On 29 June, Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC), close to the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), released a briefing emphasizing that the UPWC leader, U Aung Min might likely stick to the 31 March draft as a finalized one to ratify or signed, before moving on to the drawing of political framework, followed by the much awaited dialogue process.
The briefing writes: “The Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC), led by Union Minister U Aung Min, will meet informally with the Ethnic Armed Organizations’ (EAOs) Senior Delegation this week in Chiang Mai, Thailand, rather than holding the formal talks as proposed by the Senior Delegation. It is highly likely that U Aung Min and his team will adhere to the NCA draft finalized by the UPWC and the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) on 31 March 2015. In addition, it appears the government is hesitant to recognize the Senior Delegation as a dialogue partner. These issues will likely create obstacles in moving forward with the peace process.”
But the EAOs’ Senior Delegation (SD) said that draft is not a finalized version and that its 15 or so amendment points proposal made in Law Khee Lah, a month ago, must be discussed and ironed out first, before the peace process could move forward.
The UPWC sees this as the SD hindering the process, while the SD could not understand for it is moving according to the procedure. From SD point of view, amending and touching up the draft is within the mandate of EAOs’ leadership and the UPWC has nothing to complain about. And NCCT only has the mandate to negotiate to the utmost limit that it could achieve by bargaining with the UPWC. The finalized version of 31 March is the outcome of such document and in no way a complete treaty to be signed by the EAOs, but a version to be reviewed and make necessary amendments by the EAOs’ leadership. The Law Khee Lah summit meeting of EAOs has thus finalized the draft that reflects the collective aspirations and is ready to negotiate the result with the government, which will be headed by the SD that has more power to decide on the spot, except for the signing of it. For only another, final EAOs leadership summit meeting could decide the ratification of the ironed out and agreed draft outcome, to be worked out together between the UPWC and SD. This is, at least, the procedure or consideration from the point of SD.
According to the ENAC briefing:“The Senior Delegation was formed to move the NCA process forward smoothly. The NCCT and UPWC are working groups that cannot pursue anything outside of their mandates.”
VOA report on 30 June, Nai Han Tha, a top NCCT peace negotiator and now an SD member, said that it is hard to alter the EAOs’ leadership decision. He said: “When signing the 31 March draft, NCCT already made it clear that it is in no position to make decision and that it has to table the draft to the EAOs leadership for eventual filling in and alteration, after which further discussion would be made. It is also included in the draft. Now they are indicating that it should not be changed and I’m disappointed. And we cannot also make changes to the EAOs’ leadership decision.”
Earlier, complicating the process it was said that the regime’s side didn’t have confidence and enough trust, even to initially meet the newly formed body of SD, according to the sources from Myanmar Peace Center (MPC).
Another reason given by U Aung Min is that the main text of 31 March be left untouched, but could carry on all untouched, unresolved issues in the appendix section for further discussion, except for secession and infringement of sovereignty. For the SD inclusion for discussions doesn’t mean that the issues that need immediate attention would be accepted.
Lawyer U Aung Htoo, principal of the Federal Law Academy, in Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State, pointed out four points that won’t sit quite well with the regime, according to an interview given to the DVB, on 25 June.
The first is the inserting of a paragraph, which writes: “It is decided that it means, in endorsing the Union Accord to become law, the Assembly of the Union may not in any way refuse, reject and make postponement.”
Signing a “Union Accord” or “Pyidaungsu Accord” is the second last step, in NCA’s seven steps roadmap.
The second is the “security reintegration” issue, which the EAOs have decided to leave out “reintegration” and addressed as only “security” issue. The reason is that it could either be surrender or integration of the EAOs forces into the Burma Army. And as such could become a problem in further interpretation.
The third is transitional period arrangement. Since the transition time span could be long there are things that need to be worked out in cooperation or jointly. The EAOs have included an issue, which concerns “Land use and natural resources management”. This means, the hitherto regime sole responsible area of decision will have to be shared with the EAOs.
The final one is the involvement of international witnesses that the EAOs have demanded, when signing the NCA, in addition to the participation of top three branches personnel of the country – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The reason that the EAOs insist on such international involvement of UN General Secretary, ASEAN General Secretary, the U.S., China, India, Thailand, U.K., Japan and Norway were to pave way for joint-monitoring mechanism, like in case of Aceh of Indonesia; for joint-monitoring between the regime’s military and the EAOs had never worked in the past, or even the present, if Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Burma Army joint-monitoring undertaking is to be taken as evidence. And so, the EAOs move is to solicit such an international participation, according to U Aung Htoo’s interpretation.
