By: Sai Wansai
Tuesday, 18 March 2014

The latest development that the Armed Resistance Movements’ Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) and the government’s Union Peacemaking Work Committee (UPWC) have resolved to jointly draft a single text document for the nationwide cease-fire proposal ahead of Hpa-an peace talks in Kayin State is a welcome news, after months of delayed progress, which have hindered the overall peace process in general.

In a recent statement, reported by Xinhua/Global Times, on 10 March 2014, issued at the end of the preliminary meeting between UPWC led by Vice Chairman U Aung Min and NCCT at the Myanmar Peace Centre, both sides agreed to form a team including nine members each from the government and NCCT to draft single text document that includes seven sections.

Accordingly, Eleven Media Group's published news on  11 March 2014, a team will be formed with three representatives from the government, three representatives from the parliament, three representatives from the military, and nine members from the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) on behalf of ethnic armed groups, to draft the ceasefire agreement together.

“The government and ourselves have different ceasefire drafts. We submitted the Law Khee Lar draft. The government also has its own draft, so both sides were holding onto their own drafts. As it was difficult to negotiate like this, we have agreed to draft a new agreement by forming a new group with people from both sides,” said Naing Han Tha aka Nai Hong Sar, leader of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT).

DVB report of 10 March also said that Ministers Khin Yi (Immigration), Thet Naing Win (Border Affairs) and Lt-Gen Myint Soe of the Ministry of Defence were present at the meeting, alongside NCCT leaders Nai Hong Sar of the New Mon State Party the Karen National Union’s (KNU) Kwe Htoo Win and Lian H. Sakhong of the Chin National Front.

Trustworthiness
The crux of the problem is trustworthiness and so far it has not been forthcoming, according to Karen National Union (KNU) Major Saw Kler Doh when he said, “The government thinks we should trust each other; but they should prove that they deserve our trust,” in an interview, published in Mizzima Daily on March 10. “So far, they have never complied with the demands we made during our peace talks,” he said.

Major Saw KlerDoh said the Tatmadaw had more than 80 positions in the 5th Brigade area.
“We demanded that they withdraw seven of them, but they never did,” he said.
“They even expanded their presence. If they act like this, how can we trust them?” the commander said, acknowledging that he doubted the Tatmadaw trusted the KNU.

Area cleansing and control
Another obstacle is the Burma Army policy of "area cleansing and control" of resistance movements within the areas sized in ethnic homelands. No wonder, despite of ceasefire agreements, armed clashes occurred hundreds of times with the SSA -South and SSA -North in Shan State that have already signed union-level ceasefire agreement with the government, needless to say about the ongoing armed clashes with the KIA and TNLA, which have still not inked the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement to de-escalate the armed conflict between the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA) and Burma Army signed months ago have also proved to be ineffective, for armed confrontation continue to occur in Kachin and Shan states.

And so the immediate pressing two issues to tackle prior to the joint-ceasefire agreement draft is the lack of "trustworthiness" and the Burma Army policy of implementing "area cleansing and control" in ethnic homelands. In other words, from the Armed Resistance Movements' (ARMs) point of view, the government and Burma Army should show that they mean business by physical withdrawal of their troops from immediate contested areas and stop military operations altogether to give up their area cleansing and control policy. The ARMs' see the ongoing conduct of Burma Army as an intruder and occupation force waging wars within their territories, while the Burma Army would argue that it is protecting the national sovereignty. This two different line of thinking or concept needs to be ironed out beforehand, if the drafting of a  single text document for the nationwide cease-fire proposal should materialize and pave way for further political settlement that lies ahead. The best way might be to accept the notion of "shared-sovereignty" between the ethnic nationalities and the Burman-dominated center, no matter if it is headed by military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) or the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD).

Time and again, the ARMs have pointed out that the military needs to show some good will by withdrawing from contested areas for a few kilometers and stop the offensives altogether, to pave way for a further consolidation of ceasefire agreement. And as the KNU commander Major Saw Kler Doh rightly put it, the military still needs to show its trustworthiness, if real ceasefire agreement is to be implemented in words and deeds.

At the end of the day, it is like what Khon Ja from the Kachin Peace Network told the panelists, during the recent DVB Debate,  on 12 March, regarding internal conflict in Burma, that there should be less discussion about the peace talks and more focus on ending the conflict in reality.

“Whether they sign the ceasefire or not is not important. What is important is to actually stop the fighting,” she said.

