It won’t be wrong to conclude that most of Burma’s woes
today stem from decades long military dictatorship, which have started
with the military coup in 1962. Consequently, the two most crucial
issues, resolving ethnic conflicts and implementing democratic reform,
continues to be hampered by military’s pre-concieved ideas, prescribed
game plan and road-map, as all could see, even during the reform-minded,
tenure of President Thein Sein headed, quasi-civilian, Union Solidarity
and development Party-Military (USDP-Military) government.
The present USDP-Military regime has its origin in Revolutionary Council
(RC), headed by General Ne Win that came to power after the military
coup, in 1962, followed by successive military regimes – Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP), State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC created the
present quasi-civilian, USDP-Military government basically out of “group
survival” mentality, surging international trend of democratization
process and “anti-totalitarian” tendencies, that have swept the Arab
world, known as “Arab Spring”, at the turn of the century. In short, the
military’s change of heart is not out of love for democratic
principles, but first and foremost, its “group survival” consideration,
to protect its military and Bama racial supremacy stance, using
political power monopoly to maintain and achieve its strategic aim. The
“guided-disciplined democracy” is the term thought out to support this
aim and in no way, with the commitment to foster real democratic norms
or principles in mind, for the betterment of the society as a whole. In
other words, it is a creation of fall-back position, with a touch of
democratic window-dressing, while the political arena will still be
dominated by the military. This is, at least, the basic consideration
thought out by the military clique and is still the driving factor for
its involvement in Burma’s political arena.
As such, the military or Tatmadaw is entrusted with the task to
uphold and protect the military-drafted, 2008 Constitution, which is
designed to maintain military supremacy position in all aspects of
social and political lives. And thus, in handling the much talked about
democratization process or resolving of the ethnic conflicts, the
military is determined to tackle the problems by holding on to total
monopolization of political power, and act accordingly to maintain its
“top dog” position, at all cost.
The recent constitutional amendment debacle is the case in point. As
all know, all meaningful Sections that need amendment were all voted
down, by using the 25% military’s veto votes. Many already speculate
that the ongoing NCA could also meet the same faith.
Democratic awareness
But this may be looking at the contemporary political situation
solely from the pessimistic point of view, for there are, somehow,
optimistic development that need mentioning, where adherence and rising
awareness to the democratic principles are concerned; and might have
even taken roots among some of the military’s USDP members.
One positive outcome of the constitutional amendment debacle is that,
even though all crucial Sections to low down the voting threshold of
military veto votes from 75% plus to a mere 70% were voted down, when
one looks at the voting pattern, it is quite evident that the USDP MPs
voted in diversified manner and not together as a bloc. But in
contrary, the appointed military MPs exercised their voting as a
disciplined, solid bloc and strictly followed the Commander-in Chief
order on how to go about with it. According to the constitution, the
military is allotted with 25% appointed MP seats within the parliament.
It seems, the USPD-Military regime might now be burdened with hardliner
and reform factions, even though people tend to think, rightly or
wrongly, that it is an entity solidly controlled and directed by the
former military strongman General Than Shwe, architect of the
military-drafted, 2008 Constitution, behind the scene.
It is astonishing that the pro-amendment vote counts were mostly over
60%, even though they failed to achieve the 75% voting threshold, for
this could be taken as exceptionally high, which the NLD, ethnic and
other small opposition parties combined wouldn’t have achieved. The
answer this is that the other pro-amendment votes come from the ruling
USDP. The Myanmar Times, on 26 June, report the rejected vote count as
follows:
Section 59(f) – 371 votes, 58.6%
Section 60(c) – 386 votes, 61%
Section 418(b) – 386 votes, 61%
Section 436(a) – 388 votes, 61.3%
Section 436(b) – 388 votes, 61.3%
Of course, it is explainable that it is an inner-party factions’
conflict played out in the open. For the friction and competition
between President Thein Sein and House Speaker Shwe Mann for
presidential post are well known; and that Shwe Mann has been trying to
bring the military under the party wing, by changing the criteria of
presidential nominee to be an elected MP and not nominated by the
Presidential Electoral College, without even having to be an MP, as is
presently the case. But first, the 75% voting threshold has to be
lowered to 70%, if other Sections were to be amended. And thus, the
voting of Section 436 amendment, which basically might be able to do
away with the military veto votes, was essential as a first step, which
was initiated and engineered by the pragmatic presidential candidate and
current Speaker, Thura Shwe Mann, quite possibly with Aung San Suu
Kyi’s knowledge and consent, followed by amendment proposal of other
Sections.
Whatever the case, this is a small positive development and Shwe Mann
has to be credited for his awareness that constitutional amendment is a
necessity, if the country is to move ahead, although getting rid of the
Thein Sein faction as a presidential competitor could also be the
motive behind.
According to the Eleven Media report of 16 July, Lower House MP of
USDP, Thura Aung Ko said that only constitutional amendment will end
conflict and establish a correct judicial system.
“The main requirements of our country are to ensure national
reconciliation, eternal peace, a genuine federal union, the rule of law,
the correct judicial system and to end conflict. To fulfill these
requirements, we must change the Constitution in accord with the public
desire,” the MP said.
He also called for a directly elected president.
As the above mentioned scenarios suggest, the blind obedience of
upholding the military supremacy doctrine might be eroding, although it
could not be concluded that democratic awareness already outweighs the
military’s power monopoly desire for the majority within the USDP. But
there is hope that the awareness-building of democratization process
might be gaining momentum and it is a positive development.
