Myanmar/Burma: Armed Groups, Contested Legitimacy and Political Transition
Catalyst for change
The following presentation is delivered by Harn
Younghwe, Brussels-based Euro Burma Office (EBO), at the Conference on National
Dialogue and Mediation Processes held in Helsinki in March 2014-Editor
Legitimacy is the key challenge
for the Burma Army or Tatmadaw, even after 50 years of absolute
rule. It no doubt has the coercive power to continue ruling. But no one, not
the ethnic population, not the person in the street, and not even the
international community, sees the military as the legitimate and rightful
ruler.
The armed struggles that have
beset Burma since independence in 1948 have involved multiple armed groups
seeking recognition and representation, and demands for political transition of
the military regime. Recent reformist moves by the state have given hope of an
opportunity for real change. A proposed nationwide ceasefire aims to bring in
all armed groups – those that have already signed ceasefires and those that
have not. A subsequent National Dialogue looks to include all stakeholders –
armed groups, political parties and civil society. The Dialogue is not just
about resolving armed insurgencies, but about the future of the country.
State
Legitimacy
Even after writing a new
constitution in 2008, holding elections and establishing a ‘democratic’ system
of government, President Thein Sein’s administration of ex-generals still face
a legitimacy deficit. For many Burmese, the rightful heirs to political
authority are symbolised in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (DASSK), daughter of
independence hero General Aung San, her National League for Democracy (NLD),
and the ethnic nationalities.
The Tatmadaw’s
vision of the great Myanmar nation
began in 1044 with King Anawrahtaand, and continued by Tabinshwehti (1531) and
Alaungpaya (1752), who conquered neighbouring kingdoms from Manipur in India to
Thailand. According to this narrative, the British conquest (1886–1948) was an
aberration of 62 years. The Tatmadaw’s mission is to re-establish
thismighty empire – at the expense of the ethnic nationalities who constitute
at least 40 per cent of the population and whose homelands make up about 60 per
cent of the territory.
The ethnic nationalities’
competing national vision acknowledges their temporary subjugation by three
Myanmar kings, but mostly they had their own kings and traditional rulers,
including during British rule, and were not part of the Myanmar empire. In
fact, they agreed to join their territories to Myanmar at the 1947 Panglong
Conference and claim that they and not the Tatmadaw are the legitimate co-rulers of the nation.
British annexation of Burma in
1886 had excluded a number of provinces: Chin Hills (now Chin State) Frontier
Area; Kachin Hills (now Kachin State) Frontier Area; Shan States (later
Federated Shan States – now Shan State) Protectorat; Karenni States (now Kayah
State) independent Protectorate; and Trans-Salween area (now Karen State)
Frontier Area. These were nominally administered separately as a buffer zone
with French Indochina. The current Arakan and Mon States were part of British
Burma.
In the process of independence
after World War II, Prime Minister Aung San (from the predominant Bamar ethnic
group) negotiated the Panglong Agreement with ethnic leaders, which promised
them equality – hence subsequent demands for federalism. But while the 1947
Constitution recognised the various constituent states it gave them no power.
Everything was centralised –Burma effectively replaced the British as the new
colonial power.
In 1962 the Tatmadaw, claiming
that federalism would break up the country, seized power, promising to oversee
gradual democratisation. Since then the Tatmadaw has re-written history. Many
Bamar are not aware of ethnic viewpoints and few understand why ethnic people
have been so ‘troublesome’.
Competing Claims to Legitimacy
Given the disappointment with the
1947 Constitution, most ethnic political movements began as independence
movements. At the grassroots, ethnic people still want to be freed from the
Bamar, whom they do not distinguish from the Tatmadaw. But in the last 25
years, ethnic leaders have been per107 suaded that independence is not an
option and have generally accepted the idea of a federal union with equal power
and autonomy.
In addition to President Thein
Sein’s government, the Tatmadaw, DASSK, and the ethnic nationalities, competing
claimants to legitimacy include:
• the ruling Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP),
• the previous ruling National Unity
Party (NUP),
• the governments of the seven
ethnic States and seven Regions,
• the more than 18 ethnic armed
groups who are negotiating ceasefires with the government,
• the ethnic parties that won
seats in the 1990 elections,
• the ethnic parties that won
seats in the 2010 elections,
• the more than 50 opposition
parties,
• thousands of civil society
movements, rights-based groups and informal community groups that have over the
years spoken up on behalf of the ‘people’, in the absence of organised opposition.
USDP is a military creation – no
more than 30 per cent of the Bamar population supports it. Most people – Bamar
and non-‐Bamar – support the NLD because they believe DASSK can bring about
freedom from military rule. However, observers and activists question NLD’s
capacity to run the country. Instead of building up the party it waited 25
years for DASSK’s release. All ethnic armed groups include both hardliners bent
on armed struggle and moderates who want to convert to a political struggle.
The situation is fluid, but generally today moderates predominate.
In Burma, policies and strategies
are second to personalities. Disputes (between or within groups) are generally
over who will lead. Burmese society was ‘atomised’ under 50 years of military rule.
There was no organised societal groupings or political parties. Civil society
and political parties have started to revive but remain small, localised and
often ethnically based.
