(25 November- 3 December 2014)

Day One. Tuesday, 25 November 2014.
Bus to Mae Sai.

Day Two. Wednessday, 26 November 2014.
By plan to Rangoon.

Day Three. Thursday, 27 November 2014: The Kachin enigma


Naturally, the first topic that is hotly discussed at length at the “Toward Ethnic Peace in Myanmar,” a seminar organized by Transnational Institute (TNI) on Chatham House rule, is the 105 mm howitzer incident near the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA) stronghold of Laiza that had killed 23 resistance cadets 8 days earlier.

“This is not only a Kachin issue,”said a participant, “but the whole country’s.”

She is seconded by at least two others. (Even a Myanmar Peace Center official who was visiting Chin State most recently was told by a local: “What are you doing here? Laiza is the place you should be going.”)

The KIA, probably suspecting a Burmese offensive, has refused to retaliate militarily, according to a Kachin participant. But the tensions remain high especially among the populace. “The people spat at us while we were working hand in hand with the government (1994-2011),” he says. “But since June 2011, when the Burma Army broke the ceasefire, their support is such the leadership is in morbid fear of losing it.”

The leadership, he concedes, is not interested in ceasefire agreement, but only in political dialogue. “We want to have both of it in a package, if we are going to sign a peace agreement.”

In a way, it explains why the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which is being negotiated between the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), of which the KIO/KIA is a leading member, and the government’s Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC), has been taking so long. But as far as the KIO/KIA is concerned, it had already signed the ceasefire agreement in 1994. There isn’t any special need for another one.

However, the stance has its opponents: the political parties. “If it is about ceasefire, it is their (the armed resistance) say,” one politician was reported as saying. “But when it comes to political matters, we would like to know who had given them the mandate to negotiate on our behalf.”

There are other resistance movements who also think the NCA process is merely the government’s ploy to postpone the political dialogue. “We have already signed both state level and union level ceasefire agreements,” complained Lt-Gen Yawdserk, Chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) to U Aung Min, the UPWC’s principal negotiator in October. “I don’t understand why we still have to do another one to get there.”

Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw (Burmese military) has reportedly decided that the KIO/KIA does not want peace. (But, according to the Kachin participant, it is not peace the KIO/KIA is against, but a ceasefire that, according to their 1994-2011 experience, has gotten nowhere.)

Interestingly, the  general international perspective is  that the peace process could have gone on well, were it not for the KIO/KIA, according to another participant. “Therefore, as far as they are concerned, the benchmark has become the 2015 elections,” he says. “What do we do to keep the peace process a benchmark?”

Here are  other discussion points which I consider noteworthy:
• Pekhon (aka Faikhun, a township in Shan State) has seen no fighting for a long time. But, contrary to what outsiders think, there is still no peace there.
• The Army has been at war with several armed groups since the passing of 1 August deadline for NCA, in Karen and central Shan, not just Kachin and northern Shan.
• How much have the ceasefire agreements with 14 armed groups been implemented?
• The government had earlier made it a condition that armed resistance leaders who wanted to amend the constitution must first form political parties, get elected and amend it in the parliament. But according to Union Speaker U Shwe Mann, even the present amendment calls by MPs will not be considered until after the 2015 elections
• Many political parties, tired of waiting for the NCA, are already embarked on the process of drafting a framework for political dialogue. An example is the draft framework that was published by 56 parties on 26 November
• Unlawful Association Act 17-1 (for active members) and 17-2 (for sympathizers) should be abolished. Applying colonialist laws more than 60 years after the British have left can mean only one thing: that the people of Burma are still under colonialist rule.

The seminar’s other topic of the day are Ethnic Political Parties and the Role of Women in the Peace Process. Here are a few highlights:
• There are two major political parties: Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and National League for Democracy (NLD). If you are comparing them to football/soccer teams, you’ll find each of the USDP’s major players in his position: President Thein Sein as Center Forward, U Shwe Mann as Midfielder, General Min Aung Hlaing as Center Fullback and U Tin Aye as Goalkeeper. In contrast, on the NLD side, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi alone makes up the team. She is forward, midfielder, full back and goalkeeper at the same time.
• As for the ethnic parties, they have no money and few popular leaders. What they have is the spirit. Their common aim is to become state governments. It’ll be an uphill struggle.
• If war is likened to fire, women can be to water. A raging fire cannot be doused by fire, only by water. Their soothing presence and voice alone are enough to calm down people. Remember how the strife-torn Philippines became a  peaceable country once again with the ascension of Corazon Aquino as President.