Security Sector Reform
Another point to ponder is the reformation of the Tatmadaw by
implementing Security Sector Reform (SSR), which is considered to be a
tool for national integration and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)
see it in the light of reformation of the existing Burma Army into a
federal one, where equitable, ethnic quota system could be implemented,
apart from employing the rest of ethnic troops as state police forces,
for example. But in contrary, the present the Commander-in-Chief Min
Aung Hliang is very much in favor of keeping the the military setup of
Burman or Bama-dominated army as it is. He has often voiced his opinion
of pushing through the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) option, which the EAOs see it as a “negotiated surrender”.
Besides, the Commander-in-Chief maintains that the present Burma Army is
a “Union Army” for many non-Burman ethnic soldiers are already
participating in it. Thus, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
of the ethnic armies are the only sensible option from his point of
view.
While it is important that the Commander-in-Chief should not be
clinging only to DDR as a means to an end, to eradicate ethnic rebellion
by hook or by crook, once and for all, it is equally essential not to
reject SSR as a tool to clip the wings of Burman-dominated Tatmadaw,
from its total domination of the establishment. For this line of
reasoning would only lead to “lose-lose” outcome, as the stalled
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) has proven, accepting the SSR would
produce a “win-win” situation for all the warring parties.
In an article titled “Building “National” Armies—Building Nations?
Determinants of Success for Post intervention Integration Efforts”, Sven
Gunnar Simonsen, Oslo-based independent analyst and international
reporter, wrote:
“In societies where the front lines of recent armed conflict have
followed ethnic boundaries,the political salience of ethnicity is very
high. For both locals and outsiders, it is easy to perceive ethnic
identities as fixed in both character and intensity. Ethnic integration
in the sense of assimilation (re-identification into a dominant group)
is very unlikely to take place under such circumstances. However,
integration and nation-building are both understood as describing a
process of (re)building a sense of community within a polity, without
the need for members of different ethnic groups to change the character
of their ethnic identity. Even in a post-conflict situation where
“everything is ethnic,” a reduction of the political salience of
ethnicity can take place and may even be essential to securing a fragile
peace.”
To make his point, he further stressed:
“Security sector reform is now widely acknowledged as a core
component of comprehensive peace-building efforts. In post-conflict
societies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines, the building of a
new, more inclusive army is a major challenge. If it is done
successfully, however, such a force may contribute toward
nation-building that transcends ethnic divisions, reducing their
salience—and thus the risk of new armed conflict. With an externally
driven process, the military can be more than a mirror of society and
its cleavages. A national army could, if not build a new nation on its
own, then at least influence perceptions of what a nation might
constitute.”
The argument that needs to be emphasized here is if SSR could be
viewed as a national integration tool, in line with the formation of a
federal army, where equitable quota system is applied to benefit all
warring parties, this would benefit all stakeholders. And if the
military top brass could think out of the box and willing to restructure
with the SSR guidelines, Burma has a good chance to achieve it much
easier than expected for a couple of reasons.
Firstly, all non-Burman ethnic nationalities have long resolved that
federal union form of government that is tune with “unity in diversity”
is the way to go and have long abandoned their previous secession
aspirations. Secondly, the present situation could be taken as really
ripe, for all conflict parties – EAOs and Tatmadaw – are of the opinion
that peace is a necessity, essential and only achievable through
negotiation or dialogue and not armed confrontation, as decades long
armed conflict have not produce a clear cut winner, but only permanent
stalemate, which have dragged on until today, hindering peace and
development, at the expense of the whole country. At least this reality
and crucial factor is accepted by all warring parties.
Although almost all EAOs have shown “political will” to adhere to the
already signed state and union level ceasefire agreements, Burma army
has insisted upon “ area cleansing and control”, under the pretext of
sole sovereignty claims, employing offensives and military occupation of
the ethnic homelands. This has been the main reason why ceasefire could
not be maintained. The military could have easily stopped all the
offensives and, at least, withdraw all its front-line forces to their
respective mother units, to show that it means business and also
sincerity. In fact, the EAOs have earlier demanded that the military
should withdraw from all ethnic homelands, before any negotiation
started, but lower down their demand and commit themselves to the state
and union level ceasefire agreements.
Consequently, the offensive wars continue unabated in Northern Shan,
Kachin and Karen States, making it hard to advance the peace process and
finalizing the NCA.
The military top brass should also take cue from the rising
democratic awareness of some USDP members and start to think of
themselves as part of the solution than a liability, by agreeing to
reform of the military, to become part of the national integration
process, rather than sticking to its rigid, military supremacy doctrine.
According to a reliable source near to the regime, information
minister , U Ye Htut was said to have stressed that, “The regime have
created a mechanism where the military, political parties and ethnic
peoples can work together, from which a sense of reconciliation can be
forged, problems that arise can be handled, and the military taken as
part of, not out of, the solution.”
The source also said regarding the SSR, the military had visited
South Africa in April of this year, and were said to be impressed with
the SSR process there, especially the negotiation of the new structure,
followed by demobilization and re-enlisting.
It is true that the retired military old hand in civil and active
military personnel are still in control of the country’s political arena
and continue to steer the political course. But even a guided
-disciplined democracy, designed to serve the military class, could not
forsake to mention the democratic principles; and because of this,
political awareness have sipped into those party functionaries, who
started to question the wisdom of serving a particular interest group,
rather than the people.
Thura Shwe Mann, Thura Aung Ko and the protest voting pattern of some
USDP MPs might be a pioneering move to serve the interest of the
people, which could snowball into a genuine people’s party.
At this writing, there is only a faint hope for some military
personnel had begun to look at the SSR implementation in South Africa,
but still far from the commitment that comprehensive reform of the
military establishment, to be all- inclusive and federal, is underway.
But the military has the choice to either stick to the old way and
risk having to make do with the “lose – lose” situation, or accepting
the reform of the military and reap the” win- win” outcome.
The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor