On Monday, a two day Technical Assistance Team (TAT) from both the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and Union Peace-making Work Committee (UPWC) will thrash out the details on Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), according to the non-Burman ethnic sources, although the government side is keen to hold the seventh official session of ceasefire negotiations. It is not clear on how the meeting will be structured, but nevertheless the two day discussion will take place in Rangoon or Yangon.

Reportedly, SHAN on 18 December wrote that 5 NCCT members will include Padoh Kwe Htoo Win, Deputy leader, Karen National Union (KNU), Hkun Okker Member, Pao National Liberation Organization (PNLO), Khu Taw Reh, Member, Karenni National Progressive Party KNPP, U Twan Zaw, Member, Arakan National Council (ANC), Dr Lian Hmung Sakhong, Member, Chin National Front (CNF).

The 4 members TAT are Col La Awng, Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Col Sinwa (KIO), Ja Nan (Peace Foundation, also known as Shalom) and Ta Do Mo (KNU).

Prior to the meeting, the NCCT has tabled a five point proposal, which includes:
1. Constructive response to Laiza incident
2. Measures and guarantee that such incident is not repeated
3. Increased security for Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) delegations
4. Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) involvement, in addition to UN and China to observe the peace talks
5. Response to NCCT suggestions to 4th NCA draft

The first three points are aimed to remedy the deteriorating aftermath situation of Cadet School shelling at Laiza, KIO headquarters, killing 23 resistance cadet trainees and wounding some 20 or more, apart from asking for more security for the EAOs leadership. The points also show that trust is at its lowest ebb and just continuing the talks for the sake of keeping the peace process alive.

The fourth point demand is to involve more third parties, observers to guarantee that the agreed terms would be honored and not going back on or reject the already accepted issues, as was the case of last September meeting. The UPWC has reportedly rejected the agreed terms of "federalism and federal army" issues of August, to be tackled at the political phase discussion, which were torpedoed during the September peace talks.

The fifth point explicitly underlined and documented by SHAN in its report, on 5 November, the core sticking points or issues relating to peace talks are as follows:
1. Discussion on Federal army formation
2. Signing of NCA by EAOs members as proposed by NCCT
3. Formation of Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at different levels and Joint Union Peace Dialogue Committee
4. Interpretation of the term "Ceasefire Zones". The NCCT argues after the NCA is signed, all territories in the Union become ceasefire zones. UPWC position is not clear.
5. UPWC proposed removal of Interim Arrangements and Code of Conduct, which NCCT counter proposes that a new team be formed to negotiate them
6. The UPWC proposal that the EAOs don’t expand their forces and recruit new members (The NCCT has counter proposed that the EAOs will discuss and implement reduction of recruits instead)
7. The NCCT proposal that apart from the UN Secretary General, representatives from other countries such as India, China, Japan, Asean, US and UK be witness signatories and that they are allowed to play significant roles such as being observers to the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee)
8. Further details on repositioning of troops
9. The NCA should be submitted to the Union Assembly instead of “should be ratified by the Union Assembly”
10. Implementation of the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration) before political dialogue begins instead of after political settlement has been reached as agreed
11. The President and the Commander-in-Chief will be witnesses at the NCA signing ceremony instead of being signatories as agreed earlier (The MPC says the change was prompted by the growing military distrust of the NCCT following the Congress of the United Nationalities Federal Council which announced its takeover of the negotiation team on 2 September)

According to the Eleven Media Group report, on 20 December, Col Khun Okker said, “The work negotiation event is official. However, it is not a big event. We need some preparations before we hold the big event. Only when we can agree on a draft can we hold an official ceasefire negotiation meeting. Otherwise, we should hold work negotiation meetings frequently.”

“Ongoing political and armed conflict conditions obstruct the ceasefire negotiations. Likewise, the cancellation of agreements, including in the draft created in the previous official session of ceasefire negotiations, also leads to delays in enacting a ceasefire,” said Khun Okker.

“We want to conclude the ceasefire meetings so that we can move on to political talks,” Khun Okker said.

Given such a backdrop, it is clear that the recent meeting will just be to keep the ball rolling, even if it is moving at a snail pace and not in anyway design to reach ground-breaking agreement.

In sum, the first step of reaching NCA is a formidable hurdle which cannot be overcome with the same, decades-old military mindset, projected and designed for a negotiated surrender of the EAOs. In other words, political guarantee in form of equitable power-sharing and earnest ceasefire deal that address the future, continued sustenance of the EAOs, either by absorption into an agreed, future, federal army formation, or at least, deployment as police forces in the EAOs concerned states have to be met.

Last but not least, if the ongoing armed ethnic conflict is to be defused, political, economical and social inequalities would have to be acknowledged, addressed and corrected.

The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) — Editor