Other than the USDP, NUP (previous
government party) and the NLD, there are no national political bodies.
Women in Burma have equal status –
in theory. But in reality most Burmese women play a supporting role and are
generally discouraged from leadership.
Women are active and are the
‘doers’, but they are rarely recognized as such. Various cultural perceptions
and practices sustain gender inequality. For instance, in some communities and
locations, women’s touching men’s heads is considered to diminish men’s power.
Peace Process
The Myanmar peace process came
from within, not from international pressure. President Thein Sein, in his
inaugural speech on 30 March 2011, surprised everyone by stating that his top
priority was to build national unity by addressing decades of armed conflicts
with ethnic nationalities caused by ‘dogmatism, sectarian strife and racism’. Never
before had any ruler made it a priority to address the ethnic problem let alone
acknowledge its root causes.
This was followed on 18 August
2011 with an offer of talks with armed groups seeking peace. Informal talks
began on 19 November and the first ceasefire was signed on 11 December with the
Restoration Council for the Shan State/Shan State Army – South (RCSS/SSAS). To
date, 13 other ceasefire agreements have been signed, and a nationwide
ceasefire is being proposed. However, while the government is signing
agreements and making commitments, it does not seem to be able to control the
Tatmadaw. Serious ceasefire violations continue.
The government initially mimicked
1990s ceasefire models, which were negotiated surreptitiously as ‘gentlemen’s
agreements’, which granted special economic privileges in exchange for an
undertaking not to join the democracy
movement. Except with the Kachins,
nothing was put on paper. Similarly the President and his Chief Negotiator, Minister
Aung Min, thought they could grant special economic privileges, sign ceasefire
agreements and get the ethnic armed groups to disband. The idea was that the
armed groups would embrace democracy, form political parties, contest
elections, and argue their case for a federal system in parliament. A critical
flaw in this concept was that most armed groups that agreed to ceasefires in
the 1990s (again except the Kachins) were not the main ethnic political movements.
Most used their privileges to trade in opium and other illicit drugs.
109 The ethnic nationalists want
political settlement, not economic privileges. They have also rejected the
notion of surrendering their arms without guarantee that their grievances would
be favourably heard in a parliament that is more than 95 per cent controlled by
the government.
Ethnic civil society groups have
protested their exclusion from talks and the possibility of armed groups
‘selling out’. A Norwegian initiative to provide ‘peace dividends’ for
ceasefire areas, intended to support implementation, was criticised by some
civil society actors as an economic incentive to deliver ceasefires. The EU’s
promotion of the government’s Myanmar Peace Centre as a neutral inclusive space
was also disputed as an attempt to impose the government’s programme. Also, the
newly unfettered Myanmar press tended to equate ceasefires simplistically with
peace, causing other stakeholders to worry they were being excluded from
negotiations.
Initially the government did not have a clear
plan as two different government negotiators pursued competing agendas. In May
2012 the government consolidated its peace initiative behind Aung Min and
formed the Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC). Under the UPCC is the
Union Peace Working Committee (UPWC) led by Minister Aung Min as Chief
Negotiator. The MPC was also established in November 2012 to support Aung Min.
The Birth of the National Dialogue
Ethnic groups in Myanmar are
extremely diverse with different historical and cultural backgrounds, religious
affiliations, political aspirations and revolutionary histories. They are
geographically dispersed along the nation’s international borders.
In February 2012, 19 ethnic armed
groups were invited to coordinate their individual ceasefire negotiations and
plan together how to transform their ceasefire talks into a collective
political dialogue as part of an inclusive peace process.
An Ethnic Peace Plan emerged that
called for an extra-parliamentary dialogue to seek a political solution in the
form of a federal union. Subsequently, the ethnic armed groups met monthly to
share notes and coordinate. In response
to growing resistance to the
government’s plan, the Chief Negotiator proposed a Panglong-type conference
(which was extra-parliamentary) to resolve theproblem, instead of his original
scheme to amend the constitution through parliamentary debate.
Recognising that they alone could
not force the government to agree to a federal system, the ethnic armed groups
invited some of the 2010 election-winning ethnic parties and ethnic civil
society actors to a workshop in May 2012. They discussed the approaching end of
President Thein Sein’s government in 2015, whereas the solution to the problems
may entail negotiations beyond that, especially as armed groups did not plan to
relinquish arms before 2015. How could they ensure that the next government
would continue the talks? What
guarantees could they seek?
The rudimentary concept of an
inclusive National Dialogue with deadlockbreaking and consensus-building mechanisms
began to emerge. A more permanent Working Group for Ethnic Coordination (WGEC)
was established in June 2012. To gain an even broader acceptance for the
National Dialogue concept, an Ethnic Nationalities Conference was convened in
September 2012. The Conference endorsed the idea and tasked the WGEC to further
develop a Six- Step Road Map:
1. develop a Framework for
Political Dialogue,
2. agree the Framework with the
government,
3. organise conferences by States
and Regions, as well as by ethnic nationalities,
4. hold a nationwide Ethnic
Nationalities’ Conference to discuss the Framework,
5. hold a Convention based on the
Panglong spirit, with equal representation from ethnic nationalities,
democratic forces and the government,
6. implement the Union Accord
within the agreed timeframe. From September to January 2013, the WGEC Core
Group worked out the details for a National Dialogue, which was then taken in
February 2013 to all the ethnic armed groups’ headquarters for their
endorsement. The documents were subsequently released for public consultation
with ethnic political parties and civil society in March 2013.
111 The key concepts of the
Framework, as presented to Aung Min in May 2013, include that it must be
jointly managed, must continue beyond 2015 and must be inclusive. It stipulates
a nationwide ceasefire to facilitate the peace process, and a joint military
code of conduct to ensure that the ceasefire holds. A joint monitoring
mechanism would then oversee adherence to the code, with a joint ceasefire
committee to facilitate the monitoring mechanism. All signatories must be
removed from the government’s Unlawful Association List and other
restrictive laws.
The concepts were all accepted by
Aung Min, who was so enthusiastic he prematurely announced in June that a
nationwide ceasefire would be signed by all groups in July 2013. Caught by
surprise, the armed groups back-pedalled. But despite the negative reaction and
criticism from within the government’s own ranks, the MPC began seriously
negotiating the draft Framework and the text of the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement.
Transforming the Process
Originally, the government may
have envisioned the process narrowly as a quick win: provide economic
incentives in exchange for laying down arms, gain support for the government’s
democratisation plan, and win international
kudos. But the ethnic armed groups
saw an opportunity to push for what they really wanted – a political dialogue
on the future of the country. There had been no opening in the last 50 years
and they were determined to make it work in their favour.
The government could not depend on
its own support base, which was not open to such rapid changes. Instead, small
circle of reformers began to see that winning over the ethnic armed groups
would help build the momentum they needed to press ahead with the reform
agenda. The armed groups also saw that if the reformers gained momentum, they
could actually get the government to commit to a political dialogue. So what
began as a one-sided push became a common process. The government and the armed
groups both then began parallel informal campaigns to win over doubters within
the parliament, military, political parties, civil society actors and the
ethnic population.
This effort received an unexpected
boost when the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament in alliance with DASSK,
started to publicly attack Minister Aung Min and the MPC for not being
inclusive enough and for being too tentative.
This fit the ethnic armed groups’
agenda exactly: in defending itself the MPC fully endorsed the Framework.
The armed groups were then
encouraged to brief DASSK, the Commanderin- Chief, and finally on 31 August,
the Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) chaired by Vice President Dr Sai
Mawk Hkam, an ethnic Shan. This was a key move since the Work Committee includes
key actors within the executive, the military and the parliament.
The proposal was well received and
UPWC agreed to report to the UPCC and meet again on a regular basis with the
ethnic armed groups, thereby elevating the negotiations to a higher level.
New developments have been
achieved on the part of ethnic armed groups. In October 2013, an ethnic
leaders’ summit was held in Laiza, Kachin State in northern Myanmar. This is
the first time in the post-independence history of Burma that top leaders from
major ethnic armed organizations could have a summit ‘in’ the country. The
summit formed the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordinating Team (NCCT) to draft the nationwide
ceasefire agreement and lead
negotiation efforts. In November
(right after the summit), ethnic leaders held a meeting in Myintkina, Kachin
State, with military representatives to discuss nationwide ceasefire. In the
meeting, military representatives proposed its own nationwide ceasefire
agreement draft. Strong wording and demands surprised ethnic leaders, but both
sides agreed to study each other’s draft proposals.
In January 2014, NCCT held another
ethnic leaders’ conference in Law Khee Lar, Karen State. The outcome was the
updated version of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
In March 2014, NCCT and
representatives from the government’s negotiation team, military and parliament
met in Yangon. They agreed to form a joint committee to jointly develop a
nationwide ceasefire agreement - known as “One Text” or “Single Text”. Up to
this meeting, both sides were proposing its own drafts one version after
another.
The joint committee will consist
of nine mem113 bers each from the NCCT and the government (three each from the
executive branch, the military, and the parliament). The government proposes
that the NCA be signed no later than the first of August. A National Dialogue
might begin in late 2014. Major threats to the process include the commitment
of the Tatmadaw, which will be determined by whether the Commander-in-Chief is prepared
to sign the agreement and to arrange intra-military talks to separate troops in
the conflict zones; and the inclusion of the Kachin Independence Organisation and
the United Wa State Army, the two largest armed groups.
The situation remains uncertain at
the time of writing and much could go wrong, but the opportunity is there for
Burma to resolve its outstanding problem of the last 60 years. A lot of
preparatory work has already begun on fundamental issues: power- and
revenue-sharing; reform of the security sector, the judiciary and land; and
community, ethnic and minority rights – to name but a few! How can
international peacebuilders best support this domestic process? The conflicts
are too diverse, multi-layered, deep-rooted and complex for a single mediator.
The National Dialogue will require technical support of domestic and
international experts. International peacebuilders might best use their
experience and knowledge to help build capacity of multiple local stakeholders and
allow them to work their way through, rather than try to impose a solution.
Tags: Opinion
