Quite a lot has happened during a time span of a week. It started out with the President Thein Sein’s invitation of 15 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on 11 August, followed by the purge of Thura Shwe Mann from the ruling party, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), as Acting Chairman, on 13 August; Karen National Union (KNU) statement emphasizing that it would sign the NCA as accepted by the government, on 15 August; the four EAOs, KNU, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen Peace Council (KPC) and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) joint-statement along the same line as KNU, on 17 August; and the government publication of the NCA for public consumption in its own newspapers, also on 17 August. On the heels of all these, an EAOs leadership meeting is scheduled to be held from 21 to 23 August, for deliberations on how to respond to the President’s invitation initiative, prior to another round of meeting in Naypyitaw, between the 5 EAOs, representing Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan and 3 Ethnic armed Organizations-Senior Delegation (EAOs-SD) members, with the Union Peace-making Central Committee (UPCC), involving the President and Commander-in-Chief.

In this seemingly well orchestrated chain of execution, the question arises, whether the recently publicized, ninth NCA could be taken as a full-fledged, complete ceasefire treaty, as assumed by the government.

In normal circumstances, an unfinished draft could not be taken as an official document, much less when the two negotiating parties could not come to terms, on a heatedly debated major issue that is left unresolved. The last NCA Section 33, which is concerned with the participation list, is the bone of contention.

This is exactly what has happened with the ninth NCA. The issue of all-inclusiveness signing of the NCA could not be ironed out between the regime’s Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) and the EAOs-SD. The two parties’ participant list and counts differ quite a great deal with one another. The UPWC only wants 15 EAOs to participate, while the SD prefers, at least, 17 of its EAOs members. The problem is the regime would not accept 6 of the EAOs members, which means only 11 of its members will be included in the signing of NCA.

The UPWC count of 15 includes National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), United Wa State Army (UWSA), while it excludes the six organizations – previously represented by Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and now by EAOs-SD – the Palaung State Liberation Front/ Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), the ethnic Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Arakan Army (AA)—all of which have had recent armed clashes with the Burma army; and also wants to exclude three smaller groups—the Wa National Organization (WNO), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) and Arakan National Council (ANC).

The ninth NCA draft
Apart from the disagreement over all-inclusiveness of the EAOs, the draft has not corrected the flaws that the SD had mentioned that it would seek alteration, prior to the meeting of the ninth NCA meeting. In other words, it doesn’t look like that any of the SD demand has been met.

For example, in Section 6, the government preferred usage of “security reintegration”, which is disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and being used in the present draft, without mentioning the SD preferred position of security sector reform (SSR). From ethnic point of view DDR is “negotiated surrender” and SSR is a reform process of the Burma Army, which could transform the now Burman-dominated army into a federal army formation.*

Section 10(a) uses the term “with the permission of the government” phrase, whereas the SD has suggested “joint-cooperation”, which means the EAOs have no say at all in all aspects of INGO operation within their homeland.

Section 22 (d) writes: “ Basing on the decision of Union Convention, necessary amendment of constitutional laws of inserting and deleting, according to the implementation procedure is agreed.”

In the same vein, Section 26 writes: “ It is agreed that this agreement (treaty) will seek endorsement from the union parliament, according to the implementation procedure.”
This means, the EAOs would have to adhere to the 2008 Constitution, which they neither accept nor acknowledge, for they are seeking a completely different new political system that would cater to the genuine federal union setup. The 2008 Constitution is a non-starter from the ethnic point of view, for it is presidential unitary system and could not be altered to become federal. But surprisingly, the SD has accepted the draft, knowing that it won’t be able to push for its aspirations within this framework.