One text procedure
The hope that one text negotiation procedure could break the ice seems to be quite high, given the remarkable success of Camp David Accord signed between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat on 17 September 1978. It would do us good to look at a little more at the principles surrounding the approach.

Fisher and Ury explain that a good agreement is one which is wise and efficient, and which improves the parties' relationship. Wise agreements satisfy the parties' interests and are fair and lasting. The authors' goal is to develop a method for reaching good agreements. 

Negotiations often take the form of positional bargaining. In positional bargaining each part opens with their position on an issue. The parties then bargain from their separate opening positions to agree on one position. Haggling over a price is a typical example of positional bargaining. Fisher and Ury argue that positional bargaining does not tend to produce good agreements. It is an inefficient means of reaching agreements, and the agreements tend to neglect the parties' interests. It encourages stubbornness and so tends to harm the parties' relationship. Principled negotiation provides a better way of reaching good agreements. 

Fisher and Ury develop four principles of negotiation. Their process of principled negotiation can be used effectively on almost any type of dispute. Their four principles are 1) separate the people from the problem; 2) focus on interests rather than positions; 3) generate a variety of options before settling on an agreement; and 4) insist that the agreement be based on objective criteria. 

The one-text procedure is a systematic process for shifting negotiators away from thinking about concessions, by using a neutral, third party facilitator to elicit underlying interests and to simplify the process of jointly inventing many options and deciding on one. (Source: Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In - by Roger Fisher and William Ury)
 
This procedure was used at Camp David in the negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat. President Carter and Secretary of State Vance created 23 drafts in 13 days before they had a proposal to which both sides could say yes.( Source: The Negotiator Magazine - 2003)

Meanwhile, the NCCT  optimistic mood for the participation of the Burma Army in the process of one text procedure might be short-lived, for the Burma Army recent statement contradict with at least two of the four principles spelled out in the negotiation approach.

RFA reported on 16 March, speaking on behalf of Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Northern Regional Commander Tun Tun Naung, when asked about nationwide ceasefire in Myitkyina, Kachin state, said: "The military's part is after signing the ceasefire, to discuss the deployment of troops".

He further explained the position of the military regarding the peace process as follows.
"Not to take advantage of the peace agreement and be a burden to the concerned ethnic population; to follow the existing laws; to follow the three duties - non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of National Solidarity, non-disintegration of Sovereignty - and essence of democracy by adhering to the 2008 Constitution in the process of democratization together. These are the military policies laid down regarding the peace process."
 
The 2008 Constitution, Chapter VII, Defence Services, writes:
This, in effect, means that all the ethnic armed resistance groups must either surrender or incorporated into Burma Army without question, which is a far cry from their aspiration of a "Federal Army" of the ARMs or ethnic armed groups, having a collective say in the formation and decision-making of the national army. The non-Burman ethnic sees the present Burma Army wholly dominated by the Burmans and that they are not adequately presented in any way, except for the role of cannon fodder with no say in decision-making process.

One couldn't imagine, with this rigid positioning of the Burma Army,  whether the much publicized drafting of one text negotiation procedure could successfully be drawn, leading to the resolution of the conflict.

Concluding note
Actually, to break the ice on this stalemate, there has to be a political will and real desire to compromise.  In practical terms, it would mean the shelving of Burma Army's "area cleansing and control" under the pretext of protecting or upholding sovereignty and started withdrawing from immediate, contested areas and stop all offensives altogether, to give this one text procedure on ceasefire agreement draft a chance. If progress could be made on one text procedure and nationwide ceasefire could be inked, we could go on to the next step of political dialogue in the same manner.

Apart from this, another sticking point, however, would be on how to determine the role of mediator or facilitator. So far, no one has heard of the third party mediator participation.

And if government run Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) or any of its affiliated groups would enter the fray is also anybody's guess. Besides, if these groups could even be considered as neutral body is also a big question.

And again, in the end all these deliberation will boils down to constitutional amendment or rewriting it, with special emphasizes on the form of political system -  unitary or federal - and the formation of national army - federal or Burman-dominated army - to encompass and address the ongoing political woes in Burma, so that durable solution could be found.

But one thing is clear that digging-in in one's pre-conceived, entrenched position won't do us any good and will only be a hindrance to the reconciliation process.

The contributor is the General Secretary of Shan Democratic Union (SDU) - Editor