The one text procedure, also known as single text procedure, worked most famously at Camp David in 1978 when Israel and Egypt signed the peace agreement mediated by US President Jimmy Carter. It was the result of a 13 day retreat of the three leaders who had gone through 23 drafts before deciding to ink their signatures.

Imagine something like that taking place, say somewhere in Thailand, between top leaders of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and President Thein Sein, with, say the UN hopping back and forth between the two sides (also running from one prima donna EAO leader to another), one might be persuaded to bet it wouldn’t have taken the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) this long to sign it.

So how do other countries work out a one-text document? Does it have to be an outsider to act as a mediator, as called for by most of the EAOs and so far opposed by Naypyitaw?

First, let us find out the answer for the second question.

According to Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, “you could invite a third party in to mediate. Or, in negotiations involving more than two parties, a natural third party may be a participant whose interests on this issue lie more in effecting an agreement than in effecting the particular terms.”

For instance, in South Africa, talented members of the business community were chosen as facilitators. Getting to Yes says: “While the business community was hardly neutral, everyone understood that its overriding interest was to maintain stability and prosperity and avoid a civil war, interests likely to be best served by a successful process.”

Now, before getting any further, let us go back to the first question: How-and why-a one text procedure?
• It isn’t about positional bargaining. In fact, it is a way out for the deadlock resulting from positional bargaining
• A mediator can separate the people from the problem and direct the discussion to interests and options
• Further, he or she can often suggest some impartial basis for resolving differences.
• He or she can also separate inventing from decision-making, reduce the number of decisions required to reach agreement, and help the parties know what they will get when they do decide.

And  here is how he/she does the job.
• First, he asks about their interests, not about their positions (Why one wants something and not what/how much one wants it) He tries to learn all he can about their needs and interests
• Afterward, he develops a list of interests and needs of the two sides
• He asks each side in turn to criticize the list and suggest improvements on it
• A few days later, he returns with a rough sketch for further criticisms
• After a few more sketch-criticism routine and feeling he can improve it no further, he brings the final sketch and recommends they accept it
“The one-text procedure,” it concludes, “not only shifts the game away from positional bargaining, it greatly simplifies the process both of inventing options and of deciding jointly on  one.”

Now, if one compares it to what we are doing in Burma/Myanmar between the EAOs’ Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and the government’s Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC), the differences can be discerned quite easily, without SHAN pointing out here and there.

So the questions for the negotiators and the leaders are:
• What can we do to improve on the one-text process, both ongoing and upcoming ones? Because obviously one-text procedure is not just for the NCA. It can also be applied to Framework and Political Dialogue negotiations
• Which individuals or sector of the country will be most suitable as mediators?

The sooner we can answer them the better.
Time indeed is running out.