Four EAOs’ Joint-Statement
The four EAOs – KNU, DKBA, KPC, RCSS – joint-statement writes:
“ The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and the Deed of Commitment signed on 12 February 2015 by the government, military, both Parliamentary Speakers, 19 Ethnic Affairs Ministers, 55 political parties, are guarantees for building of a democratic and federal union which reflects our aspirations for freedom, equality and justice based on the spirit of Panglong and the principles of democracy, equality, and self-determination.”
The statement further stressed the following points for as reasons and guarantee to sign the ceasefire agreement.
(a) We will retain our arms and be able to defend our region and people;
(b) We will not be restricted by the Unlawful Association Act, Articles 17/1 and 17/2, and be able to freely seek resolution to political challenges through a political dialogue;
(c) We will be able to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict through the joint implementation of a Code of Conduct and the Joint Monitoring of the ceasefire;
(d) We will be able to continue to protect the interest of the local population during the political dialogue process;
(e) We will be able to have a political dialogue with the government, political parties and all other stakeholders;
(f) The political dialogues with the government and political parties will be jointly conducted to ensure that any one group or groups does not dominate;
(g) We will be able to change the 2008 Constitution In accordance with the agreement reached through the political dialogue;

However, when DVB, on 17 August, asked Colonel Sai La, spokesman of the RCSS in an interview regarding the matter, if he really thought that all the privileges mentioned in the statement would literally be granted by the government, he presumed that this would be the case, as it is written in the NCA draft.

Thein Sein sent invitation letters
Following the end of ninth NCA on 7 August, the SD team made a proposal to meet the President and Commander in Chief to iron out the issue of all-inclusiveness, which was left unresolved. U Aung Min, the regime’s top peace negotiator, was said to have taken the SD’s overtures to Naypyitaw.

The EAOs leadership informed U Aung Min of Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) that five representatives, each from KNU, Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), New Mon State Party (NMSP) and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), plus three representatives from SD will travel to Naypyitaw to thrash out the all-inclusive issue, so that NCA could be finalized.

But Thein Sein’s invitation letters, addressed to the 15 EAOs, which the government has chosen for signing of the NCA, torpedoed the negotiation process, scheduled to take place around 25 August, by pre-empting it with the well-intended initiative. The high level ethnic team is geared to negotiate with the government for the inclusion of all its 17 members in the NCA signing process. Apart from that recently, a member of the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) told the SD that the government won’t change its policy of chosen 15 EAOs.

Thus, if any of the invited armed group would sign the incomplete ninth NCA draft, not yet officially endorsed by the two drafting, negotiating parties, it would amount to the undertaking of inking the invalid ceasefire agreement. In other words, it would mean signing the regime’s manipulated version of treaty at their own risk.

How much is enough to qualify as nationwide?
According to reliable insider sources, Thein Sein was said to have stressed that, at least two third of the EAOs should sign the NCA, in order to be able to call it a nationwide undertaking. And so, if the EAOs count of 21 is taken as a starting point, he would need 14 armed groups to sign the treaty. But if it is 15 groups, according to the government’s count, he would need 10 to be able to get the two third participation in signing the treaty.
For now, the regime could count on 5 groups, which is short of another 5. But the problem is, if this really make sense, for this practice would still not resemble or come any near to the notion of “nationwide”, which the regime desperately need to show it to the public. In a sense, this will be only a loss of face again and admitting the failure to achieve nationwide ceasefire.

Either way, if all fail, it could go ahead with the “open book” method or “Plan B”, which has been an ongoing low key operation of the regime, since May this year. The method is employing the EAOs to sign the treaty, according to their chosen time and space, one after another.

On 9 May, at Yangon’s Inya Lake Hotel, the Karen National Union and the Restoration Council of Shan State Army, both seen as closer to the government, sought to set up a Coordination Team for Peace and National Reconciliation to smooth the way toward political dialogue. But the National League for Democracy, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, the Pa-Oh National Organization, the Karen National Party and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front had not agreed to take part.

A proposal to establish the reconciliation team was included in a six-part agreement reached in Naypyitaw on February 12 between the government and some, but not all, ethnic armed groups and parties.

Although it has never been clear if the said coordination team has been set up, the successive meetings, possibly headed by the same group has managed to compile and draw up a draft framework for political dialogue, which is by all means a very comprehensive and balanced one.