Apart from that, while the regime would like to portray the happening as a conflict resolution and reconciliation among members of the same family, the EAOs, clearly see that the treaty is made between territorial-state-based nationalities and the Burmese regime that has an internationally accepted norms.
On top of all these, the EAOs’ all-inclusive signing of the NCA and establishing a national-state-based federal union are problematic areas, where the government is still not on the same page with the EAOs and ethnic nationalities as a whole.
The recent constitutional amendment debacle also poisoned the already deteriorating ethnic-regime relationship. According to Myanmar Times, on 26 June, the voting outcome is as follows:
Full voting results
Proposed changes required the support of 75 percent of all 633 MPs, or at least 475 votes in favor. Only 583 MPs were present for the vote.
APPROVED
Section 59(d) – 556 votes, 87.8%
REJECTED
Section 59(f) – 371 votes, 58.6%
Section 60(c) – 386 votes, 61%
Section 418(b) – 386 votes, 61%
Section 436(a) – 388 votes, 61.3%
Section 436(b) – 388 votes, 61.3%
As all could see, the most crucial Section 436 (a) (b) and 59 (f) were effectively blocked with the 25% appointed military vote, which means even lowering of the 75% necessary vote-ceiling to 70% could not even be tolerated by the military bloc. More than 75% MPs vote is needed, in order to sail through the first motion, within the parliament.
If one would heap the blame at USDP-Military regime as not having “political will” to compromise, it will certainly not agree. From its perspective, making way for a nominal civilian regime is a big sacrifice; just keeping 25% appointed MPs for the military is also a largesse to ensure that the military will not make a coup; accepting the word “federalism” in itself is also a turnaround if one looks at it as being a taboo theme, since the military coup in 1962; degradation of the military’s prestige by making room or even talks to the assorted lowly ethnic insurgent groups is also because of the love for the country; and finally, allowing and even participating in the constitution amendments originally called for by ethnic and opposition political parties, and later taken over and headed by the regime’s USDP, it is indeed a big compromise. Only it could not allow things to get out of hand and thus the rejection of changing the Article 436, which might reduce the military veto vote of 25%.
It depends on how one looks at it with regards to “political will”. But one thing is evident amendments to dilute the military’s political power monopoly will not be tolerated either within the parliament or outside of it. And this includes the NCA, where the EAOs are pushing for genuine federal union and reformation of the Tatmadaw or Burma Army into a federal one.
Meanwhile, Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing told the Chinese diplomat, Sun Guoxiang, who had attended the Law Khee Lah meeting earlier in Karen State, that it was important ethnic rebels abandon armed struggle and accept the process of DDR—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, according to the military-owned Myawaddy newspaper, reported The Irrawaddy, on 30 June.
“In any country there is only one armed force,” Min Aung Hlaing said, adding that ethnic armed groups should have the will to integrate according to the law and that their demands should be “logical.”
According to the SHAN report of 1 July, Min Aung Hlaing has summoned and reprimanded the United Wa State Army’s (UWSA) representatives, in Naypyidaw, telling them that the confiscated logs won’t be given back and the six arrested Chinese won’t also be released. He further said that they cannot defy the country, while living in it and that measured retaliation will be employed against the Wa. And as if to prove his point, soldiers from Light Infantry Division 55, Kalaw, Southern Shan State, were moved to the Thai border area, using some fifty trucks to transport them.
The beefing up of Wa and Burmese forces have forced hundreds of residents in Mongton township, opposite Chiangmai province, to seek refuge inside Thai territory since 2 June, when the Burma Army detained 16 loggers hired by the UWSA.
Taking cue of the chain of happenings, a keen Burma-watcher told this writer that “If the USDP-Military regime’s amendment rejection is still not enough to convince the naïve and well-meaning optimistic people, domestically and internationally, that it will try to hold on to political power monopoly at all cost, wait till the regime refuses to consider about EAOs leadership’s 15 points amendment proposal and even to deal with EAOs’ SD; torpedoes the whole NCA; puts the blame on the EAOs as a whole, and wages an undeclared war, or even a declare all out war, to prove its point”
Let us just hope that the keen Burma-watcher is wrong.
The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor
