The Kokang's rude awakening, on 9 February, has disturbed the normally quite tranquil landscape and sent tremendous ripples, in today's ethnic political arena. While the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts, accusation of waging proxy aggression war from neighboring country, or a personal vendetta of a formerly disposed don, staging a specultacular comeback are said to be the reasons behind this violent outbreak of war, no single reason is comprehensive enough to explain the abrupt explosive situation that has unfold, with vengeance. The truth, however, is likely to be a mixture of all the facts mentioned above.


The first accusation from the regime is that Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) has employed foreign mercenaries from mainland China and also conducting the offensives with the help of Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Shan State Army (SSA)North, Ta-ang National Liberation Front (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA), United Wa State Army (UWSA) and MongLa, also known as National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and not to be confused with MNDAA. The second allegation is the infringement of Burma's sovereignty and territorial integrity, with the help of foreigners across the border and collaboration with the said ethnic resistance forces, which in effect means, abettors of the foreign power. This in turn makes them the enemies of the state, which must be dealt with decisively.


As the war in northern Shan State of Kokang area drags on, with little likelihood to forcefully end the MNDAA and its allies military activities, the ensuing armed conflict would likely continue within Kokang area and beyond. Peng Jiasheng's home coming would be a prolonged one, even though the Union Solidarity and Development Party- Military (USDP-Military) regime is determined to flush him and MNDAA out of the area.


DVB reported, on 6 March, that the MNDAA claims that the number of its troops has risen to around 5,000 since conflict reignited with Burmese government forces on 9 February. According to the report, Tun Myat Linn, the spokesperson for the Kokang rebel militia, said that about a thousand civilians from the local ethnic Kokang population in northeastern Shan State have signed up into its ranks in the past few weeks.



“The people support us and they want to join with us, because they have a sense of duty to protect their people and their homeland,” he told DVB.

And so the regime's accusation that it is not against the people of Kokang, but with drugs traffickers and criminals that are out to overthrow the legitimately elected self-administrative body of Kokang, holds no more truth, if the swelling of MNDAA ranks is to be taken as a popular uprising indication.

As Kokang's violent outbreak, started out by MNDAA offensive, is part and parcel of the whole ethnic conflict spectrum, and the regime's attempt to portray it as a separate incident, having to do with some narcotic trafficking gangs disturbing normalcy, is not at all convincing. Instead, the regime should start to entertain the idea to resolve the interethnic conflict in a holistic manner and not just “piecemeal” solution, which will bring us nowhere. We should all be reminded that Peng Jiasheng was a respectable national race leader until 2009 for the military regime and only falls out of grace, becomes drug trafficking menace, all of a sudden again, when he refused to become part of the military's Border Guard Force (BGF) plan.

The problem with the successive military dominated regimes have been the refusal to acknowledge the legitimate ethnic rights of self-determination, and instead tend to portray it as developmental and poverty reduction issues, rightly or wrongly. In short, the regimes have been downplaying the aspirations of non-Burman ethnic groups and refused to even accept that ethnic conflict exists and it is the main core problem that has to be resolved, if Burma is to get out of the conflict mode and progress further.

According to Wsevolod W. Isajiw, in his research titled “Approaches to ethnic conflict resolution: paradigms and principles”, he writes:

Three types of such preconceptions are singled out: the preconception of ethnic groups as pre-modern, the self-conception of the majority group in society as non-ethnic and the often-assumed “command” character of the mandate carried out by appointed administrators dealing with minority ethnic groups. These preconceptions have contributed to ineffectiveness of efforts at interethnic conflict resolution in as much as they have excluded the principle of identity recognition, regarded here as a basic metaprinciple of interethnic relations.

Let us ponder a bit more on Wsevolod W. Isajiw's three types of preconceptions, in relation to Burma's interethnic conflicts.

The traditional preconception of ethnic groups, together with ethnic upsurge and interethnic conflicts have been there for as long as humanity exists and the tendency would likely continue for foreseeable future. According to  Wsevolod W. Isajiw's findings “researchers have identified 575 ethnic groups as being actual or potential nation-states, and one has estimated that there are as many as 3,000 -5,000 “nations” in the world.”

And as such, there is little the social scientists could do to curb the rising tendency, but to devise a compromised, co-habitation model, acceptable to all parties. But Burma's interethnic conflicts situation could be seen as fortunate, or a blessing in disguise, for most Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have already abandon their total independence posture and have opted for federalism to resolve the conflict. The initiative now lies with the quasi-civilian regime of Thein Sein and to what extend political accommodation could be meted out.

If one compares the self-conception of the majority group situation to Burma's ethnic conflict spectrum, the Bama or Burman majority group has indeed assumed itself as a non-ethnic society and has taken over the mantle of the British colonial master, from the period of independence to this very day. Bama has never has a state of its own, but instead, as Burma Proper, usurped the powers of the union, at the expense of all the non-Burman ethnic states. In other words, Burma Proper refusal to become a state,  as all the other states within the union, effectively block the realization of federal union in a true sense. And as a result, military's political power monopoly continues to be the order of the day, even though the setting now might suggest it is already a quasi-civilian government.

Exclusion of ethnic identity recognition, which is a basic principle, is what we are witnessing today. Successive military-dominated regimes often pay lip-service regarding the ethnic identities, but failed to recognize them as equals, with corresponding rights that the ethnic groups are entitled to enjoy. In other words, as a result, only the subordinate type of ethnic groups, without rights of self-determination, exists in today's Burma.

The biggest stumbling block, however, is the deeply rooted conceptual differences between the regime and non-Burman ethnic nationalities.


The successive military dominated regimes, including the ruling USDP-Military regime, see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha (1044-1077?). As such, all other non-Burmans – Shan, Kachin, Chin , Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni – are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.

On the other hand, the non-Burmans maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed political, territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.


Against this backdrop, the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team/Union Peacemaking Working Committee (NCCT/UPWC) peace talks is scheduled to take place in Rangoon, on the 16th of this month. According to the Myanmar Peace Centre's (MPC) officials, technical team of the UPWC, this seventh round of peace talks would be a “make-it-or-break-it” event. If the former, stage after stage formula will be employed. If the latter, parallel negotiations, at the same time; that is Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and Framework (FW)/ Political Dialogue (PD) negotiations simultaneously. It is, however, not at all clear how the MPC would like to pull through the said parallel negotiation process.


The government and the EAOs have been meeting for more than two hundred times, but decisive, positive outcome is still not in sight, mainly due to pre-conceived, acquired mindset and refusal to think out of the box. And as such, the upcoming seventh round of peace talks will likely be the same.


The peace process has been going on for more than a year, employing the so-called “single text  negotiation” procedure. But the problem is that it is neither a single text nor negotiations structured according to the original framer. For example, the already agreed issues were back-tracked at will or continuously amended, apart from not even employing mediator, third party team to oversee the fairness of the process, which is crucial for positive outcomes. In short, it is single text in name only and all could see it is reaching nowhere.


The name of the game should be “win-win” oriented negotiation, which is at the heart of single text negotiation. But the situation on the ground is that while the EAOs want devolution-maximum within the genuine federal structure, the regime might just wants the opposite and give in, as little as possible, presumably within the mold of present, presidential unitary system. In other words, the regime is against any move that would make Burma Proper – now diversified as seven regions – an equal state, like all the other ethnic states.


For the EAOs and non-Burman ethnic nationalities as a whole have already made concession by abandoning their original demand for total independence and instead opted for genuine federalism. The USDP-Military regime should as well abandon its aspiration for political power monopoly and accept the fact that federalism is only possible, if all states are equal.


Refusing to acknowledge the fallacy of preconception in resolving interethnic conflicts will eventually lead to peace process failure. Thus if the regime is sincere enough, there is no other way than to rethink its failed strategy and embrace Wsevolod W. Isajiw's three types of preconceptions as guiding principles to resolve interethnic conflict earnestly.


The only way to build trust and move forward would be to accept the facts that the Bama, projecting itself as a non-ethnic society and assuming new colonial master posture has to be repealed, together with recognizing the non-Burman ethnic identities as equal negotiation partners. Apart from that the powers-that-be would need to wean itself of the ethnocentrism, better known as Burmanization, if the pre-conceived mindset is to be altered. Anything less than the said radical mindset change would never be able to produce result.

It should be clear by now that the basic theoretical concept has to be changed, so that all would be able to think out of the box. Otherwise, we will never be able to get out of the vicious circle of petty bargaining and senseless long hours debate over wordings, which won't bring us any near to resolve the interethnic conflicts.