suppressed ethnic states in a primitive, old style colonial setting.

As the constitution also allows to impose military emergency rule, the military only needs to create an atmosphere of war in ethnic areas, through deliberate military provocation or staging fake battles, as is the case in Mong Nawng and Mong Hsu Townships.

There is no other viable explanation for the military's ongoing offensives to justify its military aggressions.

Besides, ending the war in Kachin and Shan States would be more problematic, due to the differing views on how the notion of sovereignty and national unity is viewed by the Tatmadaw and the EAOs.

As time and again been stressed and explained, the Tatmadaw views that it is protecting the nation's sovereignty and sees that the EAOs are encroaching and violating it and thus, has to be fought and eliminated. But the EAOs view that they are entitled to shared-sovereignty, as the independence from the British in 1947 is also a co-independence. And since, the promise of equality, rights of self-determination and democracy anchored in a real federal union is denied by successive Bamar-dominated mostly military regimes, they have fought back to regain their birthright legacies.

Thus, they reject the assumption of sovereignty monopoly by the Bamar-dominated regimes and demand for shared-sovereignty through armed struggle. It is clear to all that this conceptual differences could only be ironed out politically and not militarily or occupation of more ethnic territories in by the Tatmadaw.

Because of all these, the Tatmadaw's accusation and conducting territorial winning wars in ethnic areas neither solve the underlying political problems nor make the reconciliation peace process easier. It is now up to the Tatmadaw either to show good will and tone down the offensives and stop them or continue with its warpath rhetoric, but it should keep in mind that only political dialogue and settlement could resolve this ongoing ethnic conflict and nothing else.

Another corresponding issue, closely connected to the notion of sovereignty is the concept of “national unity”. But before one even starts to mention this, those concerned would need to consider if there is already an accepted common “national identity”.

From the independence of Burma in 1947 to this very days there has been no commonly accepted such identity, but only various ethnic identities that still need to be merged into a “national identity”. The reason is that there has been no awareness-building, corresponding to the power and resources sharing within the mould of a genuine federalism. In other words, the making of a voluntary, accepted common national identity has never occurred, other than the imposed “Myanmar” identity, which neither is consented nor adopted by the non-Bamar ethnic nationalities and minorities. And this again is due to the lack of the said political power and resources sharing, for without which a common national identity could not be forged or developed, much less to foster and nurture it. Thus, the military's notion of protecting the national unity just  resembles a dominant ethnic group trying to protect its occupied and colonized territories. Of course this has to be corrected and again a political give-and-take is the only way out and not suppressing and occupying the ethnic homelands.

And finally, the handling of the NCA process should be conducted in a way that the Thein Sein regime instead of rushing and pushing all the procedures and formation according to its liking, lopsidedly manned more by its own people, with the hope that the incoming regime has no other choice but to follow only, it should instead invite, cooperate and coordinate with the NLD and other elected ethnic parties' functionaries, so that the peace process could be carried on smoothly when the new regime comes into being. This kind of approach will definitely benefit all the people in the country.

For now, the contemporary political setting calls for at least a calculated compromise, if not fully-fledge, from all stakeholders: the USDP-Military regime, the Aung San Suu Kyi headed NLD party and the whole spectrum of ethnic nationalities, armed or unarmed. Any failure to successfully link these three major actor groups to compromise for a political settlement would lead to end of a true, democratic, reform process and push all those that have been achieved back to the square one, which nobody wants to see happen.

 The Contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SUD) - Editor