Thus, it is quite possible that the regime would go ahead with whatever groups that it could rally behind its scheme, using the already acquired ninth NCA draft, to start its “open book” signing plan, if it fails to gather two third of the EAOs.

KNU, RCSS, SSPP and KIO on NCA
Reasons given for RCSS endorsement of President Thein Sein initiated NCA is due to the disunity of the EAOs and doesn’t know when the nationwide ceasefire and political dialogue would materialize. Also it is in agreement with the President’s initiative. Other than that it stressed that it could work for the inclusion of other groups that are left out of the process from within, reported SHAN on 18 August.

The same SHAN report wrote that the SSPP, another Shan armed group, would work for all-inclusiveness of EAOs participation and stressed that the people within its jurisdiction are for real genuine peace settlement, perhaps implying that it won’t be signing the NCA.
KNU has also identical aim as the RCSS, although it has quite recently made known that it is committed to signing the NCA, even if there is no all-inclusiveness of EAOs and a real atmosphere of ceasefire prevailing on the ground, according to various media reports. It is committed to sign it, at all cost.

The VOA 19 August reporting on KIO, Laiza meeting with the Kachin people, quoted Daw Khun Jar from Kachin Peace Network, as saying: “Number one is all-inclusiveness. If all is included, it should be signed. When talking about all-inclusiveness, Palaung, MNDAA Kokang and all armed organizations should be included. If all will sign, then sign it. Because if one looks at Law Khi Lar, UNFC and NCCT statements, they are for signing it all together. I persuaded (the KIO) to tread the original line (all-inclusiveness), for it has tried (struggled) so many years. The second point is that I asked them to consider the people’s suggestion.”

She further said: “This all-inclusive signing is not only demanded by the Kachin people, but by all civil societies’ coordination committee of the whole country, which has declared in its 17 August statement, to sign only when all would sign it.”

She added that this is the demand of all the people of Myanmar and not just the Kachin. And that since 80% of the fighting since 2013 has occurred in Palaung-PSLF area, excluding the group from signing will be meaningless.

To wrap up, the EAOs leadership should now think if they should go along with solving the problem under the mould of 2008 Constitution and try to amend it to become more federal or stick to its non-recognition of the Constitution, opting for the rewriting to be a genuine federalism. Originally, the ethnic armed groups have hoped for a negotiation that would enable them to work out a political settlement, on an equal footing with the regime. But now this seems far-fetched.

Just recently, on 20 August, The Myawady Daily reported as telling the British Ambassador H.E. Mr. Andrew Silas Patrick at Bayintnaung villa, on 19 August that the ethnic armed groups need to give up arms after signing the ceasefire agreement and that those who refused to sign and failed to observe the rules and principles will be met with government actions.

This is, no doubt, could be interpreted as a threat and an ultimatum, telling the EAOs to yield to “negotiated surrender” and those who refused to comply with would be drastically taken care of.

Consequently, the regime would also need to re-access its position, if this hand-wringing and imposing it’s will on the ethnic nationalities is the kind of reconciliation it prefers, rather than creating a fair and level playing field, so that equality, democracy and rights of self-determination could flourish, leading to a genuine federal form of government. The government would need to do away with its ethnocentrism and political power monopoly, if genuine reconciliation and political settlement are to be achieved.

For now, Thein Sein has up the ante by issuing invitation letters to its chosen 15 EAOs, coupled with various incentive and at the same time rejecting the ethnic demand for all-inclusiveness. But whether this last-ditch effort of gamble would turn out in his favour or not in the near future is anybody’s guess.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU)-Editor


Note by editor            According to Resolution # 9 passed at the 8^th SD-UPWC meeting, 23 July 2015: It is agreed that (a) Security Sector Reintegration means the DDR-SSR procedures (b) The two parties will jointly see to it that negotiations on Security Sector Reintegration matters shall not delay, stop or harm in any way the political dialogue at all levels.