By: Sai Wansai
Friday, 25 April 2014

Pessimistic mood has set in, as Nai Hong Sar, leader of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), Major-General Gun Maw, the deputy chief of staff of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and Colonel Khun Okker, member of the NCCT aired their disappointments on the recent armed offensive of the Burma Army in Kachin and Shan states, amid ongoing peace talks, which is due to take place again within a few weeks time.

Nai Hong Sar, in a report filed by VOA, on 21 April, said. "The NCCT has to review the recent Burma Army military offensive on one of its members. At the moment some problems exist and the Burma Army offensive on the Kachin could cause the postponement of the forth-coming talks with the government. Some of us are having different views because of the armed engagement".

KIA Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Gun Maw, who is recently on a visit to the U.S., according to the report of VOA, dated 21 April said: "The battles are raging on. Although de-escalation of the armed conflict was agreed, battles are ongoing. When we analyze why this happens, we found the problem of who's going to take responsibility for the promises given to each other from both sides. The second point is that there is a tendency to assert pressure. The opinion - from the government side - that by conducting offensives on the Ta'-ang group and KIA, they could pressure to sign the ceasefire agreement. That's why I said, while we are trying to draft national ceasefire agreement, please don't act like this. We have to say that we will refuse to sign, if militarily pressured".

To buttress his argument, Gen. Gun Maw in his interview with RFA, on 22 April said: "When I come to think about the battles occurring, I found out two crucial points. First it is the military pressure and secondly, the intention to be able to control the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), after signing the ceasefire agreement. My analysis is that to weaken and push KIO to give in, during the process of political dialogue."

The VOA report of 16 April said that NCCT member, Colonel Khun Okker accused the government of fighting for more territory before signing any cease-fire agreement.

“It seems the Burmese military wants to control the territorial and ground situation as much as while they can before signing a nationwide cease-fire agreement [and before] implementation takes place," said Okker.

Earlier, according to SHAN report of 12 April, Khun Okker said that the single text draft, produced by the meeting between the government and NCCT, from 5 to 8 April, has approximate agreement of 60% and 40% still needed to be iron out, of which 10% to 15% were differing positions needing much more time to negotiate.

During one of the TV interview while he was in Burma, Khun Okker said that the said 10% to 15% differing positions were "trench clause", which were hard to bridge, with each side clinging to its entrenched political position.

The same report from SHAN also said that Dr Lian Hmung Sakhong, Chin National Front (CNF) representative for NCCT, when asked why the single text draft hasn't been made public replied that it wasn't even ready to be presented to the concerned parties involved, not to mention the outsiders. But he outlined three points, which are hard to reconcile.

1. NCCT could hardly accept the proposition that if Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Team (JCMT) could not resolve the eventual dispute arising in the future, conflicting parties should adhere to the decision of Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC).
2. NCCT prefers to jointly write the political framework, rather than Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) taking sole responsibility, as the government side demanded.
3. The government side wanted to include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) in political framework before the political settlement, which the NCCT sees as not at all appropriate.

SHAN report also pointed out that UPCC and National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) with 11 members each are almost identical, except for the fact that UPCC has inserted Attorney-General and Director of President’s office, replacing the deputy Commander in Chief and Foreign Minister in NDSC setup.

The 2008 constitution does not define the day-to-day role of the NDSC. However, the Council takes a lead role in a State of Emergency, wherein it exercises the powers of the legislature, executive, and judiciary before the Parliaments are again formed.

Government pretext on its offensive
According to VOA report of 20 April, KIA spokesman Daung Khar summed up the government pretext on launching the offensive on KIO/KIA as follows. He said: “The government affix several headings (or tags) - for the ongoing offensive on KIA - . Their mission is specifically area control and area cleansing. When the armed engagement escalate, its armed forces use the tag as military exercises as a pretext for their troops activities. Later on, anti-illegal logging excuse is used. After that, it is security measures for those taking nation-wide census for their troops movements. And now, it seems taking revenge for their fallen commander. All sorts of tags are used for the offensive, but the main reason is to conduct area control and area cleansing.”

Regarding the slain commander, Eleven Media Group report the following story, on 21 April.
On April 4, deputy commander Major Myo Nyunt Soe from Light Infantry Division 567 came under attack by the KIA in Manwainggyi.

According to a statement by the Ministry of Defense, the major was killed by a KIA ambush during a routine change of sentry on the Manweinggyi to Kaunghmuyan road.

The KIA has refuted this claim saying that the major, accompanied by a soldier, reached Manmaung village which is under KIA control at 3 pm in the afternoon of April 4.

