Harder to win than war -Day 2 (continued from 7 October 2014)



Day Two. Wednesday, 2 October 2014 (continued from 7 October 2014)

The meeting, dubbed “Towards a Common Understanding”, begins with short opening speeches from 5 top leaders:
·       Hkun Htun Oo, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), better known as “Tiger Head” party
·       Sai Ai Pao, Shan Nationalities Democratice Party (SNDP), better known as “White Tiger” party
·       Lt-Gen Hso Ten, Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), better known as SSA North
·       Maj Gen Gaifa, Hseng Keow People’s Militia Force (PMF)
·       Lt-Gen Yawd Serk, Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), better known as SSA South


Sai Ai Pao, 68, who is also mining minister of Shan State Government, urges signing of NCA as soon as possible. “If there is no peace, there is no stability,” he says. “And if there is no stability, there is no development.”

Lang Kher and Loilem are the least developed districts in Shan State South, according to him. Because development grants from donors such as EU and JICA only go to relatively peaceful districts such as Taunggyi.

Hso Ten meanwhile reminds younger participants of his younger days: “When I first arrived in Thailand in 1959, the people here said they envied our country. But now it’s the other way round and that’s because if war, which wouldn’t have started if the Panglong Agreement was honored.”

Harn Yawnghwe explains how U Aung Min is involved in the organization of the meeting: “In 1962, many Shan leaders were imprisoned because of their call for federalism. Then in 2005 the next generation leaders (including Hkun Htun Oo and Hso Ten) were thrown in jail, because of their meeting in Taunggyi. U Aung Min has therefore accompanied our leaders here to Bangkok to demonstrate that our meeting is taking place with the government blessing.

The following are excerpts from the thoughts expressed by the participants (whose names are withheld here) on the ongoing peace process:
·       Why is the government launching a large scale operation against the SSPP/SSA (at 05:40 this morning), when it has already signed state and union level ceasefire agreements? We have to make sure such incidents don’t happen after the NCA has been signed.
Note
The battle known as Ta Pha Sawng lasted 3 days with the Burma Army using some 500 120mm and 2,500 60mm mortar shells against the SSA North, according to sources.

·       This is our second chance after Panglong (1497). We need to go about it carefully before signing.
·       Widespread use of drugs
·       Forced recruitment by the armed movements
·       With Aung San Suu Kyi, she has to worry only about politics. With us Shans we have to consider not only political issues, but also the survival of the Shan nation and its homeland
·       We need to consider the rights of non-Shans in our State as well
·       The Wa has the right to demand what it wants. But we need to take into consideration what the Shans in Sagaing Region and Kachin State want too.
·       Personal pride must always take a distant second place to national pride. We need to be humble to each other.
·       2015 elections
The SNLD and the SNDP discuss problems that exist between them after which Hkun Htun Oo offers his hand to Sai Ai Pao, who shakes it, amid applause by the rest of the participants.
(To be continued)


Day Two. Wednesday, 2 October 2014 (Continued from above)


At 17:30, the RCSS delegation holds meeting with U Aung Min.

SYS
·       The C-in-C’s 6 point conduition is unacceptable
·       The reason the 31 point agreements concluded between the two sides have yet to be implemented is also because of the military. I think the military is too over-suspicious. (Earlier he had suggested that informal meetings be held between the two sides to break the ice). If it continues the same way, there’ll be no NCA.
·       There is much talking about Plan B. Why should we believe Plan B will work if Plan A doesn’t?
·       The fighting in central Shan State
·       Proposes opening of Lak Taeng-Pang Gamgaw border pass to facilitate the industrial zone project agreed by both sides in May 2012

UAM
News coming from the UNFC (United Nationalities Federal Council, the 12-party armed alliance) have toughened the stance taken by the military:
·       The CEC of the UNFC being taken over by 3 KIO  (Kachin Independent Organization) members
·       The formation of the Federal Union Army (FUA)
·       The placement of the NCCT (Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team) under the UNFC wing (The NCCT was formed by the Ethnic Armed Organizations Conference in November 2013)
·       The tripartite agreement between the NLD (National League for Democracy), UNA (United Nationalities Alliance, which the SNLD is the leading member) and The UNFC to hold up the NCA until after 2016 (when a new administration has been installed)
Note
The SNLD has flatly denied there is such an agreement between the three.

The military had retaliated by restating the C-in-C’s 6 points (although they are not incorporated into the 4th NCA single text draft) and the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) of the ethnic armed forces before political settlement is reached (“The president has already assured you should disarm only when you are satisfied with the terms”)

We are going to do our best to make sure there is no Plan B. An informal meeting with the NCCT will be held before the formal one later. (He repeats what was said earlier at the Shan leaders meeting)
·       The military is responsible for security. Therefore the signing of the NCA is necessary before the 31 point agreements can be implemented
·       What happens at Ta Pha Sawng is because the Army needs it for its movements during the rainy season. The two sides met twice and the President, during the second meeting, had suggested that both sides withdraw. However the SSA had refused to despite having given consent to the President.
Note
1.)   The SSA North leaders said withdrawal should be made by the Burma Army first, because, in its past experience, every time the SSA withdrew first, the Burma Army took over its abandoned positions
2.)   The SSA North also pointed out that the Burma Army had already had the main crossing at Nam Lawng, that it needed the Ta Pha Sawng crossing therefore did not make sense
·       As for the opening of the Thai-Burmese border crossing, the two countries must negotiate first

Note
Thais in Chiangmai’s Wiang Haeng say opening it will bring prosperity as well as problems (notably drugs) to the area. But that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

SYS
If the Burma Army does not want to fight, the solution is simple: Just keep the soldiers in their camps. No one will come to fight them.

Before parting each to his room, one SSA officer confides that the minister’s explanations are fine, except they don’t convince him.





 

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