“He entered our territory. When asked to stop the car for a check, they drove away. They were shot while they were running away. That night, his dead body and a captured soldier, who was still alive were sent back to the government side,” said an officer from the KIA’s Laiza headquarters.

According to AP report of 22 April, recent armed clashes in northern Burma happened despite efforts to forge a nationwide ceasefire agreement between the government and all armed ethnic groups. Gen. Gun Maw contended that the spike in violence is an effort by the Burma Army to militarily weaken the Kachin forces before any ceasefire deal is inked.

“I can tell for sure this is not an accident. This is a planned act from the government side,” Gun Maw, vice chief of staff of the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, told reporters on Monday as he wrapped up a trip to Washington and New York, where he has met with senior U.S. Officials.

According Eleven Media Group report of 21 April, a government release stated that the army has stemmed the lucrative illegal timber trade used by the KIA. Up to 5,087 tonnes of illegal timber, 120 cars and 53 smugglers (including 12 Chinese citizens) were arrested in Mansi-Momake, Hsinbo-Bhamo and Hsinbo-Manbin regions between September 2013 and March 2014.

The KIA has denied the government’s accusations saying that the timber comes from Sagaing Region not from Kachin State. They raised the question about the reinforcement of troops, saying that the fighting is a result of the army invading KIA territory.

Some experts see the recent fights as a way for the army to slowly surround and eventually capture the KIO/KIA headquarters in Laiza by strategically holding supply roads.

“The government is doing it on purpose so as to gain control of frontline territories after the ceasefire agreement has been signed,” said KIO information officer Lan Nan.

Conceptual differences
The successive military dominated regimes, including the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), see Burma as an existing unified nation since the reign of Anawratha thousands of years ago. As such, all other non-Burman ethnic nationalities Shan, Kachin, Chin, Arakanese, Mon, Karen and Karenni - are seen as minorities, which must be controlled and suppressed, lest they break up the country.

In contrast, the non-Burman ethnic groups maintain that the Union of Burma is a newly developed territorial entity, founded by a treaty, the Panglong Agreement, where independent territories merged together on equal basis.

Given such conceptual differences, the Burmese military goes about with its implementation of protecting “national sovereignty” and “national unity” at all cost. This, in turn, gives way to open conflict resulting in more suppression and gross human rights violations. The intolerance of the military and its inspiration to “racial supremacy”, political domination and control has no limit and are still kicking and very much alive, with the ruling USDP leaders still toeing this military mindset.

The woes of Burma today are deeply rooted in the inadequate constitutional drafting of 1947. The Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without reflecting the spirit of Panglong. The ethnic homeland were recognized as constituent states but all power was concentrated in the central government or the government of the Burma Mother state. The 1974 Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) Constitution and the recent military-drawn 2008 Constitution are also unitary in nature and failed to address the genuine federalism aspiration of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities, which are embedded in 1947 Panglong Agreement.

Almost all the non-Burmans and Burman democratic opposition groups are in agreement that the ethnic conflict resolution and reform of social, political and economics cannot be separated from one another. And the only viable solution and answer is to go back to the basis of the 1947 Constitution according to Panglong Agreement and make some amendment, to suite the contemporary political nature of the day, where equality, voluntary participation and self-determination, of the constituent states, will form the basis of a federal union that all could be proud of and identify with.

In an interview with VOA, on 22 April, Gen Gun Maw spelled out his doubts and opinion on how the government view the non-Burman ethnic nationalities' aspiration of federalism or federal union as follows:

"Basically, I see that there is no willingness to accept federalism. It can't be that it is not understood, but refusal to accept. I understand that federalism is publicly accepted. Our present NCCT nationwide ceasefire draft includes the discussion of federalism, after the achievement of ceasefire. But in the government written text there is not even one word of federalism included. That's why it could be taken that the government is not in acceptance of federalism. The first point is to understand the non-Burman ethnic nationalities' demand and take into account of building a federal union. The second point is that in practical discussion, there is quite a big difference concerning basic concept."

Trench clauses and political bargaining
USDP and military clinging to 2008 Constitution; and refusing to acknowledge equal status of the ethnic armed groups are major stumbling block in trying to achieve nationwide ceasefire agreement and eventual political settlement.

Almost all the USDP and military leaders, starting from the President Thein Sein, Union Parliament Speaker Thura Shwe Mann to Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing have time and again stressed that all should abide by 2008 Constitution and existing laws, which are to be taken as the government's entrenched positions. Besides, the preposition of a "federal army", favored by the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), which would do away with Burman-dominated army, has been rejected by the Commander-in-chief claiming that the current military is already a federally constituted institution, pointing out its inclusion of non-Burman ethnic members within the ranks.

As for the NCCT, political settlement is only possible with the drastic amendment of the 2008 Constitution or rewriting it altogether. The UNFC and United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) jointly drawn, federal constitution, which is nearing its completion is to be used as a guideline in political bargaining for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities with the government.

The much talk-about formulation of "single text procedure", which should lead to the nationwide ceasefire, is also bogged down by the dispute of vocabularies to be included.

The NCCT and the government are also at loggerheads regarding the usage of the terms "revolution, federal, according to existing laws" in the text, just to name a few.

To sum up, the government side has dug in to uphold its position of "unitary system of governance, Burman-dominated army and adherence of the 2008 Constitution", while the ethnic nationalities are striving for "federal system of governance, federal army and the drastic amendment or rewriting of the 2008 Constitution".

Military's constitutional prerogatives
Meanwhile, on 22 April, the International Crisis Group (ICG) that is generally sympathetic to Thein Sein regime, surprisingly comes up with some critical view on how the Burmese military should behave.  Two out of five major findings in its briefing writes:

• For Myanmar’s full democratic transition to take place, the military needs to accept that its political role, as enshrined in the current constitution, must be reduced and civilian control of the armed forces increased.
• The military must end ongoing rights abuses and change how it interacts with civilians, particularly in the ethnic borderlands, in order to restore its damaged reputation and transform itself into a professional institution that is reflective of – and serves to defend – Myanmar’s ethnic and religious diversity.

In the closing paragraph of its overview, titled "Myanmar’s Military: Back to the Barracks?", it writes:

The Tatmadaw’s constitutional prerogatives were no doubt critical in giving it the confidence to embark on this transition, and the commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and key members of the political establishment have said that they will be gradually reduced. There is a strong possibility, however, that the military will want to preserve its political role longer than is healthy. If such undemocratic provisions are in place for anything more than a short transitional period, they risk becoming entrenched, which would be deeply damaging to the country’s future – by entrenching a political role for the Tatmadaw, leaving it permanently outside civilian control and able to privilege its institutional interests at the expense of the country.

The Burma Army recent military offensives doesn't fit well with the ICG suggestion to restore its damaged reputation and only lead to more negative impact and lost of trust.

A yesable proposition
Understanding the other side's interest is the most crucial part formulating a yesable agreement for the adversaries. Let us look into some of the major stumbling blocks that are hard to bridge for the parties concerned.

The major demand of the government is to uphold the three sacred duties of “ Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, Perpetuation of National Sovereignty ” and “ adhering to the 2008 Constitution ” in the process of democratization together.

From the part of the ethnic nationalities, upholding the three sacred duties is acceptable so long as equality, right of self-determination and democracy are the norms. But adhering to the military-drawn, 2008 Constitution, without question, is certainly a non-starter, or should we say a big challenge. To put it differently, without rewriting or altering the constitution, which reflects the aspiration of all the ethnic groups, it will be impossible to formulate a yesable proposition.

In a nutshell, the government needs to accept the ethnic resistance groups as equal partners in finding a solution and not treating them as underlings, outlaws or insurgent groups. In other words, they should be accepted as representatives of their concerned ethnic groups and dialogue partners. Apart from that, it should seriously reconsider its constitutional prerogatives demand or privilege, which is hindering the peace process and as well, the development of the country as a whole.

One last reminder is that the government should accept the fact that the Union of Burma formed in 1948, according to the 1947 Constitution, is no more in existence, due the abolition of the constitution and Panglong Agreement of 1947, following the military coup in 1962 by General Ne Win, which were the sole legal-binding factor between the non-Burman ethnic nationalities and the Burman government. The 1974 and 2008 Constitutions that followed are also in no position to legalize or reactivate the voluntary union of 1948, as the contractual obligation was breached by the then Revolutionary Council, headed by General Ne Win. In other words, the country now known as "Republic of the Union of Myanmar" is an entity forcibly and coercively held together with brute military might, without the voluntary consent of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. And the ethnic groups are now striving to rebuild a shattered union, together with the Burman, for it is the only feasible option available from the perspective of geopolitics and internationally accepted norms.

On the eve of drafting the 1947 Union of Burma Constitution, General Aung San said: “The right of secession must be given. But it is our job to see that they don’t want to secede.”

The present government would be well advised to heed what Aung San had said decades ago and get rid of its phobia of secession threat,  political monopoly and racial supremacy doctrine, so that the peace process could move forward and political settlement realized. Otherwise, the formulation of single text draft on nationwide ceasefire agreement will remain an illusion, not to mention the comprehensive political settlement, to end the decades-old ethnic conflict.

The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor